International audience ; This paper addresses public opinion on common European policies in foreign affairs and defence. It proposes three models of support for common policies in these fields. Drawing on Eurobarometer data, the analysis shows that instrumental self-interest and territorial identities contribute considerably to explaining support for common foreign affairs and defence policies. Moreover, support for common policies is strongly driven by domain-specific evaluations of the European Union's performance. These findings suggest that popular support for common European policies in foreign affairs and defence has an experiential base. Thus, elites have an incentive to respond to public opinion when making policy decisions, so this analysis supports the liberal view in international relations rather than the realist account.
In times of rising partisan polarization and increasing disenchantment with political elites, everyday political talk could constitute an important venue for citizen deliberation. Everyday political discussions offer ordinary people opportunities to strengthen deliberative skills, form considered preferences ,and hone political identities in relation to others. However, informal political discussions seldom follow the norms of formal deliberative fora, calling into question how often such everyday talk really enables democratic deliberation in the broader public. The answer is essential to assess the deliberative potential of everyday political talk and thus to understand its role in the deliberative system. Focusing on the democratic and deliberative standards of reason-giving, mutual respect, equality, and inclusion, we develop a multi-step model of democratic deliberation in everyday political talk, in which the potential for democratic deliberation depends on the presence of all four core standards. As individuals' propensity for democratic deliberation is likely to vary with their level of political involvement, both in terms of how much they care about politics and how strongly they identify with political groups, we consider both dimensions when modeling democratic deliberation in individuals' everyday political discussions. We test all steps of the model with data from a large panel survey tracing the informal political discussion networks of 18,079 German voters during the year leading up to the national elections in 2017. Our findings indicate that everyday political talk is more deliberative than expected, as the three core standards of democratic deliberation we can measure are largely upheld in people's political exchanges.
Der Datensatz beinhaltet eine zweiwellige Befragung unter Mitgliedern der CDU Berlin im Jahr 2015. Eingeladen wurden alle Mitglieder der CDU Berlin mit gültigen eMail Adressen. Die Einladung erfolgte durch die CDU-Parteiverwaltung mit personalisiertem Link. Die Befragung erfolgte online mit der Software Unipark. Zu keinem Zeitpunkt war es der CDU Berlin oder dem Forscherteam möglich, Antworten spezifischen Parteimitgliedern zuzuordnen. Das Frageprogramm umfasst soziodemographische Angaben, psychologische Konstrukte, Quizfragen zum politischen Wissen, Medienkonsum, Issue-Positionen und Werte, Einstellungen zur Berliner Landespolitik sowie Fragen zur Landespartei. -- This dataset consists of a two-panel survey among members of CDU Berlin. All members with valid eMail addresses were invited to participate in the survey. The invitation was send out by the party secretariat with personalized links. The survey was conducted online, using the software Unipark. At no time it was possible for either CDU Berlin or the team of researchers to link answers in the survey to specific party members. The questionnaire consists of socio-demographic information, psychological constructs, political knowledge, media consumption, issue positions and political values, attitudes towards state politics and questions about the state party. ; Der Datensatz beinhaltet eine zweiwellige Befragung unter Mitgliedern der CDU Berlin im Jahr 2015. Eingeladen wurden alle Mitglieder der CDU Berlin mit gültigen eMail Adressen. Die Einladung erfolgte durch die CDU-Parteiverwaltung mit personalisiertem Link. Die Befragung erfolgte online mit der Software Unipark. Zu keinem Zeitpunkt war es der CDU Berlin oder dem Forscherteam möglich, Antworten spezifischen Parteimitgliedern zuzuordnen. Das Frageprogramm umfasst soziodemographische Angaben, psychologische Konstrukte, Quizfragen zum politischen Wissen, Medienkonsum, Issue-Positionen und Werte, Einstellungen zur Berliner Landespolitik sowie Fragen zur Landespartei. -- This dataset consists of a two-panel survey among members of CDU Berlin. All members with valid eMail addresses were invited to participate in the survey. The invitation was send out by the party secretariat with personalized links. The survey was conducted online, using the software Unipark. At no time it was possible for either CDU Berlin or the team of researchers to link answers in the survey to specific party members. The questionnaire consists of socio-demographic information, psychological constructs, political knowledge, media consumption, issue positions and political values, attitudes towards state politics and questions about the state party. ; Mitglieder der CDU Berlin ; Mitglieder der CDU Berlin ; E-Mail Einladung aller Mitglieder mit gültigen E-Mail Adressen. ; E-Mail Einladung aller Mitglieder mit gültigen E-Mail Adressen. ; Web-basiert - Standardisierter Selbstausfüller ; Fixed form self-administered questionnaire: Web-based ; Web-basiert - Standardisierter Selbstausfüller ; Fixed form self-administered questionnaire: Web-based
This concluding chapter discusses changing German voters' behavior in the context of changing parties, campaigns, and media during the period of its hitherto most dramatically increased fluidity at the 2009, 2013, and 2017 federal elections. It summarizes the book's findings on three questions: How did the turbulences that increasingly characterize German electoral politics come about? How did they in turn condition voters' decision-making? How were electoral attitudes and choices affected by situational factors that pertained to the specifics of particular elections? Discussing the consequences of these developments the chapter finds that the ideological and affective polarization of the party system has increased, leading to a dualistic structure that pits the right-wing populist AfD against all other parties. It also shows how the formation of governments under the German parliamentary system of governance gets increasingly difficult. The chapter closes with speculations about the prospects of electoral politics in Germany. ; The open access publication of the edited volume "The Changing German Voter" was financially supported by the Leibniz Association's Open Access Publication Fund for Monographs, the University of Mannheim, and the DGfW.
Over the past half century, the behavior of German voters has changed profoundly. After a long period of stability, elections have dramatically altered their character—at first rather gradually, but during the past decade at an accelerated speed. Voters' decision-making has become much more volatile, rendering election outcomes less predictable. The long-term process of party system fragmentation that had already been going on for a while intensified sharply. A particularly conspicuous outcome of this period of turbulent electoral politics was the termination of Germany's exceptionality as one of the few European countries without a strong right-wing populist party. The chapter traces this development in detail. It identifies three distinctive phases of party system development: 1949 to 1976, 1980 to 2005, and 2009 to 2017. The topoi of realignment and dealignment are evoked as key concepts for interpreting the trends that have become increasingly visible since the second phase. ; The open access publication of the edited volume "The Changing German Voter" was financially supported by the Leibniz Association's Open Access Publication Fund for Monographs, the University of Mannheim, and the DGfW.
Research demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of American identity arguing that the normative content of American identity relates to political ideologies in the United States, but the sense of belonging to the nation does not. This paper replicates that analysis and extends it to the German and British cases. Exploratory structural equation modeling attests to cross-cultural validity of measures of the sense of belonging and norms of uncritical loyalty and engagement for positive change. In the 2010s, we find partisanship and ideology in all three nations explains levels of belonging and the two content dimensions. Interestingly, those identifying with major parties of the left and right in all three countries have a higher sense of belonging and uncritical loyalty than their moderate counterparts. The relationship between partisanship, ideology, and national identity seems to wax and wane over time, presumably because elite political discourse linking party or ideology to identity varies from one political moment to the next.
Research demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of American identity arguing that the normative content of American identity relates to political ideologies in the United States, but the sense of belonging to the nation does not. This paper replicates that analysis and extends it to the German and British cases. Exploratory structural equation modeling attests to cross-cultural validity of measures of the sense of belonging and norms of uncritical loyalty and engagement for positive change. In the 2010s, we find partisanship and ideology in all three nations explains levels of belonging and the two content dimensions. Interestingly, those identifying with major parties of the left and right in all three countries have a higher sense of belonging and uncritical loyalty than their moderate counterparts. The relationship between partisanship, ideology, and national identity seems to wax and wane over time, presumably because elite political discourse linking party or ideology to identity varies from one political moment to the next.
In: Caprara , G V , Vecchione , M , Schwartz , S H , Schoen , H , Bain , P G , Silvester , J , Cieciuch , J , Pavlopoulos , V , Bianchi , G , Kirmanoglu , H , Baslevent , C , Mamali , C , Manzi , J , Katayama , M , Posnova , T , Tabernero , C , Torres , C , Verkasalo , M , Lönnqvist , J E , Vondráková , E & Caprara , M G 2018 , ' The Contribution of Religiosity to Ideology : Empirical Evidences From Five Continents ' , Cross-Cultural Research , vol. 52 , no. 5 , pp. 524-541 . https://doi.org/10.1177/1069397118774233
The current study examines the extent to which religiosity account for ideological orientations in 16 countries from five continents (Australia, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Greece, Finland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Results showed that religiosity was consistently related to right and conservative ideologies in all countries, except Australia. This relation held across different religions, and did not vary across participant's demographic conditions (i.e., gender, age, income, and education). After controlling for basic personal values, the contribution of religiosity on ideology was still significant. However, the effect was substantial only in countries where religion has played a prominent role in the public sphere, such as Spain, Poland, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, and Turkey. In the other countries, the unique contribution of religiosity was marginal or small.
The current study examines the contribution of left-right (or liberal-conservative) ideology to voting, as well as the extent to which basic values account for ideological orientation. Analyses were conducted in 16 countries from five continents (Europe, North America, South America, Asia, and Oceania), most of which have been neglected by previous studies. Results showed that left-right (or liberal-conservative) ideology predicted voting in all countries except Ukraine. Basic values exerted a considerable effect in predicting ideology in most countries, especially in established democracies such as Australia, Finland, Italy, United Kingdom, and Germany. Pattern of relations with the whole set of 10 values revealed that the critical trade-off underlying ideology is between values concerned with tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people (universalism) versus values concerned with preserving the social order and status quo (security). A noteworthy exception was found in European postcommunist countries, where relations of values with ideology were small (Poland) or near to zero (Ukraine, Slovakia). ; Peer reviewed