Suchergebnisse

Danmark har konsekvent været blandt de lande i NATO, som anvender den laveste andel af BNP på forsvar. Artiklen behandler, hvordan amerikanske og danske beslutningstagere har italesat dansk forsvarspolitik i forbindelse med den igangværende byrdedelingsdebat i NATO og alliancens seneste byrdedelingsdebat, der fandt sted i slutningen 1970'erne og første halvdel af 1980'erne. Der argumenteres i artiklen for, at der er kontinuitet i de argumenter, der fremføres fra amerikansk side i forsøg på at påvirke dansk forsvarspolitik, og som danske aktører anvender for at retfærdiggøre, hvorfor Danmark ikke lever op til NATO's byrdedelingsmålsætninger. Amerikanske aktører forsøger således konsekvent i byrdedelingsdebatterne at påvirke dansk forsvarspolitik ved at påpege, at politikken er usolidarisk, at opfyldelse af målsætningerne er i dansk egeninteresse, og ved at skabe usikkerhed om udsigten til amerikanske forstærkninger, mens danske aktører dels anvender de gældende forsvarsforlig som værn mod kortsigtede ændringer, dels argumenterer for, at mindre end opfyldelse af byrdedelingsmålsætningerne også er acceptabelt. En konsekvens af den manglende målopfyldelse kan vise sig at blive, at Danmark mister sin position i det gode selskab i NATO. Dette gælder ikke mindst i en tid, hvor der er mindre efterspørgsel efter styrkebidrag til internationale operationer.
Abstract in English:Burden-sharing Debates in NATO and Danish Defence PolicyDenmark has consistently been among the countries in NATO that spend the lowest share of GDP on defence. This article explores how American and Danish decision-makers have articulated Danish defence policy in relation to the ongoing burden-sharing debate in NATO and the Alliance's most recent burden-sharing debate, which took place in the late 1970s and first half of the 1980s. The article argues that there is continuity in the arguments put forward by the United States in attempts to influence Danish defence policy and by Danish actors to justify why Denmark does not live up to NATO's burden-sharing guidelines. In the burden-sharing debates American actors thus consistently try to influence Danish defence policy by pointing out that the policy is an expression of a lack of solidarity, that fulfilment of the objectives is in Danish self-interest, and by creating uncertainty about the prospect of American reinforcements. Danish actors, on the other hand, use existing defence agreements as a bulwark against short-term changes and argue that not meeting the burden-sharing objectives is acceptable. A consequence of not meeting the guidelines may result in Denmark losing its position as part of the good company in NATO. In times where force contributions to international operations are in less demand this is even more likely.

Nordic states' partnership choices in security and defence are more aligned than they were a decade ago. When Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish government officials now identify key security challenges and partners, and reflect on the potential for Nordic cooperation, they have the same reference points and use similar wording. Since 2014, the toolbox for Nordic defence cooperation has also solidified and different formal affiliations with NATO and the EU seem to matter less than before. Furthermore, an array of multi- and minilateral cooperation structures have emerged across and beyond the EU and NATO, expanding the possibilities for Nordic cooperation under a larger Euro-Atlantic umbrella. However, two limitations remain: First, Nordic security and defence cooperation still remains subordinate to and a supplement rather than an alternative to NATO. Second, putting Nordic response mechanisms into practice remains dependent not only on the context and issue at stake, but also on the political appetite of the individual Nordic governments to choose a Nordic solution. ; publishedVersion

The Danish defence opt-out will hamper the protection of Danish interests if, in the future, there is dynamic integration, working towards increased European strategic autonomy. Conversely, the defence opt-out will be less important if the EU's defence cooperation stagnates or is rolled back, for example due to internal disagreement among the member states. These were the main findings in the external DIIS report from 2019 that has now been translated to English. The report was commissioned by the Danish government in November 2018 and focuses on the development in the EU in the field of security and defence policy cooperation and its significance for Denmark. Picking up from the last DIIS report (2008), the new report focuses in particular on the period following the launch of the EU's global strategy in the summer of 2016. The analysis is based on interviews with experts, officials and representatives from the EU, NATO, Denmark and other Member States, as well as case files in the archive of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, official documents, and existing research.