Suchergebnisse

In spring 2014, the military offensive in Iraq's Sunni radical group 'Islamic State' (IS), which operates from Syria, brutally confirmed the accelerated decomposition of these two states. But another country has also been dangerously weakened by this offensive: Turkey. Powerless to contain the blitzkrieg of IS, the West and the Sunni Arab 'moderates' have, in fact, the 'Kurdish bulwark' facing the jihadist onslaught. Kurdish option that embarrasses Ankara since the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan does not want to see this minority (about 15% of the inhabitants of Turkey) to strengthen beyond measure ... In any event, the Kurds appear otherwise the masters of the game, at least a major protagonist of political realignments at work in the Iraq-Syria-Turkey triangle. Adapted from the source document.

The repercussions of the conflict in Syria are being felt well beyond the country's borders. Faced with the destabilization of the entire region, Syria's neighbors are attempting to adapt to the new order as best they can. One of the countries most concerned is Turkey. Although relations between Ankara and Damascus remained cool throughout the second half of the 20th century, Turkey was one of the Assad regime's main foreign partners between 2005 and the start of the uprising in 2011. At that time, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was keen to play a leading role in the Muslim world and to export his 'model' throughout the region. In 2011, however, as the Arab Spring swept through North Africa and the Middle East, Turkey changed its strategy and stood firmly on the side of the opponents of authoritarian regimes. In the case of Syria, there's also a sectarian issue: Turkey is supporting the Sunni rebels who are attempting to overthrow the Alawite clan (affiliated to Shia Islam) to which Bashar al-Assad belongs. As the conflict becomes increasingly entrenched, however, has Ankara really made the right choice? Adapted from the source document.

For the Turks, the Treaty of Sevres symbolizes the liquidation of the Empire and the carving up of Turkey by outside forces. The historian effect of the Treaty survives in the form of a syndrome, which explains an under-siege vision of national survival. Aside from the current trend of neo-Ottomanism, entering into new, recontextualized dialogue with Europe could, perhaps, help the country form a new relationship with its history and overcome a syndrome that has been manipulated by all components of its political class. Adapted from the source document.

The army is a key player in the history of the Turkish nation. The guardian of secular government, it intervened more or less directly in Turkish politics throughout the 20th century. In recent years, however, the balance of power between the civilian and military authorities has been reversed. The electoral victory in 2002 of the A KP, a political party with Islamist roots, triggered a trial of strength which is playing out in the civilians' favor this time. By staking his future on 'deeper democracy', Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been able to challenge the army's long-standing power, privileges and hitherto untouchable legitimacy. The extent and apparent ease of the AKP's takeover has been fascinating to watch, but the Turkish army has naturally not emerged unscathed from the adjustment, which weakens it just when the country is called upon to exercise new international responsibilities. Turkey will not be able to broker stability in the Middle East if it cannot rely on a well organized army given clear duties and controlled by responsible political leaders. Adapted from the source document.

Popular tensions in the Middle East have erupted into the streets in an unprecedented wave of protests this year. Old regimes have toppled, with others set to follow in their wake. But what type of government will replace them? Few imagine that these former dictatorships will transition rapidly into Western-style secular democracies. At the same time, the people seem little inclined to hand power back to religious parties, as they did in Iran. In this respect, Turkey stands as a compelling compromise. Power in Ankara is exercised by the AK Party, which describes itself as "moderate Islamist", with liberal economic policies and a determination to reduce the influence of the country's once all-powerful army. The Turkish model is not without its drawbacks, however. The AK Party has shown itself to be increasingly authoritarian and ever more determined to impose strict religious standards in public life. While countries emerging from decades of dictatorship could learn much from the Turkish model, it is far from a 'cure-all' remedy. Adapted from the source document.

The start of negotiations with the European Union was good news for Ankara, an encouraging token of success. However, the slow progression & absence of perspective in negotiations has made the good news start to seem like failure. Public opinion & government policy seem to have fallen in line on the issue, & Turkey rethink its desire for a rapprochement with the EU. This turn comes in the midst of a fast-paced redefinition of the field of influence of a dynamic diplomacy & a regional boom. Adapted from the source document.

An introduction to the first part of the current volume of Politique Etrangiere outlines the scope of the papers in this part, which focus on the negotiations of Turkey with the European Union and its chances of possible EU membership. Adapted from the source document.