Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half title -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Table of contents -- Notes on contributors -- Foreword -- Introduction -- 1 The classical foundations of Raymond Aron's theory of international relations -- 2 Pilgrims' progress: the disenchanted destinations of Raymond Aron and Georges Canguilhem -- 3 A theory of international relations or a theory of foreign policy? Reading Peace and War among Nations -- 4 Aron's oxymorus international ethics -- 5 Raymond Aron, war and nuclear weapons: the primacy of politics paradox -- 6 Raymond Aron and the idea of Europe -- 7 Beyond Soviet and American models of industrialization: Aron's third way approach to global development -- 8 Raymond Aron's heritage for the International Relations discipline: the French school of sociological liberalism -- 9 Raymond Aron and the ethics of current global affairs -- 10 The diplomat, the soldier, and the spy: toward a new taxonomy in International Relations -- Index

Les forces armées françaises sont aujourd'hui probablement les plus performantes en Europe. Avec le Royaume-Uni, la France est actuellement la seule puissance européenne capable d'intervenir sur tout le spectre d'intensité des opérations – y compris nucléaire –, et dans tous les domaines – terrestre, naval, aérien, cyber et spatial. Toutefois, les armées françaises sont actuellement à la fin d'un cycle opérationnel caractérisé par trente ans « d'opérations extérieures », et doivent désormais se recentrer sur le haut du spectre des opérations. Cette adaptation, liée à l'évolution du contexte stratégique international marqué notamment par la fin de l'unipolarité américaine, contraint la France à hiérarchiser ses intérêts et théâtres d'engagement, avec des conséquences importantes pour les missions et le format des forces armées.

Le secret n'est jamais absolu en matière nucléaire, du fait de la nature fondamentale de la manœuvre de dissuasion, mais aussi des besoins de coopération dans le cadre de la lutte contre la prolifération. L'alternance maîtrisée entre la lumière et l'ombre constitue ainsi le cœur des enjeux recouvrant le fait nucléaire. On peut alors distinguer deux dimensions à ce secret : une qui recouvre les intentions et les capacités, et une qui relève de la diffusion et du partage des informations sur ses capacités et sur celles des autres.

From the perception of the imminence of threats at the political level to the seizing of initiative through proper timing at the tactical level, temporality is directly related to war and warfare. Yet, despite some analyses of the importance of time at the political/grand strategic level (usually by scholars) and at the tactical level (usually by military professionals) there is surprisingly little discussion of the impact of time on the preparation and the conduct of warfare. This article introduces the concept of 'wartime paradigm' as a heuristic device to understand the relationship between the perception of time and the conduct of warfare, and argues that after the Cold War, a specific 'wartime paradigm' combining an optimization for speed and an understanding of war as risk management has guided western warfare, from force structure to the conduct of actual operations. It shows how the changing character of warfare directly challenges this wartime paradigm and why, if western forces want to prevail in future conflicts, the establishment of a new wartime paradigm guiding technological improvements and operational concepts is critical.

From the perception of the imminence of threats at the political level to the seizing of initiative through proper timing at the tactical level, temporality is directly related to war and warfare. Yet, despite some analyses of the importance of time at the political/grand strategic level (usually by scholars) and at the tactical level (usually by military professionals) there is surprisingly little discussion of the impact of time on the preparation and the conduct of warfare. This article introduces the concept of 'wartime paradigm' as a heuristic device to understand the relationship between the perception of time and the conduct of warfare, and argues that after the Cold War, a specific 'wartime paradigm' combining an optimization for speed and an understanding of war as risk management has guided western warfare, from force structure to the conduct of actual operations. It shows how the changing character of warfare directly challenges this wartime paradigm and why, if western forces want to prevail in future conflicts, the establishment of a new wartime paradigm guiding technological improvements and operational concepts is critical.

Many policy and academic debates focus on the extent to which Russia is a revisionist power challenging the 'liberal world order'. However, there is little agreement on the primary motives explaining the behaviour of Russia, some pointing to her unsatisfied great power ambitions and neo-imperial ideologies, and others to genuine security concerns. Adjudicating those claims is important because of their policy implications for engagement and/or deterrence towards Russia. This article contributes to this debate through a theoretical contribution to practice-based approaches to International Relations. Using De Certeau's understanding of practices, it analyses Russian diplomatic practices in multilateral security organisations and illustrates how this helps infer foreign policy motives, contrary to the field-specific relationalism of Bourdieu-inspired practice approaches. Empirically, it builds on 126 interviews and participant observation in three multilateral security organisations (the United Nations, the NATO–Russia Council and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). The article shows that at least since 2014, Russian diplomats in the three organisations consistently defend policies and use narratives that reveal more interest in status recognition, sometimes at the expense of security concerns.

There is a growing consensus that multinational military operations are often less effective than the theoretical sum of their constitutive parts. Multiple chains of command, restriction on intelligence sharing, and capability aggregation problems can reduce fighting power. However, partners may be necessary to provide legitimacy to an intervention. As such, most studies assume that the state leading a coalition (usually the United States) has to accept a degree of operational ineffectiveness in order to gain political benefits from the participation of junior partners to a multinational military operation. However, such analysis puts all junior partners under the same category, without taking into account the differentiated contributions of those junior partners based on their relative military power and international status. This article explores variation between the junior partners' contributions and their impact on coalition political and military dynamics. It teases out the implications of adopting a fine-grained analysis of junior partners.

Résumé Le régime de maîtrise des armements conventionnels en Europe élaboré à la fin de la guerre froide est considérablement affaibli, du fait d'une combinaison de violations non sanctionnées au nom d'une « approche flexible » censée faciliter la coopération, et d'un manque de ressources administratives de la part de l'OSCE et des États parties pour exercer un contrôle efficace. Cet affaiblissement du régime est également un signe clair du retour de la compétition de sécurité en Europe, qui augmente les risques de conflits conventionnels dans la zone. La France et les pays de l'OTAN doivent, sur le court terme, prendre acte de cette compétition de sécurité en renforçant la dissuasion conventionnelle (notamment par une augmentation de la fréquence et des volumes de forces engagés lors d'exercices multinationaux), tout en explorant sur le moyen terme avec la Russie une possible réforme de l'OSCE et un nouveau traité de limitation des armements pour remplacer le Traité FCE.

Derrière le mot « innovation » se cachent des enjeux multiples. L'innovation ne peut se limiter au champ des technologies et doit être un processus permanent élargi où la culture du débat est essentielle. Sinon, l'innovation imposée par le haut serait vouée à l'inefficacité. Innover ne se décrète pas mais se construit avec tous.