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Эрдэс болон металл олборлох нь олборлолтод шаардлагатай усны хэмжээ, хаягдал ус хаях болон усны нөөцөд үзүүлэх боломжит бохирдлын хувьд усанд томоохон ул мөр үлдээдэг. Иймд уул уурхай болон усны салбар хооронд зохицуулалт хийх нь маш чухал. Уул уурхайн усны нөөц болон усны нөөцөөс хамааралтай орон нутагт үзүүлэх сөрөг нөлөөллийг бууруулах зорилготой энэ хүрээний олон тооны хэрэгслүүдийг гаргасан байдаг. Үүнд байгаль орчинд нөлөөлөх байдлын үнэлгээ (БОНБҮ), эдгээр үйл явцуудад болон голын сав газрын менежментэд оролцогч талуудын оролцоог хангах, уурхайд хаягдал ус цэвэрлэх сэдэлжүүлэлтийн төлбөрийн схемүүд зэрэг багтана. Хэрэгсэл бүрт нэлээд хэдэн урьдчилсан нөхцөлийг бүрдүүлэх хэрэгтэй учраас тэдгээрийг хэрэгжүүлэх эсэх, хэрхэн хэрэгжүүлэх нь үндэсний, бүсийн болон дотоодын байдлаас хамаарна. Энэ судалгааны хураангуй тайланд Монгол улсыг бид жишээ судалгааны тохиолдол болгон авч, оролцогч талуудын оролцоо, хаягдал ус цэвэрлэх сэдэлжүүлэлт хоёр нь зохицуулалтыг сайжруулах үндсэн хоёр стратеги гэж үзнэ. Бид эдгээр стратегийг бодлогод хэрхэн хөрвүүлж, хоёр зэргэлдээ голын сав газарт бодитоор хэрхэн хэрэгжүүлснийг үнэлнэ. Ингэхдээ доогуур түвшний захиргааны нэгжүүд дэх хүн хүчний болон санхүүгийн чадавх, устай холбоотой мэдээллийн хүртээмжийг байгалийн нөөцийн үр дүнтэй засаглалын урьдчилсан нөхцөл гэж тусгайлан анхаарч үзнэ. Монгол улсын засаглалын систем олон тооны үйл явцуудаар оролцогч талуудын оролцоог хангадаг гэж заадаг бөгөөд хамгийн чухал нь голын сав газрын олон талт платформууд (ГСГОТП) болон БОНБҮ-ний журмын дагуу хийгддэг орон нутгийн хэлэлцүүлгүүдээр дамжуулан хангах гэдгийг бид олж тогтоосон. Гэхдээ одоогоор судалгааны бүсийн ГСГОТП нь ихэнхдээ доогуур түвшний захиргааны ажилтнуудыг оруулан гишүүдээ шинэчлэх гэж байгаа ба энд орон нутгийн хэлэлцүүлэг бараг хийгддэггүй.Хаягдал усыг цэвэрлэх сэдэлжүүлэлтийн чиглэлээр Монгол улс 2019 оны зун Ус бохирдуулсны төлбөрийн тухай хуулийн нэмэлт, өөрчлөлтийг баталсан бөгөөд одоогоор хэрэгжүүлэх гарын авлагыг боловсруулж байна.Хүндрэлүүд нь сав газрын усны чанарын мэдээллийг цуглуулах болон хангалттай дээж авах, шинжилгээ хийх баталгаатай холбоотой. Энэ нь хамаарах мэдээллийг авах эсвэл үнэлэхэд хүндрэлтэй тулгардаг, доогуур түвшний захиргааны нэгжүүдийн хүн хүч, санхүүгийн чадавх хязгаарлагдмал байгаатай холбоотой. Бид дараах арга хэмжээг зөвлөж байна. Үүнд: * Тэнцвэртэй хүртээмж болон платформ дахь хэлэлцүүлгийг хангахын тулд нийгэм, эдийн засгийн байдлын ялгааг харгалзан хувийн хэвшил болон иргэний нийгмийн төлөөллийг түлхүү оролцуулах хэлбэрээр ГСГОТП дахь оролцогч талуудын ялгаатай байдлыг бий болгох * БОНБҮ-ний хүрээнд олон нийтийн хэлэлцүүлгийг идэвхжүүлэх (уул уурхайн лиценз авах болон БОНБҮ-г батлуулах гэх мэт) ба Засгийн газраас баталсан дүрэм, журмуудыг нээлттэй болгох, энэ хүрээнд хариуцлага тооцдог болох * Усны мэдээллийг олон нийтэд илүү хүртээмжтэй болгох * Уул уурхайн хаягдал усыг хаяхын өмнө цэвэрлэхэд урамшуулал олгохын тулд Ус бохирдуулсны төлбөрийн тухай хуулийг хурдхан хэрэгжүүлэх * Эрх мэдлээ хэрэгжүүлэх боломжийг нь бүрдүүлэхийн тулд доогуур түвшний захиргааны байгууллагуудыг чадавхжуулах ба ГСГОТП-д санхүүжилт олгох. ; This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available. The extraction of minerals and metals comes with a large water footprint, both in terms of water needed for extraction itself and in terms of wastewater discharge and the potential pollution of water resources. Thus, coordination between the mining and water sectors is key. A number of instruments to that end have been devised, which aim to mitigate the negative impacts of mining on water resources and on water-resource dependent communities. Among these are environmental impact assessments (EIAs), stakeholder involvement within these processes and within river basin management, and payment schemes that incentivise wastewater treatment at the mine. Whether and how these instruments are implemented depends on the national, provincial and local context, since each instrument involves a number of preconditions. Assessing the effectiveness of these instruments thus requires a sound analysis of the governance system within which they operate. In this Briefing Paper, we focus on Mongolia as an example case study and look at stakeholder involvement and incentivising wastewater treatment as two key strategies to increase coordination. We assess how these strategies are translated into policies and how they are implemented on the ground in two adjacent river basins. In doing so, we pay particular attention to the human and financial capacities of lower-level administrative entities, as well as to the availability of water-related information, as essential prerequisites for effective natural resource governance. We find that the Mongolian governance system stipulates the implementation of stakeholder involvement through multiple processes, most importantly through River Basin Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (RB-MSPs) and community consultation within the EIA procedure. In practice, however, the RB-MSP in the study area has yet to diversify its membership from mostly lower-level administrative staff, and community consultations rarely take place. In terms of incentivising wastewater treatment, Mongolia passed amendments to its Water Pollution Fee Law in summer 2019 and is now working on implementation guidelines. Challenges here relate to the collection of data for a baseline on water quality and to guarantees for adequate sampling and analysis. This is tied to the limited human and financial capacity of lower-level administrative entities, which struggle to access or evaluate relevant data. We recommend that: * the diversity of stakeholders in RB-MSPs is increased to better include the private sector and civil society, with sensitivity to differences in socioeconomic standing to ensure equitable access to and deliberation within the platform; * the enacting of public consultations as part of EIAs is ensured and governmental procedures (i.e. mining licensing and approval of EIAs) are made more transparent and accountable; * public availability of water data is increased; * the Water Pollution Fee Law is implemented swiftly to provide incentives for the treatment of mining wastewater before discharge; * funding and institutional capacity development for lower-level administrative bodies are increased and funding for RB-MSPs is provided to enable them to fulfill their mandates.

This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available.The extraction of minerals and metals comes with a large water footprint, both in terms of water needed for extraction itself and in terms of wastewater discharge and the potential pollution of water resources. Thus, coordination between the mining and water sectors is key. A number of instruments to that end have been devised, which aim to mitigate the negative impacts of mining on water resources and on water-resource dependent communities. Among these are environmental impact assessments (EIAs), stakeholder involvement within these processes and within river basin management, and payment schemes that incentivise wastewater treatment at the mine. Whether and how these instruments are implemented depends on the national, provincial and local context, since each instrument involves a number of preconditions. Assessing the effectiveness of these instruments thus requires a sound analysis of the governance system within which they operate.In this Briefing Paper, we focus on Mongolia as an example case study and look at stakeholder involvement and incentivising wastewater treatment as two key strategies to increase coordination. We assess how these strategies are translated into policies and how they are implemented on the ground in two adjacent river basins. In doing so, we pay particular attention to the human and financial capacities of lower-level administrative entities, as well as to the availability of water-related information, as essential prerequisites for effective natural resource governance.We find that the Mongolian governance system stipulates the implementation of stakeholder involvement through multiple processes, most importantly through River Basin Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (RB-MSPs) and community consultation within the EIA procedure. In practice, however, the RB-MSP in the study area has yet to diversify its membership from mostly lower-level administrative staff, and community consultations rarely take place. In terms of incentivising wastewater treatment, Mongolia passed amendments to its Water Pollution Fee Law in summer 2019 and is now working on implementation guidelines. Challenges here relate to the collection of data for a baseline on water quality and to guarantees for adequate sampling and analysis. This is tied to the limited human and financial capacity of lower-level administrative entities, which struggle to access or evaluate relevant data.We recommend that:• the diversity of stakeholders in RB-MSPs is increased to better include the private sector and civil society, with sensitivity to differences in socioeconomic standing to ensure equitable access to and deliberation within the platform;• the enacting of public consultations as part of EIAs is ensured and governmental procedures (i.e. mining licensing and approval of EIAs) are made more transparent and accountable;• public availability of water data is increased;• the Water Pollution Fee Law is implemented swiftly to provide incentives for the treatment of mining wastewater before discharge;• funding and institutional capacity development for lower-level administrative bodies are increased and funding for RB-MSPs is provided to enable them to fulfill their mandates.

Diese Veröffentlichung stellt eine von sechs Analysen sektorenübergreifender Herausforderungen für Wasser-Governance dar, die als Teil des STEER-Forschungsprojekts durchgeführt wurden und deren Resultate in separaten Analysen und Stellungnahmen vorliegen.Der Abbau von Mineralien und Metallen geht mit einem großen Wasserfußabdruck einher, sowohl im Hinblick auf die Ressourcen, die für den Abbau selbst benötigt werden, als auch im Hinblick auf die Einleitung schadstoffbelasteter Abwässer in Flussläufe. Diverse politische Steuerungsinstrumente zielen darauf ab, die negative Auswirkungen des Bergbaus auf Wasserressourcen und Bevölkerungsgruppen zu mildern, welche von diesen Ressourcen abhängig sind. Hierzu gehören Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfungen (UVPs), die Einbindung von Stakeholdern in Planungsprozesse sowie ökonomische Anreize für Abwasserbehandlung noch auf dem Minengelände. Ob und wie diese Instrumente umgesetzt werden, hängt vom nationalen, regionalen und lokalen Kontext ab, da jedes Instrument auf einer Reihe von Voraussetzungen aufbaut. Um die Wirksamkeit dieser Instrumente zu beurteilen, bedarf es daher einer fundierten Analyse des Governance-Systems, in dem sie eingesetzt werden.Die vorliegende Veröffentlichung untersucht diese Zusammenhänge für die Mongolei. Sie betrachtet die Einbeziehung von Stakeholdern und die Schaffung von Anreizen für die Abwasserbehandlung als Schlüsselstrategien zur Verbesserung der Koordination. Zudem richtet sie besonderes Augenmerk auf die personellen und finanziellen Kapazitäten der nachgeordneten Verwaltungseinheiten sowie auf die Verfügbarkeit wasserbezogener Informationen als wesentliche Voraussetzungen für wirksame Governance im Bereich der natürlichen Ressourcen.Wir stellen fest, dass das mongolische Gesetz die Einbindung von Stakeholdern mehrfach vorsieht, vor allem durch Multi-Stakeholder-Plattformen (River Basin Multi-Stakeholder Platforms, RB-MSPs) und Anhörungen betroffener Bevölkerungsgruppen im Zuge der UVP-Verfahren. In der Praxis besteht die RB-MSP oft primär aus Mitarbeiter*innen unterer Verwaltungsebenen und Anhörungen betroffener Bevölkerungsgruppen finden selten statt. Bezüglich ökonomischer Anreize für Abwasserbehandlung, hat die Mongolei im Sommer 2019 Änderungen des Gesetzes über Wasserverschmutzungsgebühren verabschiedet und arbeitet an Umsetzungsrichtlinien. Hier liegen die Herausforderungen darin, Ausgangswerte in Bezug auf Wasserqualität zu bestimmen und eine unabhängige Probenahme und -analyse zu garantieren. Begrenzte personelle und finanzielle Kapazitäten der nachgeordneten Behörden erschweren dies.Wir empfehlen• die Beteiligung des Privatsektors und der Zivilgesellschaft in RB-MSPs zu erhöhen und hierbei Unterschiede im sozioökonomischen Status mitzudenken, um gleichberechtigte Diskussionen zu gewährleisten.• die Durchführung öffentlicher Anhörungen als Teil von UVPs sicherzustellen und Verwaltungsverfahren (Lizensierung, UVP-Abnahmen) transparent zu gestalten.• die öffentliche Verfügbarkeit von Wasserdaten zu verbessern• das Gesetz über Wasserverschmutzungsgebühren zügig umzusetzen, um Anreize für die Behandlung von Bergbauabwässern vor Ort zu schaffen.• die Mittel für nachgeordnete Verwaltungsorgane aufzustocken, ihre institutionellen Kapazitäten zu verbessern und Mittel für RB-MSPs bereitzustellen.

This Briefing Paper presents one of six analyses of cross-sectoral coordination challenges that were conducted as part of the STEER research project and on which separate Briefing Papers are available. The extraction of minerals and metals comes with a large water footprint, both in terms of water needed for extraction itself and in terms of wastewater discharge and the potential pollution of water resources. Thus, coordination between the mining and water sectors is key. A number of instruments to that end have been devised, which aim to mitigate the negative impacts of mining on water resources and on water-resource dependent communities. Among these are environmental impact assessments (EIAs), stakeholder involvement within these processes and within river basin management, and payment schemes that incentivise wastewater treatment at the mine. Whether and how these instruments are implemented depends on the national, provincial and local context, since each instrument involves a number of preconditions. Assessing the effectiveness of these instruments thus requires a sound analysis of the governance system within which they operate. In this Briefing Paper, we focus on Mongolia as an example case study and look at stakeholder involvement and incentivising wastewater treatment as two key strategies to increase coordination. We assess how these strategies are translated into policies and how they are implemented on the ground in two adjacent river basins. In doing so, we pay particular attention to the human and financial capacities of lower-level administrative entities, as well as to the availability of water-related information, as essential prerequisites for effective natural resource governance. We find that the Mongolian governance system stipulates the implementation of stakeholder involvement through multiple processes, most importantly through River Basin Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (RB-MSPs) and community consultation within the EIA procedure. In practice, however, the RB-MSP in the study area has yet to diversify its membership from mostly lower-level administrative staff, and community consultations rarely take place. In terms of incentivising wastewater treatment, Mongolia passed amendments to its Water Pollution Fee Law in summer 2019 and is now working on implementation guidelines. Challenges here relate to the collection of data for a baseline on water quality and to guarantees for adequate sampling and analysis. This is tied to the limited human and financial capacity of lower-level administrative entities, which struggle to access or evaluate relevant data. We recommend that: * the diversity of stakeholders in RB-MSPs is increased to better include the private sector and civil society, with sensitivity to differences in socioeconomic standing to ensure equitable access to and deliberation within the platform; * the enacting of public consultations as part of EIAs is ensured and governmental procedures (i.e. mining licensing and approval of EIAs) are made more transparent and accountable; * public availability of water data is increased; * the Water Pollution Fee Law is implemented swiftly to provide incentives for the treatment of mining wastewater before discharge; * funding and institutional capacity development for lower-level administrative bodies are increased and funding for RB-MSPs is provided to enable them to fulfill their mandates.

Diese Veröffentlichung stellt eine von sechs Analysen sektorenübergreifender Herausforderungen für Wasser-Governance dar, die als Teil des STEER-Forschungsprojekts durchgeführt wurden und deren Resultate in separaten Analysen und Stellungnahmen vorliegen. Der Abbau von Mineralien und Metallen geht mit einem großen Wasserfußabdruck einher, sowohl im Hinblick auf die Ressourcen, die für den Abbau selbst benötigt werden, als auch im Hinblick auf die Einleitung schadstoffbelasteter Abwässer in Flussläufe. Diverse politische Steuerungsinstrumente zielen darauf ab, die negative Auswirkungen des Bergbaus auf Wasserressourcen und Bevölkerungsgruppen zu mildern, welche von diesen Ressourcen abhängig sind. Hierzu gehören Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfungen (UVPs), die Einbindung von Stakeholdern in Planungsprozesse sowie ökonomische Anreize für Abwasserbehandlung noch auf dem Minengelände. Ob und wie diese Instrumente umgesetzt werden, hängt vom nationalen, regionalen und lokalen Kontext ab, da jedes Instrument auf einer Reihe von Voraussetzungen aufbaut. Um die Wirksamkeit dieser Instrumente zu beurteilen, bedarf es daher einer fundierten Analyse des Governance-Systems, in dem sie eingesetzt werden. Die vorliegende Veröffentlichung untersucht diese Zusammenhänge für die Mongolei. Sie betrachtet die Einbeziehung von Stakeholdern und die Schaffung von Anreizen für die Abwasserbehandlung als Schlüsselstrategien zur Verbesserung der Koordination. Zudem richtet sie besonderes Augenmerk auf die personellen und finanziellen Kapazitäten der nachgeordneten Verwaltungseinheiten sowie auf die Verfügbarkeit wasserbezogener Informationen als wesentliche Voraussetzungen für wirksame Governance im Bereich der natürlichen Ressourcen. Wir stellen fest, dass das mongolische Gesetz die Einbindung von Stakeholdern mehrfach vorsieht, vor allem durch Multi-Stakeholder-Plattformen (River Basin Multi-Stakeholder Platforms, RB-MSPs) und Anhörungen betroffener Bevölkerungsgruppen im Zuge der UVP-Verfahren. In der Praxis besteht die RB-MSP oft primär aus Mitarbeiter*innen unterer Verwaltungsebenen und Anhörungen betroffener Bevölkerungsgruppen finden selten statt. Bezüglich ökonomischer Anreize für Abwasserbehandlung, hat die Mongolei im Sommer 2019 Änderungen des Gesetzes über Wasserverschmutzungsgebühren verabschiedet und arbeitet an Umsetzungsrichtlinien. Hier liegen die Herausforderungen darin, Ausgangswerte in Bezug auf Wasserqualität zu bestimmen und eine unabhängige Probenahme und -analyse zu garantieren. Begrenzte personelle und finanzielle Kapazitäten der nachgeordneten Behörden erschweren dies. Wir empfehlen die Beteiligung des Privatsektors und der Zivilgesellschaft in RB-MSPs zu erhöhen und hierbei Unterschiede im sozioökonomischen Status mitzudenken, um gleichberechtigte Diskussionen zu gewährleisten. * die Durchführung öffentlicher Anhörungen als Teil von UVPs sicherzustellen und Verwaltungsverfahren (Lizensierung, UVP-Abnahmen) transparent zu gestalten. * die öffentliche Verfügbarkeit von Wasserdaten zu verbessern * das Gesetz über asserverschmutzungsgebühren zügig umzusetzen, um Anreize für die Behandlung von Bergbauabwässern vor Ort zu schaffen. * die Mittel für nachgeordnete Verwaltungsorgane aufzustocken, ihre institutionellen Kapazitäten zu verbessern und Mittel für RB-MSPs bereitzustellen.

In the last decade, Mongolia has undergone parallel processes of institutionalising River Basin Organisations (RBOs) and of fiscal decentralisation. River basin management calls for managing water resources at the river basin level in order to promote a sustainable resource use. However, often RBOs remain underfunded. Fiscal decentralisation involves shifting certain fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government. Against this background, the paper asks whether fiscal decentralisation supports or counteracts river basin management in the Mongolian case. The paper finds that at the sub-national level, a high number of actors are involved in water governance. Despite a broad division of labour, a high level of overlap exists in terms of data management; monitoring water resources, water uses and law implementation; law enforcement; and to a certain degree the implementation of measures among these actors. In terms of financing water governance, River Basin Authorities (RBAs) are primarily financed through the national budget and Aimag (province-level) Environmental Authorities (AEAs) through sub-national province budgets. However, uncertainties exist regarding the allocation of water-use fees. In practice, available funds to RBAs only cover fixed costs. AEAs have somewhat higher budgets, but do not necessarily use these funds for water-related projects or earmark water-use fees. Inconsistent legal provisions on water-use fees have led to competition between AEAs and RBAs, but also to first collaborative arrangements. We conclude that in Mongolia, fiscal decentralisation and river basin management are, so far, hardly mutually supportive and recommend a number of legal and financial adjustments. Key words: River basin management, fiscal decentralisation, funding water governance, water use fees, Mongolia

The concept of "river basin management" calls for managing water resources at the river basin level in order to promote the sustainable use of water resources. Often the concept of river basin management is associated with the introduction of "river basin organisations" (RBOs) as special purpose organisations. However, in many developing countries, RBOs remain underfunded. Fiscal decentralisation involves shifting certain responsibilities for expenditures or revenues to lower levels of government. It usually involves a reallocation of functions and revenues so that functions are adequately funded. Fiscal decentralisation is supported by the principles of subsidiarity, disentanglement, cooperation, accountability and fiscal equivalence, with the latter asking for a congruence of those who pay for, who decide upon and who benefit from public goods. On the one hand, fiscal decentralisation can support RBOs if sufficient financial resources are allocated to them to fulfil their tasks. However, if RBOs are excluded from resources at the sub-national level, it can also be counterproductive and lead to increased competition with general-purpose jurisdictions at the sub-national level.This discussion paper, therefore, asks the question of whether fiscal decentralisation supports or counteracts the funding of river basin management in the case of Mongolia, which has undergone parallel processes of institutionalising RBOs and of fiscal decentralisation in the last decade. In order to answer the overriding question, the paper analyses i) how competencies for various water governance functions between RBOs and other bodies at the sub-national level are formally allocated; ii) the funding arrangements in place for water-related functions of RBOs and other sub-national bodies; and iii) how RBOs and other sub-national authorities coordinate or compete for water governance funding, and what this implies for sustainable water resource use. The paper compares the responsibilities of national and various sub-national entities and assesses the extent to which the principles of disentanglement, cooperation, subsidiarity and accountability are applied in Mongolian water governance. It also analyses the formal and de facto funding sources and budgeting systems of the sub-national entities responsible for water management, in order to assess to what extent the principle of fiscal equivalence is realised.The discussion paper finds that there is still considerable room for improving the realisation of the principles of disentanglement, cooperation, subsidiarity and accountability in the allocation of competencies in Mongolian water governance. At the sub-national level, a high number of actors are involved in water governance, and the allocation of various water governance functions between river basin authorities (RBAs), river basin councils (RBCs), Aimag environmental agencies (AEAs), and governors and assemblies at the levels of provinces (Aimags), districts (Soums) and communities (Bahgs) remains complex and convoluted. Despite a broad division of labour, a high level of overlap exists in terms of data management; monitoring water resources, water uses and law implementation; law enforcement; and to a certain degree the implementation of measures among these actors.The principle of fiscal equivalence is also not fully realised in Mongolian water resources management. In terms of financing water governance, RBAs are primarily financed through the national budget and AEAs through sub-national province budgets. However, uncertainties exist regarding the allocation of water-use fees due to inconsistent legal provisions. In practice, available funds to RBAs only cover fixed costs. Thus, RBAs are largely assigned unfunded mandates for planning, monitoring and implementing water protection. This considerably limits the effectiveness of the river basin management approach. Overall, AEAs have somewhat higher budgets for environmental protection than RBAs. However, the case study shows, for example, that AEAs sometimes do not allocate any funds for water-related projects at all and do not necessarily earmark 35 per cent of water-use fees for environmental protection.Furthermore, problems of underfinancing exacerbate problems of overlapping responsibilities. The inconsistent legal provisions on water-use fees have led to competition between AEAs and RBAs, which undermines trust between the different agencies and makes it more difficult to perform the tasks that they share as well as to coordinate on those tasks where their responsibilities overlap. Still, in the case analysed, recent first attempts have been undertaken to clarify responsibilities in Memorandums of Understanding. While the effectiveness of these Memorandums of Understanding should be subject to future research, they alone will hardly solve the problem of underfinancing. Therefore, the paper concludes that in Mongolia, fiscal decentralisation and the institutionalisation of river basin management are, so far, hardly mutually supportive, but rather competitive processes. It recommends a number of legal adjustments as well as the financial empowerment of RBAs and RBCs in order to support the sustainable use of water resources.

The concept of river basin management calls for managing water resources at the river basin level in order to promote the sustainable use of water resources. Often this goes along with the introduction of river basin organisations (RBOs) as special purpose organisations. However, particularly in developing countries, RBOs often suffer from insufficient funds. Fiscal decentralisation involves shifting certain fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government. Decentralisation could thus provide a source of funding for RBOs, depending on how tasks and funds are allocated among RBOs and general-purpose jurisdictions. This briefing paper examines administrative and fiscal aspects of river basin management and analyses whether fiscal decentralisation supports or counteracts the funding of river basin management. We present the example of Mongolia, where in recent years the processes of RBO institutionalisation and fiscal decentralisation have occurred in parallel. More specifically, we analyse i) how competencies for various water governance functions between RBOs and other bodies at the sub-national level are formally allocated, ii) which de jure and de facto funding arrangements are in place, and iii) what this implies for the coordination and sustainability of water resource use.We find that despite a broad division of labour among administrative units, a high level of overlap exists, for instance in the areas of data management, water law enforcement and implementation of water protection measures.In terms of financing water governance, River Basin Authorities (RBAs) are primarily financed through the national budget and aimag (province-level) environmental authorities (AEAs) through sub-national province budgets. However, uncertainties exist regarding the allocation of water-use fees. In practice, funds available to RBAs only cover fixed costs. AEAs have somewhat higher budgets, but do not necessarily use these funds for water-related projects nor do they earmark water-use fees. Inconsistent legal provisions on water-use fees have led to competition between AEAs and RBAs, but also to initial collaborative arrangements. We conclude that in Mongolia, fiscal decentralisation and river basin management are, so far, hardly mutually supportive and we recommend a number of legal and financial adjustments. In particular, we recommend thatresponsibilities be distributed more clearly to reduce overlap and uncertainty;legal inconsistencies regarding water-use fees be clarified;funding be arranged according to tasks; andfunding for RBAs be increased and minimum state-funding be provided to river basin councils (RBCs), so they can fulfil their mandates.

The concept of river basin management calls for managing water resources at the river basin level in order to promote the sustainable use of water resources. Often this goes along with the introduction of river basin organisations (RBOs) as special purpose organisations. However, particularly in developing countries, RBOs often suffer from insufficient funds. Fiscal decentralisation involves shifting certain fiscal responsibilities to lower levels of government. Decentralisation could thus provide a source of funding for RBOs, depending on how tasks and funds are allocated among RBOs and general-purpose jurisdictions. This briefing paper examines administrative and fiscal aspects of river basin management and analyses whether fiscal decentralisation supports or counteracts the funding of river basin management. We present the example of Mongolia, where in recent years the processes of RBO institutionalisation and fiscal decentralisation have occurred in parallel. More specifically, we analyse i) how competencies for various water governance functions between RBOs and other bodies at the sub-national level are formally allocated, ii) which de jure and de facto funding arrangements are in place, and iii) what this implies for the coordination and sustainability of water resource use. We find that despite a broad division of labour among administrative units, a high level of overlap exists, for instance in the areas of data management, water law enforcement and implementation of water protection measures. In terms of financing water governance, River Basin Authorities (RBAs) are primarily financed through the national budget and aimag (province-level) environmental authorities (AEAs) through sub-national province budgets. However, uncertainties exist regarding the allocation of water-use fees. In practice, funds available to RBAs only cover fixed costs. AEAs have somewhat higher budgets, but do not necessarily use these funds for water-related projects nor do they earmark water-use fees. Inconsistent legal provisions on water-use fees have led to competition between AEAs and RBAs, but also to initial collaborative arrangements. We conclude that in Mongolia, fiscal decentralisation and river basin management are, so far, hardly mutually supportive and we recommend a number of legal and financial adjustments. In particular, we recommend that responsibilities be distributed more clearly to reduce overlap and uncertainty; legal inconsistencies regarding water-use fees be clarified; funding be arranged according to tasks; and funding for RBAs be increased and minimum state-funding be provided to river basin councils (RBCs), so they can fulfil their mandates.