Descriptive studies on the European Union's global image reveal generally favourable feelings towards the European Union on the part of citizens outside Europe. However, European Union perceptions vary considerably across countries. This article argues that these patterns can be analytically explained by taking context and individual factors into account. European Union behaviour and an individual's supranationalist attitude should exert a substantial impact on citizens' feelings. A multi-level model confirms the expect- ations. These findings imply practically that the behaviour of the European Union and other International Organizations shapes public opinion and that it might, in the future, negatively influence global public opinion towards the European Union. ; peerReviewed
How does elite communication affect citizens attitudes towards trade agreements? Building on a growing literature on context factors influencing public opinion about trade and trade agreements; we argue that citizens rely on cues provided by political elites, especially political parties, when forming their views towards these agreements. Such cueing effects are most likely for citizens with little information about a trade agreement and for citizens receiving cues from trusted elites. In addition, citizens exposed to cues from non-trusted elites should exhibit a source-opposing effect. Our key contribution is to test these expectations relying on a survey experiment on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) carried out in Germany and Spain. The findings from our experiment support the existence of elite cueing effects, although to a limited degree. Overall, the paper contributes to a better understanding of public opinion towards TTIP, trade policy attitudes, and public opinion more generally. ; (VLID)5531071
Legitimacy is central to the functioning of global governance institutions (GGIs) such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations. There is a vibrant debate about legitimacy in International Relations, and a burgeoning literature in comparative politics on public attitudes towards the EU. Yet, these literatures rarely speak to each other, which has resulted in missed opportunities for theoretical advancements on the sources and consequences of citizens' legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis GGIs. To assist researchers in advancing on this state of the art, this research note develops a conceptualization of popular legitimacy as a multidimensional belief system including both moral convictions and self-interest. A statistical analysis of public attitudes towards the EU from 1973 to 2012 suggests that commonly used survey measures capture self-interest rather than moral beliefs. This note concludes by suggesting a research agenda intended to push theory and survey research on legitimacy beliefs towards GGIs forward.
Ein kürzlich erschienener Literaturüberblick von Cammett und Luong diskutiert den politischen Vorteil islamistischer Parteien in Nordafrika und Nahost, kann die angenommene Funktionsweise des politischen Vorteils aber nicht empirisch belegen. Durch den Rückgriff auf das Konzept der individuellen Nutzung von Heuristiken umgehen wir gängige Messprobleme und argumentieren, dass durch die von islamistischen Parteien bereitgestellten "cues" bestimmte Gruppen von BürgerInnen eine höhere Wahlwahrscheinlichkeit zugunsten eben dieser Parteien haben sollten. Der Test unseres Arguments mit Daten des Arab Barometer für das Beispiel Tunesien zeigt ein ambivalentes Bild. Während Befragte, die unverbrauchte politische Akteure bevorzugen, zu islamistischen Parteien tendieren, gilt dies für Befragte, denen die Integrität von KandidatInnen wichtig ist, entgegen unserer Erwartungen nicht. A recent literature review by Cammett and Luong discusses the political advantage of Islamist parties in North Africa and the Middle East. Yet, there is a lack of empirical evidence with regard to the mechanism through which the political advantage is assumed to work. Drawing on the concept of the individual use of heuristics, we are able to circumvent common measuring problems. We then argue that specific groups of citizens should have a higher likelihood to vote for Islamist parties as a result of the cues these parties provide. Testing our argument with data from the Arab Barometer for the Tunisian case, we find mixed results. In line with our expectations, respondents who prefer untested political actors are more likely to vote for Islamist parties, whereas – contrary to our hypothesis – respondents who value integrity are less likely to vote for these parties.
