Suchergebnisse

Abstract
The present paper is a commentary on the article "The relationship between Taxation, Accounting and Legal Forms", which has already been published in AEL: A Convivium. The article deals with Controlled Foreign Corporation rules (CFC rules) from a profit-seeking perspective. It develops tax schemes and assumes them to be adequate means to avoiding the Austrian or German CFC rules. This commentary argues that from the perspective of a critical rationalist methodology, the topic and the findings of the article need to be viewed with some reservation. A substantial objection applies to the article's statement that the developed tax schemes are adequate to achieve the end of optimising the effective tax rate. However, there is the even more substantial objection that neither the developed tax schemes nor the end of optimising the effective tax rate without taking the interests of society systematically into account are legitimate. However, the article fails to address the major societal issue of how to reduce tax avoidance.

This paper asks if we can support by argument the norm "we should hold firms responsible". From a critical rationalist perspective, answering this question has an ethical and an empirical dimension. The ethical dimension discusses whether we should hold firms socially responsible for ethical reasons. However, since demanding that we should hold firms responsible requires that we can hold them responsible, this paper focuses on this empirical dimension. Thus, this paper asks whether we can hold firms responsible for theoretical reasons. Theoretical reasons means that this paper refers to theories of the firm and in particular to their hypotheses about the behaviour of firms and firm members. The paper finds that the nexus of contracts approach (which is the economic mainstream theory of the firm) ascribes behaviour to the firm that corresponds to the firm members' behaviour. In consequence, we would not have reasons to ascribe responsibility to the firm from a social science perspective. Since the nexus of contracts approach is not adequate from a critical rationalist perspective, however, this paper develops an extended corporate actors approach. In contrast to the nexus of contacts approach, the extended corporate actors approach ascribes behaviour to the firm that differs from firm members' actions. Thus, we do have reasons to ascribe responsibility to the firm from a social science perspective.

Abstract
Business administration argues that means-end-analysis in the interest of firms does not need to take the interests of other actors into account. Its implicit or explicit reason is that there is a harmony between firm goals and the interests of other actors. This study objects from a critical rationalist perspective that such harmony hypotheses are not empirically confirmed. Because of this, actors are not truly free to pursue their own interests. Instead, this study argues that actors on markets are allowed to pursue their own interests as long as they consider the legitimate interests of other actors at the same time. The study goes on to show how business administration should analyze means-end-statements that try to realize this market value.

Zusammenfassung
Gleichmäßigkeit der Besteuerung hat neben einer ethischen eine erfahrungswissenschaftliche Dimension. Im Hinblick auf diese erfahrungswissenschaftliche Dimension stellt sich die Frage, wie Gleichmäßigkeit der Besteuerung durch ökonomische Theorien konkretisiert werden kann und auf welche ökonomischen Theorien rekurriert werden sollte. Das hier vorgelegte Ergebnis lautet, dass sich Gleichmäßigkeit der Besteuerung neoklassisch und evolutorisch fundieren lässt. Neoklassische Gleichmäßigkeit wird in der Betriebswirtschaftlichen Steuerlehre als neoklassische Entscheidungsneutralität konkretisiert. Neoklassische Gleichmäßigkeit hat ihr theoretisches Fundament in der neoklassischen Steuerwirkungstheorie und wird aus der neoklassischen Wohlfahrtsökonomik hergeleitet. Evolutorische Gleichmäßigkeit wird hier als Verringerung von Steuerausweichentscheidungen konkretisiert. Sie basiert auf dem von Viktor Vanberg vertretenen evolutorischen Ansatz. Die Entscheidung für neoklassische oder evolutorische Gleichmäßigkeit hängt davon ab, ob man Realitätsgehalt und Widerspruchsfreiheit oder methodische Stringenz stärker gewichtet. Nach hier vertretener Auffassung ist eine realitätsnähere, widerspruchsfreie, wenn auch weniger stringente evolutorische Gleichmäßigkeit gegenüber einer neoklassischen Gleichmäßigkeit vorzuziehen.

"Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, ob in wirtschaftsethischer Perspektive Argumente für den Straftatbestand Steuerhinterziehung sprechen. Die Analyse erfolgt auf der Grundlage eines vertragstheoretischen Bezugsrahmens und der Situationslogik Poppers. Sie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass in dieser Perspektive Gründe für einen Straftatbestand Steuerhinterziehung angeführt werden können, die durch entgegenstehende Argumentationen im ökonomischen Schrifttum nicht in Frage gestellt werden. Die hier vorgelegte Begründung eines solchen Straftatbestands wirkt sich auf zahlreiche Besteuerungsfragen aus." (Autorenreferat)

AbstractThis paper examines whether a one-book-system that takes the commercial law profit definition as tax base (the so-called authoritative principle) is adequate from an evolutionary point of view. We consider firstly the case that European International Financial Reporting Standards (EU-IFRS) are relevant for all statements with the authoritative principle based on EU-IFRS. Secondly, we examine the fact that EU-IFRS focus on the consolidated annual accounts and that the national accounting principles are relevant for individual statements. Tax law analysis under genuine uncertainty requires a framework and we present such a framework. It entails an interpretation of equality of taxation, a hypothesis on the functioning of markets, an interpretation of realizable and desirable market goals, tax effects hypotheses, and action hypotheses for personal and corporate companies under genuine uncertainty. Contrary to the mainstream of accounting literature, from our evolutionary point of view, the authoritative principle is adequate. The reason is that commercial profit is an adequate instrument to achieving the tax goal equality of taxation in the sense of reducing expectable tax avoidance decisions. This is the case because according to evolutionary action hypotheses as well as tax effects hypotheses, commercial profit can be a subjectively rational decision criterion for personal and corporate companies alike. Equality of taxation is for its part in line with the evolutionarily interpreted social values freedom of choice and equality before the law. Since we focus on the question if the existing commercial profit concept can be an adequate tax base, we do not discuss whether we would have more reasons to take a conservative profit concept as tax base rather than EU-IFRS. Just as little, we analyze whether it is better to take EU-IFRS profit as tax base although national accounting principles are relevant for individual statements.

Abstract
International tax law is characterized by the arm's length principle. However, the arm's length principle is highly criticized since it is seen as a major driver of tax avoidance. Although the OECD's Two-Pillar Solution and EU initiatives seem to indicate that international tax law is in a state of change, the arm's length principle remains relevant. Therefore, we deal with the question whether it is possible to improve the arm's length principle. While previous attempts ask, for example, whether it is possible to reduce its complexity, we focus on the aspect that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not refer to a theory of the formation of prices in transactions between independent parties. We advocate developing a theoretical substantiation and introduce a new interpretation of the arm's length principle, based mainly on concepts of a general evolutionary theory and political-cultural market theory. This reference to an adequate market theory leads us to a new interpretation of the arm's length principle that differs considerably from the current interpretation. Still, we doubt that this new interpretation of the arm's length principle alone can reduce tax avoidance significantly. However, understood as one instrument in a mix of instruments, we estimate that this interpretation of the arm's length principle constitutes a more adequate means for fighting tax avoidance of multinational corporate groups than its current interpretation.