Suchergebnisse

Mit dem "Brexit" wird Großbritannien zu einem echten Drittstaat. Folge dessen soll sein, dass englische Gesellschaften mit Sitz im Inland als GbR oder OHG behandelt werden müssen. Aus Sicht des Verfassers ist diese Rechtsfolge auf Grundlage der Grundfreiheiten des AEUV jedoch nicht zwingend.Die Arbeit befasst sich vor diesem Hintergrund mit dem Alleinstellungsmerkmal der Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit – ihrer Wirkung auch gegenüber Drittstaatsangehörigen. Die Rechtsprechung nimmt gegenüber dieser Besonderheit bislang jedoch eine äußerst restriktive Haltung ein.Der Verfasser legt dar, weshalb die Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit entgegen der herrschenden Meinung insbesondere auch gegenüber Drittstaatsangehörigen umfassend gelten müsse. Hieraus folge sodann, dass die in Bezug auf die Niederlassungsfreiheit ergangene Überseering-Rechtsprechung auf die Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit übertragen werden müsse – sodass auch Gesellschaften aus Drittstaaten mit Sitz im Inland das Recht haben, als solche anerkannt zu werden

White-collar crime is an issue that enthralls society. It has been the topic of many successful television shows, books, and movies. Society received one of its most revered movie quotes when Gordon Gekko told a room full of investors that "Greed is good."1 Politicians like Elizabeth Warren base entire platforms on it and situations like the Trump investigation, the Iran-Contra scandal, and the Enron fraud dominate news headlines. It is most curious though that although society finds itself constantly entertained at white-collar crime, the study of it is quite lacking. To be fair, this lack of understanding is not for lack of trying. The study of this societal phenomenon has come a long way since the term was introduced by Sutherland in the 1940s.2 Criminologists and other social scientists have presented a broad spectrum of literature that narrowly present theories that explain white collar crime.

History shows that international politics is as complex as it can be contentious. Indeed, that is why our globalized world has resorted to the power of law to define the manner in which nation-states interact with each other. However, what does the system do when it is pushed to its boundaries? What happens when the means of predicting behavior is compromised? After sixty years without a questionably bad-faith invocation of Article XXI within the WTO, such stability may see its greatest test, if not its end.

History shows that international politics is as complex as it can be contentious. Indeed, that is why our globalized world has resorted to the power of law to define the manner in which nation-states interact with each other. However, what does the system do when it is pushed to its boundaries? What happens when the means of predicting behavior is compromised? After sixty years without a questionably bad-faith invocation of Article XXI within the WTO, such stability may see its greatest test, if not its end.

We analyse whether there is a relationship between EU Commissioners' national origin and political outcomes. For this purpose, we argue that examining the Commissioner for Agriculture allows the most precise empirical identification: there is a specific budget for agriculture which accounts for the largest share of the overall EU budget and gives significant leeway to the Commissioner. On average, providing the Commissioners is associated with increases in the share of the overall EU budget that is allocated to their country of origin of about one percentage point. This increase corresponds to half a billion Euro per year, a significant change in particular for smaller member states. Alternative explanations are considered using country-specific time trends, examining pre- and post-treatment trends and modeling endogenous treatment-selection. There are no significant differences in trend behavior between treated and non-treated countries both before and after providing the Commissioner. We demonstrate that our results are not driven by individual countries and show that selection-on-unobservables would have to be implausibly high to account for the estimated coefficient.

Allocation decisions are vulnerable to political influence, but it is unclear in which situations politicians use their discretionary power in a partisan manner. We analyze the allocation of presidential disaster declarations in the United States, exploiting the spatiotemporal randomness of hurricane strikes from 1965–2018 along with changes in political alignment. We show that decisions are not biased when disasters are unambiguously strong or weak. Only in ambiguous situations, after medium-intensity hurricanes, do areas governed by presidents' co-partisans receive up to twice as many declarations. This political bias explains 10 percent of total relief spending, totaling USD 450 million per year.

Allocation decisions are vulnerable to political influence, but it is unclear in which situations politicians use their discretionary power in a partisan manner. We analyze the allocation of presidential disaster declarations in the United States, exploiting the spatiotemporal randomness of all hurricane strikes from 1965-2018. We show that biased declaration behavior is not politically affordable if a disaster is either very strong or weak, when relief provision is clearly necessary or not. However, in ambiguous situations, after medium-intensity hurricanes, presidents favor areas governed by their co-partisans. Our nonlinear estimations demonstrate that this hump-shaped alignment bias exceeds average estimates up to eightfold.

Allocation decisions are vulnerable to political influence, but it is unclear in which situations politicians use their discretionary power in a partisan manner. We analyze the allocation of presidential disaster declarations in the United States, exploiting the spatiotemporal randomness of all hurricane strikes from 1965–2018. We show that biased declaration behavior is not politically affordable if a disaster is either very strong or weak, when relief provision is clearly necessary or not. However, in ambiguous situations, after medium-intensity hurricanes, presidents favor areas governed by their co-partisans. Our nonlinear estimations demonstrate that this hump-shaped alignment bias exceeds average estimates up to eightfold.

Although regional resources have been shown to influence secessionist conflicts in developing countries, their effect in established democracies has largely been neglected. We integrate regional resource value and inter-regional transfers in a model on the optimal size of nations, and show that regional wealth correlates positively with secessionist party success in a large panel of regions. To establish causality, our difference-in-differences and triple-differences designs exploit that Scotland and Wales both feature separatist parties, but only an independent Scotland would profit from oil discoveries off its coast. We document an economically and statistically significant positive effect of regional resources and rule out plausible alternative explanations.