Suchergebnisse

THIS ARTICLE REVIEWS EXTANT STUDIES OF THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ON GOVERNMENT ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR IN THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. THREE CONCLUSIONS ARE REACHED: (1) IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES THERE EXISTS A CONSISTENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND CITIZEN EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT; (2) THE PROPOSITION THAT GOVERNMENTS ARE INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING THEIR SELFISH GOALS IN ELECTIONS FARES WELL COMPARED WITH THE COMPETING PROPOSITION THAT GOVERNMENTS ARE INTERESTED IN THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY AS SUCH; AND (3) GOVERNMENTS AND VOTERS ARE NOT THE ONLY ACTORS IN POLITICO-ECONOMIC DECISIONS: BUREAUCRACIES AND INTEREST GROUPS MAY MAKE GOVERNMENT INCAPABLE OF CHANGING ITS POLICIES QUICKLY IN THE FACE OF STIFF RESISTANCE FROM THIS MULTITUDE OF OTHER ACTORS. THEIR INCLUSION IN RELEVANT MODELS IS A NECESSARY NEXT STEP IN RESEARCH DESIGNED TO UNDERSTAND BETTER THE FUNCTIONING OF MODERN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES.

WE FEEL PLEASED AND HONORED THAT ALT AND CHRYSTAL (1982) RESPOND AT SUCH LENGTH TO OUR CONTRIBUTION IN THIS JOURNAL AND ELSEWHERE (FREY SCHNEIDER, 1978; 1981; 1982). WITHOUT MENTIONING IT, THE TWO AUTHORS ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO A LIMITED PART OF OUR PAPER ONLY, THE ONE REFERRING TO THE UNITED KINGDOM, LEAVING OUT OF ACCOUNT THE MODELS AND EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY. ALT AND CHRYSTAL CLAIM TO PRESENT A POLITICO-ECONOMIC MODEL 'ROOTED IN ACTUAL INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR'. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETECT, HOWEVER, ANY ANALYSIS OF SUCH (GOVERNMENTAL) BEHAVIOR. TO CITE THE INTENDED ACTIONS OF A COMMITTEE AT A PARTICULAR PERIOD AND FOR A PARTICULAR COUNTRY IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR A SERIOUS STUDY OF WHAT MOTIVATES AND CONSTRAINS POLITICIANS AND ADMINISTRATORS. ALT AND CHRYSTAL MAINTAIN THAT THESE DECISION-MAKERS WANT TO KEEP EXPENDITURES A STABLE SHARE OF ANTICIPATED NATIONAL INCOME, BUT NOT REASON IS GIVEN TO WHY THEY SHOULD DESIRE TO DO SO. 'EXPLAINING' GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES BY NATIONAL INCOME OF THE SAME PERIOD IS RATHER UNINFORMATIVE, AND DOES NOT ALLOW US TO MAKE ANY TRUE FORECAST TO WHAT THE GOVERNMENT IS GOING TO DO, EXCEPT EX POST FACTO, WHEN THE LEVEL OF NATIONAL INCOME IS KNOWN.

'THE DECISIVE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS WITHIN THE POLITICAL PROCESS HAS BECOME A COMMONPLACE OBSERVATION' OR 'INTEREST GROUPS ARE SO INFLUENTIAL THAT THEY EVEN HAVE THE DOMINANT POLITICAL POWER IN DEMOCRACIES', SUCH STATEMENTS CAN QUITE OFTEN BE FOUND BY MANY AUTHORS IN ANALYSING THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEREST GROUPS.1 AS BERNHOLZ (1975: 94) POINTS OUT IT IS SURPRISING THAT MEASURING THE SCALE OF INFLUENCE HAS SELDOM BEEN TRIED.2 IN THIS STUDY WE MAKE AN ATTEMPT TO EMPIRICALLY MEASURE THE SCALE OF INFLUENCE OF INTEREST GROUPS IN THE CASE OF SWITZERLAND. SWITZERLAND WAS CHOSEN, BECAUSE THE SWISS POLITICAL SYSTEM, THE FORM OF A DIRECT DEMOCRACY, OFFERS FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS WHERE THE INFLUENCE OF INTEREST GROUPS CAN BE INVESTIGATED IN TWO WAYS: (I) THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE OUTCOME OF REFERENDA BY GIVING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE VOTERS. IN SWITZERLAND REFERENDA ARE COMPULSORY REQUIRED WHEN THE GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT PROPOSES CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION; THEY ARE OPTIONAL IN THE CASE OF FEDERAL LAWS, I.E. HELD ONLY WHEN CALLED FOR BY AT LEAST 50,000 VOTERS. (II) THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE SWISS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S (ECONOMIC) POLICY THROUGH DIRECT MOTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT AND TO MEMBERS IN THE PARLIAMENT AND THROUGH ACTIVITIES IN EXPERT AND PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONS WHICH FORMULATE NEW LAWS AND PREPARE THE ANNUAL BUDGET.