Flexibility and adjustment to information in sequential decision problems: a systematic approach
In: Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems 371
39 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems 371
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 48, Heft 3, S. 511-535
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 251-262
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Applied Research in Environmental Economics; ZEW Economic Studies, S. 133-153
In: University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 386 (2021)
SSRN
In: Universiy of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 396
SSRN
In: International Economic Review, Band 60, Heft 4, S. 1757-1780
SSRN
In: University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 200, Revised version
SSRN
Working paper
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 475-491
ISSN: 1756-2171
We develop a product market theory to explain why firms provide their workers with skills that are also useful to their competitors. Firms first decide whether to invest in industry‐specific training, then make wage offers for each others' trained employees and finally engage in imperfect product market competition. Equilibria with and without training can emerge. If competition is soft, firms invest in training if others do. Thereby, they avoid having to pay high wages for trained workers. Furthermore, we draw welfare conclusions from the analysis. Finally, we discuss how our ideas apply to supplier relationships and to general training.
In Germany, competitive franchising is increasingly being used to procure passenger railway services that were previously provided by a state monopolist. This paper analyzes 77 tenders that differ with respect to network size, service frequency, contract duration and the proximity to other lines that are already run by competitors of DB Regio, a subsidiary of the successor of the former state monopolist. Our analysis shows that competitors are more likely to win small networks and more recent auctions. Other controls such as contract duration and the adjacency to other lines run by entrants are insignificant.
BASE
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 2403
SSRN
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 21, Heft 4, S. 915-931
In: Frontiers of theoretical economics, Band 5, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
We examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-form model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to integrate vertically. As a result, integrated firms also tend to have a large market share. The driving force behind these findings are demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market. We also identify countervailing forces resulting from strong vertical foreclosure, upstream sales and endogenous acquisition costs.
In: European journal of political economy, Band 21, Heft 4, S. 915-931
ISSN: 1873-5703
We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy that would apply to both industries & loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry. We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries & beneficial for environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying. Figures, References. [Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V.]
In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 26(1), 2008, 247-265
SSRN
Working paper