Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Renouvier's place in nineteenth-century French thought -- Renouvier's critique of Comtean positivism -- Renouvier and mathematics -- Renouvier on evolution -- Kant, free will, and the social contract -- Hypothesis and convention in Renouvier's philosophy of science -- Conclusion

French philosopher Charles Renouvier played an influential role in reviving philosophy in France after it was proscribed during the Second Empire. Drawn to the ideals of the French Revolution, Renouvier came to recognize that the free will and civil liberties he supported were essential to the pursuit of science, contrary to the ideologies of positivists and socialists who would restrict liberty in the name of science. He struggled against monarchy and religious authority in the period up through 1848 and defended a liberal, secular form of political organization at a critical turning point in French history, the beginning of the Third Republic. As Warren Schmaus argues, Renouvier's work provides an example of one way in which philosophy of science can succeed in bringing about change in political life--by critiquing political ideologies that falsely claim absolute certainty on religious, scientific, or any other grounds. Liberty and the Pursuit of Knowledge explores the understudied relationship between Renouvier's philosophy of science and his political philosophy, shedding new light on the significance of his thought for the history of philosophy.

Although Longino and Solomon are interested in what social conditions will produce better science, neither philosopher has provided a sufficient analysis of the social character of science. For instance, neither considers the social character of discovery as well as that of justification, or that an individual scientist's social status and social relations may be important for understanding her role in both processes. The contributors to Schmitt's volume are interested in whether the terms that refer to social entities can be reduced to or eliminated in favor of terms referring to individuals. Their analyses, which proceed largely by testing their intuitions against imaginary examples, could benefit from paying more attention to actual social science and real-world social problems. Ideally, these social metaphysicians should be engaged with philosophers of science in a joint effort to investigate whether a social account of scientific knowledge can explain something that an individualist account leaves out.

Evolutionary psychologists cite Durkheim's sociology as an exemplar of an approach that takes the human mind to be largely the product of social and cultural factors with negligible contributions from biology. The author argues that on the contrary, his sociological theory of the categories is compatible with the possibility of innate cognitive capacities, taking causal cognition as his example. Whether and to what extent there are such innate capacities is a question for research in the cognitive neurosciences. The extent to which these innate capacities can then be explained by natural selection remains an open question for empirical investigation.