Suchergebnisse

The model of the "ensuring state" determines also the reform agenda of the German labor market, evidenced for instance in slogans such as "Fordern & Fordern" (actively supporting & demanding). The article defines the most important elements of this model & tests the concept using the reformed German "Federal Agency for Labour" as an example. Objectives & experiences of these reforms are compared with the analytical & normative premises of the "ensuring state" in order to sharpen & to modify them. References. Adapted from the source document.

Ökonomische Erklärungen haben sich gegenüber der anhaltenden Massenarbeitslosigkeit als unzureichend erwiesen, so daß die Bedingungen für Vollbeschäftigung nunmehr zunehmend in den gesellschaftlichen Entscheidungsstrukturen gesucht werden. "Die Fundamente einer politisch-institutionellen Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit sind neu zu durchdenken. Der vorliegende Essay ... kritisiert vor allem die Auffassung, daß der Arbeitsmarkt wie ein 'Bananenmarkt' funktionieren könnte und entwickelt die konzeptionellen Grundlagen für eine Theorie des organisierten Arbeitsmarktes. Abschließend wird die wachsende Rolle der Arbeitsmarktpolitik für die Vollbeschäftigungspolitik der Zukunft begründet." (PVS)

The issue of financing labor market policy is examined as a vehicle for finding a solution for mass unemployment. After developing an analytical framework, systems of financing in Austria, France, GB, Sweden, the US, & the Federal Republic of Germany are briefly described, & the effects of different financing systems on expenditures are analyzed as an essential element in fighting unemployment. Financial systems influence the level & the structure of labor market policy, which in turn have allocational & distributional effects. Lessons are drawn from the international comparison, focusing on the German case. Institutional incongruity -- ie, a mismatch between organizational structures & functions -- may lead political decisionmakers to behave in a generally unexpected way, & channel the effects of political programs in unintended directions. 4 Tables, 36 References. Modified HA

In this paper we explore the impact of political factors on redistribution across the states in the German Landerfinanzausgleich. From a public choice perspective the smaller states are supposed to have a higher influence on decisions in the second legislative chamber due to a lower shadow price of their votes, which implies a higher bargaining power. As the federal government's policy depends on a majority in the second chamber there is an incentive to buy smaller states' votes. Controlling for GDP per capita, we find statistically significant support for our hypotheses. 3 Tables, 35 References. Adapted from the source document.