Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of figures -- List of tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Exploring the causes and consequences of international institutions' politicization -- 2 A theory of politicization: driving forces and conditioning contexts -- 3 The politicization of global tax governance: descriptive findings -- 4 How international authority and policy output drive politicization -- 5 How international authority and domestic context shape differentiated patterns of politicization -- 6 Conclusion: the varied politicization of global tax governance -- Appendices -- Appendix 1 Level and scope of formal authority, 1981-2011 -- Appendix 2 Formal political authority of EU and OECD, 1981-2011 -- Appendix 3 EU formal external authority in Switzerland -- Appendix 4 Codebook -- Index

Why has global tax governance been politicized and how can we explain the varying intensity and content of public debates? This book offers an integrated theory of the politicization of international institutions and a detailed account of how the institutional design and policy output of tax governance by the EU and OECD have developed over time. Offering the first in-depth empirical analysis to compare politicization across international institutions, it blends institutionalist explanations that focus on the growing authority of international institutions, and sociological and political economy approaches that take into account domestic context. Exploring why and how international institutions have become increasingly contested in the 21st century, this book will be of particular interest to the scholars of the transfer of authority from the nation-state to international institutions, and the societal repercussions and political struggles that connect these processes. Researchers in the fields of political science, international relations, sociology, and political communication will also find it useful and insightful.

Legitimacy communication in the media reveals when elites become attentive to international organizations' (IOs) legitimacy and whether they support or question their legitimacy. The intensity and tone of this communication results in communicative support or legitimacy pressures on IOs. Extant research gives few insights into the scope and nature of elite legitimacy communication and the factors that shape it. This article offers a comparative and longitudinal analysis of the patterns of elite communication in the media. It maps and explains variation in the intensity and tone of legitimacy communication based on a quantitative content analysis of roughly 6500 legitimacy evaluations of the EU, the G8, and the UN in the quality press of four established democracies. A multinomial logistic regression analysis yields three key results. First, in contrast to conventional expectations, there is no clear shift from low intensity and positive tone to high intensity and negative tone. Second, communication intensity is considerably higher for powerful IOs. Third, political events, including security crises and institutional reform, are important drivers of the ebbs and flows of western elites' communicative support and pressure on major IOs.

Die Vereinten Nationen repräsentieren aufgrund ihrer intergouvernementalen Entscheidungsstrukturen einerseits und der nahezu universellen Mitgliedschaft andererseits den Typus der klassischen internationalen Organisation. Als eine der prägenden Institutionen der Nachkriegsgeschichte orientiert sich die UNO bis heute weitgehend am Prinzip des exekutiven Multilateralismus. Entscheidungen werden parlaments- und öffentlichkeitsfern getroffen und dienen vor allem der zwischenstaatlichen Koordinierung nationaler Politiken. Somit liegt die Erwartung nahe, dass das Legitimationsprofil der Vereinten Nationen, also die Art und Weise, wie sie in der öffentlichen Kommunikation bewertet werden, weiterhin an den herkömmlichen Effektivitätsmaßstäben zwischenstaatlicher Politik orientiert ist und demokratiebezogene Bewertungskriterien seltener zum Einsatz kommen. In der vorliegenden Studie werden die Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten von vier Öffentlichkeiten (Deutschland, Schweiz, Großbritannien, USA) bei den Legitimitätsbewertungen der Vereinten Nationen sowie die Entwicklung der Diskurse im Zeitraum 1998-2007 untersucht. Es wird herausgearbeitet, welche Teilaspekte des Regimes Gegenstand des öffentlichen Interesses sind (Legitimationsobjekte) und welche Maßstäbe für deren Bewertungen vornehmlich herangezogen werden (Legitimationsmuster). Die Ergebnisse werden hinsichtlich der Frage diskutiert, ob die Legitimität der Vereinten Nationen als gesichert, prekär oder krisenhaft zu bewerten ist. (ICI2)

AbstractRecent decades have seen an intensification of international organizations' (IOs) attempts to justify their authority. The existing research suggests that IO representatives have scaled up self-legitimation to defend their organizations' legitimacy in light of public criticism. In contrast, this article demonstrates that IOs intensify self-legitimation to mobilize additional support from relevant audiences when their authority increases. We argue that self-legitimation aims primarily to achieve proactive legitimacy expansion instead of reactive legitimacy protection. We develop this argument in three steps. First, we draw on organizational sociology and management studies to theorize the connection between self-legitimation and an organization's life stages. Second, we introduce a novel dataset on the self-legitimation of 28 regional IOs between 1980 and 2019 and show that the intensity of self-legitimation evolves in phases. Third, we provide a multivariate statistical analysis and a brief vignette on the African Union, both of which indicate that IOs that shift from unanimity or consensus to majority voting tend to intensify self-legitimation.

AbstractHow can we measure and explain the precision of international organizations' (IOs) founding treaties? We define precision by its negative – imprecision – as indeterminate language that intentionally leaves a wide margin of interpretation for actors after agreements enter into force. Compiling a "dictionary of imprecision" from almost 500 scholarly contributions and leveraging insight from linguists that a single vague word renders the whole sentence vague, we introduce a dictionary-based measure of imprecision (DIMI) that is replicable, applicable to all written documents, and yields a continuous measure bound between zero and one. To demonstrate that DIMI usefully complements existing approaches and advances the study of (im-)precision, we apply it to a sample of 76 IOs. Our descriptive results show high face validity and closely track previous characterizations of these IOs. Finally, we explore patterns in the data, expecting that imprecision in IO treaties increases with the number of states, power asymmetries, and the delegation of authority, while it decreases with the pooling of authority. In a sample of major IOs, we find robust empirical support for the power asymmetries and delegation propositions. Overall, DIMI provides exciting new avenues to study precision in International Relations and beyond.

AbstractInternational organizations' (IOs) power in shaping global governance outcomes is not only determined by the formal delegation of tasks and issue areas but also by the necessary capabilities to fulfill these tasks. Yet, extant research on the delegation of power to IOs gives few insights into the financial and staff capabilities of IOs and focuses mainly on the formal rules that specify IOs' tasks and issue scope. To address these limitations, this paper makes three contributions. First, we propose a more encompassing concept of IO power which incorporates three principal components: tasks, issue scope, and capabilities. Second, we introduce a new concept – IO empowerment (IOE) – which encapsulates formal and informal changes in IO power over time. Third, we introduce a novel dataset on IO capabilities, which measures the formal rules governing IO staff and financial resources as well as the actual capabilities available to six well‐known IOs over 65 years. These original data show that capabilities vary not only across IOs but also over time.

International organizations' (IOs) power in shaping global governance outcomes is not only determined by the formal delegation of tasks and issue areas but also by the necessary capabilities to fulfill these tasks. Yet, extant research on the delegation of power to IOs gives few insights into the financial and staff capabilities of IOs and focuses mainly on the formal rules that specify IOs' tasks and issue scope. To address these limitations, this paper makes three contributions. First, we propose a more encompassing concept of IO power which incorporates three principal components: tasks, issue scope, and capabilities. Second, we introduce a new concept – IO empowerment (IOE) – which encapsulates formal and informal changes in IO power over time. Third, we introduce a novel dataset on IO capabilities, which measures the formal rules governing IO staff and financial resources as well as the actual capabilities available to six well‐known IOs over 65 years. These original data show that capabilities vary not only across IOs but also over time.

AbstractThe article presents a top-down approach to the study of the empirical legitimacy of international institutions. It starts from the observation that international institutions' representatives are engaged in various strategies aimed at cultivating generalised support. The article asserts that such strategies should be taken into account to gain deeper insights into the legitimation process of international institutions. To systematise these legitimation efforts and facilitate their empirical analysis, the article introduces the concept of legitimation strategies, which are defined as goal-oriented activities employed to establish and maintain a reliable basis of diffuse support. An analytical differentiation between three types of legitimation strategies is introduced depending on the addressees of legitimation strategies, that is, member state governments, international institutions' staff, and the wider public. The applicability of the concept and the relevance of legitimation strategies for international institutions' communication, behaviour, and institutional design is demonstrated by an empirical analysis of the G8's and the IMF's reaction to legitimation crises in the recent past of both institutions. In addition, the case studies suggest that a balanced set of legitimation strategies that takes into account the legitimacy concerns of all three constituencies is more likely to be successful in improving legitimacy perceptions.