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Working paper
Varieties of insider corporate governance: the determinants of business preferences and corporate governance reform in the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 19, Heft 9, S. 1434-1451
ISSN: 1466-4429
Like a phoenix from the ashes? Reassessing the transformation of the Swedish political economy since the 1970s
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 19, Heft 8, S. 1126-1145
ISSN: 1466-4429
Varieties of insider corporate governance: the determinants of business preferences and corporate governance reform in the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 19, Heft 9, S. 1434-1451
ISSN: 1350-1763
World Affairs Online
Like a phonix from the ashes?: Reassessing the transformation of the Swedish political economy since the 1970s
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 19, Heft 8, S. 1126-1145
ISSN: 1350-1763
World Affairs Online
Public Law and Private Power. Corporate Governance Reform in the Age of Finance Capitalism; Quiet Politics and Business Power. Corporate Control in Europe and Japan
In: Swiss political science review: SPSR = Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft : SZPW = Revue suisse de science politique : RSSP, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 492-496
ISSN: 1662-6370
Revisiting the Party Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Social Democratic Preferences and Corporate Governance Reforms in Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 184-210
ISSN: 1552-3829
The "party paradox" thesis claims that in the context of the legal corporate governance reforms of the 1990s, which aimed at adjusting national corporate governance systems to the "finance capitalism" of the Anglo-American type, center-left parties promoted proshareholder corporate governance reforms, whereas center-right parties opposed such reforms. Based on case studies of Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, this article shows that this thesis does not apply to two of these cases: In Sweden and the Netherlands a broad coalition uniting center-right and center-left parties opposed- with considerable success-proshareholder reforms. Therefore, the author argues that firm-level explanations of the "party paradox" are insufficient to understand the variance in center-left preferences across different cases. Instead, the historical role of labor in different countries is critical in the formation of center-left preferences. Where labor was not excluded from the formation of corporate governance structures, center-left support for proshareholder reform was weak. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]
Public Law and Private Power. Corporate Governance Reform in the Age of Finance Capitalism
In: Swiss political science review: SPSR = Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft = Revue suisse de science politique, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 492-496
ISSN: 1424-7755
Quiet Politics and Business Power. Corporate Control in Europe and Japan
In: Swiss political science review: SPSR = Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft = Revue suisse de science politique, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 492-496
ISSN: 1424-7755
Revisiting the Party Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Social Democratic Preferences and Corporate Governance Reforms in Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 184-211
ISSN: 0010-4140
Revisiting the Party Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Social Democratic Preferences and Corporate Governance Reforms in Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 184-210
ISSN: 1552-3829
The "party paradox" thesis claims that in the context of the legal corporate governance reforms of the 1990s, which aimed at adjusting national corporate governance systems to the "finance capitalism" of the Anglo-American type, center-left parties promoted proshareholder corporate governance reforms, whereas center-right parties opposed such reforms. Based on case studies of Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, this article shows that this thesis does not apply to two of these cases: In Sweden and the Netherlands a broad coalition uniting center-right and center-left parties opposed— with considerable success—proshareholder reforms. Therefore, the author argues that firm-level explanations of the "party paradox" are insufficient to understand the variance in center-left preferences across different cases. Instead, the historical role of labor in different countries is critical in the formation of center-left preferences. Where labor was not excluded from the formation of corporate governance structures, center-left support for proshareholder reform was weak.
How Political Institutions Determine Corporate Governance Reforms: The Polity, Law and Corporate Practices in the Case of Switzerland
In: New political economy, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 565-596
ISSN: 1469-9923
Varieties of Insider Corporate Governance: Centre-Right Preferences and the Determinants of Reform in the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland
In: Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 406
SSRN
Working paper
How Political Institutions Determine Corporate Governance Reforms: The Polity, Law and Corporate Practices in the Case of Switzerland
In: New political economy, Band 15, Heft 4, S. 565-597
ISSN: 1356-3467
Revisiting the Party Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Evidence from Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands
In: Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 372
SSRN
Working paper