Suchergebnisse

"Is moral philosophy more foundational than political philosophy? In other words, is "how to live?" more fundamental than "how to live together?" We were trained to say yes, but there was never any reason to believe it. Must rigorous reflection on how to live aim to derive necessary truths from timeless axioms, ignoring ephemeral contingencies of time and place? In the 1800s, philosophy left the contingencies to emerging departments of social science. Where did that leave philosophy? Did cutting ties to empirical reality checks leave philosophers with deeper questions? Better answers? Here too, our practices suggest that we assume the answer is yes, but the truth appears to be no. To recover a measure of relevance to questions that truly need answers, theorizing about how to live together might take its cue from philosophy's current renewing of ties with political economy. We can ask which principles have a history of demonstrably being organizing principles of actual thriving communities at their best"--

Moral philosophy begins with a question of how to live. Is moral philosophy more foundational than political philosophy? In other words, is "how to live?" more fundamental than "how to live together?" Philosophers were taught to say yes, but there was never any reason to believe it. Must rigorous reflection on how to live aim to derive necessary truths from timeless axioms, ignoring ephemeral circumstances of time and place? In the 1800s, philosophy left the contingencies to emerging departments of social science. How did that work out for philosophy? Did opportunities to cut ties to empirical reality checks leave us with better questions? Better answers? Philosophy wants to say yes, but the truth appears to be no. To recover a measure of relevance to questions that truly need answers, theorizing about how to live together might take its cue from philosophy's current effort to reconnect with political economy. Philosophers can ask whether any principles have a history of demonstrably being organizing principles of actual thriving communities at their best.

Introduction -- Choosing strategies -- Choosing ends -- Reasons for altruism -- What Nozick did for decision theory / (by David Schmidtz and Sarah Wright) -- How to deserve -- Separateness, suffering, and moral theory -- Moral dualism -- Diminishing marginal utility -- Guarantees -- The institution of property -- Reinventing the commons / (by David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott) -- Natural enemies -- Are all species equal?

The neighboorhood of justice -- The basic concept -- A variety of contestants -- Contextual functionalism -- What is theory -- Desert -- What did I do to deserve this? -- Deserving a chance -- Deserving and earning -- Grounding desert -- Desert as an institutional artifact -- The limits of desert -- Reciprocity -- What is reciprocity? -- Varieties of reciprocity -- Debts to society and the problem of double counting -- The limits of reciprocity -- Equality -- Does equal trreatment imply equal shares -- What is equality for? -- Equal pay for equal work -- Equality and opportunity -- On the utility of equal shares -- The limits of equality -- Need -- Hierarchies of need -- Need as a distributive principle -- Beyond the numbers -- What do we need? -- Intellectual debts -- Rawls -- Nozick -- Rectification -- Two kinds of arbitrary -- Procedural versus distributive justice.

AbstractPoverty can be an ephemeral life stage of a young person whose skill sets will become more valuable with training and experience, a personal setback such as losing a job, or a systemic affliction that puts a whole community in danger of widespread famine. A common theme of this volume's essays is that we cannot understand poverty and famine unless we acknowledge that poor people are not mouths to be fed but agents. Amartya Sen got this right, crediting Adam Smith for the seeds of his insight. What has been enabling people by the billions since Smith's time to work their way out of poverty?

AbstractSometimes, we see crises coming. Sometimes, we can muster the resources we need to respond effectively. Sometimes, we can acquire the information we need to respond effectively.

AbstractRawlsian theory notoriously claims that basic principles of justice apply to the design of a society's basic structure. G. A. Cohen found it disturbingly convenient to treat fundamental principles as merely political rather than personal—that is, as applying exclusively to questions of institutional design and saying nothing about how to live. Instead, to Cohen, a sincere champion of egalitarian principles would, as they say, "walk the talk."

AbstractTechnological innovations and scientific discoveries do not occur in a vacuum but instead leave us needing to reimagine what we thought we knew about the human condition.

Abstract
This essay introduces basic issues that make up the topic of freedom of thought, including newly emerging issues raised by the current proliferation of Internet search algorithms.

AbstractOur modern observation-based approaches to the study of the human condition were shaped by the Scottish Enlightenment. Political Economy emerged as a discipline of its own in the nineteenth century, then fragmented further around the dawn of the twentieth century. Today, we see Political Economy's pieces being reassembled and reunited with their philosophical roots. This issue pauses to reflect on the history of this new but also old field of study.

Which social arrangements have a history of fostering progress and prosperity? One quick answer, falsely attributed to Adam Smith, holds that we are guided as if by an invisible hand to do what builds the wealth of nations. A more sober answer, closer to what Smith said and believed, is thatifthe right framework of rules—plus decent officiating—steers us away from buying and selling monopoly privilege and steers us toward being valuable to the people around us, we indeed will be part of the engine that drives human progress and the wealth of nations.

Abstract:Over the past decade, political philosophers and political theorists have had a
common purpose: to reflect on the merits of realism and idealism when theorizing
about the human condition and the nature of justice. We have settled that no one
is against being realistic or against being idealistic per se. The contributions
to this volume represent a conversation about what would make one attempt to
articulate ideals better than another.