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Tallinn Manual 2.0 expands on the highly influential first edition by extending its coverage of the international law governing cyber operations to peacetime legal regimes. The product of a three-year follow-on project by a new group of twenty renowned international law experts, it addresses such topics as sovereignty, state responsibility, human rights, and the law of air, space, and the sea. Tallinn Manual 2.0 identifies 154 'black letter' rules governing cyber operations and provides extensive commentary on each rule. Although Tallinn Manual 2.0 represents the views of the experts in their personal capacity, the project benefitted from the unofficial input of many states and over fifty peer reviewers

This collection of essays by Professor Michael N. Schmitt of Durham University draws together those of his articles published over the past two decades that have explored particular fault lines in the law of armed conflict. As such, they examine the complex interplay between warfare and law, seeking to identify where the law and warfare appear to diverge, and where such apparent divergence can be accommodated through contextual interpretation of the law. Each essay examines a particular issue in either the jus ad bellum (the law governing resort to force) or jus in bello (international humanit

This collection of essays by Professor Michael N. Schmitt of Durham University draws together those of his articles published over the past two decades that have explored particular fault lines in the law of armed conflict. As such, they examine the complex interplay between warfare and law, seeking to identify where the law and warfare appear to diverge, and where such apparent divergence can be accommodated through contextual interpretation of the law. Each essay examines a particular issue in either the jus ad bellum (the law governing resort to force) or jus in bello (international humanit.

"...explores the legality of the attacks against Al Qaeda and the Taliban under the jus ad bellum, that component of international law that governs when it is that a State may resort to force as an instrument of national policy"-- iii

Abstract
War and international humanitarian law (IHL) exist and evolve in a synergistic relationship. On the one hand, treaty and customary law norms can proactively shape warfare. But on the other, changes in the nature of warfare often determine IHL's path forward, for if IHL is to remain effective, it must remain responsive to the context in which it is to be applied. This article offers tentative reflections on how future conflict may affect the evolution of IHL's conduct of hostilities rules as applied to 'cyber capabilities'. It concludes that current and future cyber capabilities and vulnerabilities are driving the positions of States and the wider international community regarding cyber operations during armed conflict. In particular, it predicts movement in the direction of interpreting IHL rules restrictively, that is, in a manner that provides enhanced protection for the civilian population, sometimes at the expense of military advantage.

AbstractMilitary strategists have begun pivoting from a focus on counterterrorism, counter-insurgency and stability operations to potential peer and near-peer conflict. This shift has profound operational and tactical implications for how future wars will be fought, but equally, it will have a significant impact on how international humanitarian law (IHL) is understood and applied. This article considers the process by which the normative evolution of IHL will occur in response to a battlespace that looks different than it has for decades. To do so, the article introduces two concepts: "normative architecture" and "applied IHL". It argues that only by understanding the difference between these two concepts, and their relationship to each other, can States and others concerned with how IHL is developing in the face of future conflict positively affect that process.

In the 2020 U.S. elections, Russia authorized and conducted influence operations designed to support former President Trump, although it did not attempt to alter any technical aspect of the voting process. Russia was not alone. Iran mounted a multi-pronged covert influence campaign intended to undercut Trump's reelection prospects, while other foreign actors–like Lebanese Hizballah, Cuba, and Venezuela–also tried to influence the election. Interestingly, China did not conduct operations designed to alter the outcome, although it did consider doing so. The phenomenon of election meddling, however, extends well beyond the United States to such countries as Austria, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, and United Kingdom. Such election-related cyber operations have captured the international law community's attention, as evidenced by the recent The Oxford Statement on International Law Protections Against Foreign Electoral Interference Through Digital Means, which 171 experts in the field signed. This article examines how international law applies to election interference from three angles. First, it assesses if, and if so when, such interference by cyber means violates international law, particularly the rules prohibiting intervention in the target State's internal affairs or violation of its sovereignty, or requiring respect for international human rights. It then turns to the duties States shoulder to put an end to hostile cyber election interference pursuant to the principle of due diligence and international human rights law. Finally, it concludes with a brief survey of the response options available under international law to States facing election meddling by cyber means.

This article explores the intersection of autonomous cyber capabilities and two primary rules of international law—the respect for the sovereignty of other States and the prohibition on coercive intervention into another State's internal or external affairs. Of all the rules of international law, these are the likeliest to be violated through employment of cyber capabilities, whether autonomous or not. This raises the question of whether a cyber operation that involves autonomous capabilities presents unique issues with respect to the application of the two rules. The article concludes that while there are numerous unsettled issues surrounding their application to cyber operations, the fact that a cyber operation employs autonomous capabilities has little legal bearing on the resolution of those issues. Rather, autonomy simply makes it more difficult, at least at times, to confidently apply the rules because of the uncertainty as to the consequences. Yet, these are dilemmas of fact, not law, and must be understood and acknowledged as such.