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AbstractIn this article, I present the second version of the Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index (CITRIX 2.0). It measures the inclusiveness of regulations for immigrants' access to citizenship across 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2019, zooming in on four essential policy components: conditions regarding (1) birthright; (2) residence; (3) renunciation; and (4) integration. While explaining the construction of the dataset, I advance a synthetic approach to index methodology. The main idea of this approach is to use statistical dimensionality tests to validate deductively specified additive concept structures. This is the first lesson we can learn from CITRIX. After validating the index in terms of content, dimensionality, and convergence, a short empirical analysis presents two additional lessons. First, after two cycles of liberalization and subsequent restrictive turns, mostly in integration conditions, aggregate citizenship policy inclusiveness has stagnated, but liberalized overall. 2003 marks the peak of liberalization. Second, there has been long‐term convergence constituted by two phases of convergence with one diverging phase in between. I conclude that liberalization is more limited, and convergence more pronounced, than often assumed. CITRIX offers a versatile toolbox for future research to explore citizenship policies and their correlates. Regular updates are planned.

In this article, I present the second version of the Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness Index (CITRIX 2.0). It measures the inclusiveness of regulations for immigrants' access to citizenship across 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2019, zooming in on four essential policy components: conditions regarding (1) birthright; (2) residence; (3) renunciation; and (4) integration. While explaining the construction of the dataset, I advance a synthetic approach to index methodology. The main idea of this approach is to use statistical dimensionality tests to validate deductively specified additive concept structures. This is the first lesson we can learn from CITRIX. After validating the index in terms of content, dimensionality, and convergence, a short empirical analysis presents two additional lessons. First, after two cycles of liberalization and subsequent restrictive turns, mostly in integration conditions, aggregate citizenship policy inclusiveness has stagnated, but liberalized overall. 2003 marks the peak of liberalization. Second, there has been long-term convergence constituted by two phases of convergence with one diverging phase in between. I conclude that liberalization is more limited, and convergence more pronounced, than often assumed. CITRIX offers a versatile toolbox for future research to explore citizenship policies and their correlates. Regular updates are planned.

AbstractIn this article, I introduce a typology that maps the regulation of two fundamental boundaries of modern nation-states regarding immigration: territorial boundaries and membership boundaries. Based on a theory of the structural logics underlying Immigration Regime Openness (IRO) and Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI), I make four observations on the two-dimensional policy space determined by the relative porousness of these two boundaries. First, a Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CATPCA) using a combination of original and existing panel data across 23 liberal democracies from 1980 to 2010 confirms that IRO and CRI are internally consistent and statistically distinct dimensions. Immigration policies therefore appear more coherent than often assumed. Second, the distribution of cases over the four ideal-typical policy configurations from 1980 to 2010 shows that more and more cases combine relatively liberal immigration policies with relatively liberal citizenship policies. Behind this finding are, third, overall liberalizing trajectories in both policies as well as a pattern of convergence in immigration policies. The liberalisation of immigration policies is most notable until 1996 and the level of openness fluctuates thereafter. Regarding citizenship, I provide evidence for a much-cited restrictive turn during the 2000s. In addition, I show that there has already been a restrictive turn in citizenship during the 1990s. Fourth, instead of the trade-off anticipated by much of the literature, I find an increasingly positive correlation between IRO and CRI. The new typology, its underlying theory, and the subsequent findings significantly advance our understanding of the most fundamental boundaries of modern nation-states.

First published online: 20 July 2020 ; In this article, I introduce a typology that maps the regulation of two fundamental boundaries of modern nation-states regarding immigration: territorial boundaries and membership boundaries. Based on a theory of the structural logics underlying Immigration Regime Openness (IRO) and Citizenship Regime Inclusiveness (CRI), I make four observations on the two-dimensional policy space determined by the relative porousness of these two boundaries. First, a Categorical Principal Component Analysis (CATPCA) using a combination of original and existing panel data across 23 liberal democracies from 1980 to 2010 confirms that IRO and CRI are internally consistent and statistically distinct dimensions. Immigration policies therefore appear more coherent than often assumed. Second, the distribution of cases over the four ideal-typical policy configurations from 1980 to 2010 shows that more and more cases combine relatively liberal immigration policies with relatively liberal citizenship policies. Behind this finding are, third, overall liberalizing trajectories in both policies as well as a pattern of convergence in immigration policies. The liberalisation of immigration policies is most notable until 1996 and the level of openness fluctuates thereafter. Regarding citizenship, I provide evidence for a much-cited restrictive turn during the 2000s. In addition, I show that there has already been a restrictive turn in citizenship during the 1990s. Fourth, instead of the trade-off anticipated by much of the literature, I find an increasingly positive correlation between IRO and CRI. The new typology, its underlying theory, and the subsequent findings significantly advance our understanding of the most fundamental boundaries of modern nation-states.

Due to a lack of data, quantitative analysis of integration policy trends during the past decade has received limited attention. This research note presents newly collected data from the Migrant Integration Policy Index, which includes information on several different policy areas related to migrant integration in 36 EU and OECD countries between 2010 and 2019. Employing a wide set of methods, we investigate whether migrant integration policies have become more liberal or restrictive and whether they have converged across these countries during this period. We find that overall these policies have become more liberal, except in non-EU countries as well as in the areas of family reunion and permanent residence. However, the magnitude of these changes is rather small. We also show that there has been a trend of convergence in integration policy, which varies in intensity across policy areas. We conclude that while migrants' rights have been extended, long-term settlement has been limited. The popular idea that this decade, marked by crises, has triggered a comprehensive restrictive backlash in migrant integration policies is refuted.

Published online: 12 Mar 2020 ; Elaborating a popular assumption about the effects of immigration policies on the integration of migrants, we argue in this article that more restrictive immigration policies lead to the selection of immigrants with greater integration potential, and that this selection should foster migrant integration. To test this argument, we combine country-level data from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) database with individual-level data on economic, political and social integration from multiple rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) across 22 European countries. We show that, first, more restrictive immigration policies do not increase the likelihood of more educated migrants to be admitted, but they do make it more likely for migrants from European OECD countries to be admitted, while making it less likely for migrants outside the OECD. Second, we find that immigration policies affect some forms of economic, political and social integration outcomes, but mostly for immigrants from non-OECD countries. We conclude that immigration policies do affect integration outcomes but that these effects are small and limited to specific integration outcomes and migrants from specific regions. Our study, therefore, relativises the underlying popular assumption that immigration restrictions foster migrant integration, bearing important implications for the currently salient debates on immigration policy-making.

Elaborating a popular assumption about the effects of immigration policies on the integration of migrants, we argue in this article that more restrictive immigration policies lead to the selection of immigrants with greater integration potential, and that this selection should foster migrant integration. To test this argument, we combine country-level data from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) database with individual-level data on economic, political and social integration from multiple rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) across 22 European countries. We show that, first, more restrictive immigration policies do not increase the likelihood of more educated migrants to be admitted, but they do make it more likely for migrants from European OECD countries to be admitted, while making it less likely for migrants outside the OECD. Second, we find that immigration policies affect some forms of economic, political and social integration outcomes, but mostly for immigrants from non-OECD countries. We conclude that immigration policies do affect integration outcomes but that these effects are small and limited to specific integration outcomes and migrants from specific regions. Our study, therefore, relativises the underlying popular assumption that immigration restrictions foster migrant integration, bearing important implications for the currently salient debates on immigration policy-making.

Elaborating a popular assumption about the effects of immigration policies on the integration of migrants, we argue in this article that more restrictive immigration policies lead to the selection of immigrants with greater integration potential, and that this selection should foster migrant integration. To test this argument, we combine country-level data from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) database with individual-level data on economic, political and social integration from multiple rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) across 22 European countries. We show that, first, more restrictive immigration policies do not increase the likelihood of more educated migrants to be admitted, but they do make it more likely for migrants from European OECD countries to be admitted, while making it less likely for migrants outside the OECD. Second, we find that immigration policies affect some forms of economic, political and social integration outcomes, but mostly for immigrants from non-OECD countries. We conclude that immigration policies do affect integration outcomes but that these effects are small and limited to specific integration outcomes and migrants from specific regions. Our study, therefore, relativises the underlying popular assumption that immigration restrictions foster migrant integration, bearing important implications for the currently salient debates on immigration policy-making.

First Online: 14 February 2019 ; The electoral franchise has become more universal as restrictions based on criteria such as sex or property have been lifted throughout the process of democratisation. Yet, a broad range of exclusions has persisted to this date, making the suffrage non-universal, even in established democracies. In this article, we present ELECLAW, a new set of indicators that captures the subtle and variegated legal landscape of persisting electoral rights restrictions. We measure the inclusiveness of the right to vote and the right to stand as candidate across four levels and three types of elections for three categories of voters: citizen residents, non-citizen residents, and non-resident citizens. ELECLAW currently covers fifty-one democracies in three different continents (the Americas, Europe, and Oceania) depicting the legal situation in 2015. The article introduces the methodology used for building the indicators so as to make it transparent to the broader research community. To this aim, it successively unpacks the conceptualisation underlying the indicators, explains the measurement by providing specific examples, and discusses the merits of a differentiated and context-driven method of aggregation.

First published: 28 October 2016 ; Awarded the JCMS 2017 Best Article Prize ; With the help of the Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX), a quantitative tool for measuring the electoral inclusion of immigrants, we demonstrate that European democracies are much more exclusive than they should be. All normative theories of democracy share the conviction that it is imperative that democracies include long-term immigrant residents into the demos – either by granting citizenship or by introducing alien voting rights. But even the 20 most established and stable democracies within the EU are far from fully realizing the ideal of 'universal suffrage'. This is true independently of whether we count in- and excluded people in numerical terms, or whether we evaluate the relevant laws and regulations. Therefore, we diagnose a substantial democratic deficit on the level of European nation-states. By requiring its member states to enfranchise non-national EU citizens on the local level, the EU, for once, plays a positive role in reducing one of the most fundamental democratic deficits in times of migration.

AbstractWith the help of the Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX), a quantitative tool for measuring the electoral inclusion of immigrants, we demonstrate that European democracies are much more exclusive than they should be. All normative theories of democracy share the conviction that it is imperative that democracies include long‐term immigrant residents into the demos – either by granting citizenship or by introducing alien voting rights. But even the 20 most established and stable democracies within the EU are far from fully realizing the ideal of 'universal suffrage'. This is true independently of whether we count in‐ and excluded people in numerical terms, or whether we evaluate the relevant laws and regulations. Therefore, we diagnose a substantial democratic deficit on the level of European nation‐states. By requiring its member states to enfranchise non‐national EU citizens on the local level, the EU, for once, plays a positive role in reducing one of the most fundamental democratic deficits in times of migration.