Suchergebnisse

The European Green Deal (EGD) puts forward and engages with review mechanisms, such as the European Semester and policy monitoring, to ensure progress towards the long-term climate targets in a turbulent policy environment. Soft-governance mechanisms through policy monitoring have been long in the making, but their design, effects, and politics remain surprisingly under-researched. While some scholars have stressed their importance to climate governance, others have highlighted the difficulties in implementing robust policy monitoring systems, suggesting that they are neither self-implementing nor apolitical. This article advances knowledge on climate policy monitoring in the EU by proposing a new analytical framework to better understand past, present, and potential future policy monitoring efforts, especially in the context of the EGD. Drawing on Lasswell (1965), it unpacks the politics of policy monitoring by analysing who monitors, what, why, when, and with what effect(s). The article discusses each element of the framework with a view to three key climate policy monitoring efforts in the EU which are particularly relevant for the EGD, namely those emerging from the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, and the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (now included in the Energy Union Governance Regulation), as well as related processes for illustration. Doing so reveals that the policy monitoring regimes were set up differently in each case, that definitions of the subject of monitoring (i.e., public policies) either differ or remain elusive, and that the corresponding political and policy impact of monitoring varies. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of the findings for governing climate change by means of monitoring through the emerging EGD.

The European Green Deal (EGD) puts forward and engages with review mechanisms, such as the European Semester and policy monitoring, to ensure progress towards the long-term climate targets in a turbulent policy environment. Soft-governance mechanisms through policy monitoring have been long in the making, but their design, effects, and politics remain surprisingly under-researched. While some scholars have stressed their importance to climate governance, others have highlighted the difficulties in implementing robust policy monitoring systems, suggesting that they are neither self-implementing nor apolitical. This article advances knowledge on climate policy monitoring in the EU by proposing a new analytical framework to better understand past, present, and potential future policy monitoring efforts, especially in the context of the EGD. Drawing on Lasswell (1965), it unpacks the politics of policy monitoring by analysing who monitors, what, why, when, and with what effect(s). The article discusses each element of the framework with a view to three key climate policy monitoring efforts in the EU which are particularly relevant for the EGD, namely those emerging from the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, and the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (now included in the Energy Union Governance Regulation), as well as related processes for illustration. Doing so reveals that the policy monitoring regimes were set up differently in each case, that definitions of the subject of monitoring (i.e., public policies) either differ or remain elusive, and that the corresponding political and policy impact of monitoring varies. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of the findings for governing climate change by means of monitoring through the emerging EGD.

The European Green Deal (EGD) puts forward and engages with review mechanisms, such as the European Semester and policy monitoring, to ensure progress towards the long-term climate targets in a turbulent policy environment. Soft-governance mechanisms through policy monitoring have been long in the making, but their design, effects, and politics remain surprisingly under-researched. While some scholars have stressed their importance to climate governance, others have highlighted the difficulties in implementing robust policy monitoring systems, suggesting that they are neither self-implementing nor apolitical. This article advances knowledge on climate policy monitoring in the EU by proposing a new analytical framework to better understand past, present, and potential future policy monitoring efforts, especially in the context of the EGD. Drawing on Lasswell (1965), it unpacks the politics of policy monitoring by analysing who monitors, what, why, when, and with what effect(s). The article discusses each element of the framework with a view to three key climate policy monitoring efforts in the EU which are particularly relevant for the EGD, namely those emerging from the Energy Efficiency Directive, the Renewable Energy Directive, and the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (now included in the Energy Union Governance Regulation), as well as related processes for illustration. Doing so reveals that the policy monitoring regimes were set up differently in each case, that definitions of the subject of monitoring (i.e., public policies) either differ or remain elusive, and that the corresponding political and policy impact of monitoring varies. The article concludes by reflecting on the implications of the findings for governing climate change by means of monitoring through the emerging EGD.

Scholars have used varying terminology for describing non-state entities seeking to influence public policy or work with the EU's institutions. This paper argues that the use of this terminology is not and should not be random, as different 'frames' come with different normative visions about the role(s) of these entities in EU democracy. A novel bibliometric analysis of 780 academic publications between 1992 and 2020 reveals that three frames stand out: The interest group frame, the NGO frame, as well as the civil society organisation frame; a number of publications also use multiple frames. This article reveals the specific democratic visions contained in these frames, including a pluralist view for interest groups; a governance view for NGOs as 'third sector' organisations, and participatory and deliberative democracy contributions for civil society organisations. The use of these frames has dynamically changed over time, with 'interest groups' on the rise. The results demonstrate the shifting focus of studies on non-state actors in the EU and consolidation within the sub-field; the original visions of European policy-makers emerging from the 2001 White Paper on governance may only partially come true.

AbstractAs jurisdictions across the globe step up their efforts to adapt to climate change, it is important to assess progress by taking stock of and comparing adaptation policy. However, scholars and practitioners are struggling to conceptualize and measure adaptation policy. In this article, we propose a new two‐dimensional framework to measure public adaptation policy output, namely, the Climate Adaptation Policy Index (CAPI). The index combines multiple indicators from two core interdependent dimensions, namely, an institutionalization dimension focusing on strategic plans and administrative capacities for adaptation; and a measures dimension capturing concrete adaptation measures in relevant action areas such as in green and open spaces, transport infrastructure, buildings, public education, and disaster management. Our approach is extensive but feasible and may be adjusted for use in different contexts and policy areas. We probe our approach at the local level using original survey data from a diverse sample of 211 municipalities located in the state of Hessen in central Germany. A factor analysis suggests that the two dimensions constitute a meaningful measurement of municipal adaptation policy output. A cluster analysis identifies five groups of municipalities representing different stages of adaptation policy progress in Hessen. Finally, a regression analysis examines potential determinants of local adaptation policy making such as the size and wealth of municipalities. The results highlight the potential of the CAPI for analyzing both the state and the making of municipal adaptation policy.

ZusammenfassungMachen Parteien für die Klimapolitikgestaltung einen Unterschied? Diese Frage ist nicht nur angesichts des auf nationalen Beiträgen basierenden globalen Klimaregimes relevant, sondern auch, da die Klimapolitik häufig als stärker parteipolitisiert wahrgenommen wird als die Umweltpolitik im Allgemeinen. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage auf der kommunalen Ebene nach, die bislang in der Forschung zur umweltpolitischen Parteiendifferenzhypothese selten Beachtung findet. Am Beispiel des Bundeslandes Hessen prüfen wir erstens, ob Parteiendifferenzen eine Rolle für den Beitritt der hessischen Städte und Gemeinden zum Klimanetzwerk "Hessen aktiv: Die Klima-Kommunen" spielen. Zweitens prüfen wir, ob die Erstellung der obligatorischen Aktionspläne unter den Mitgliedern des Netzwerks mit Parteiendifferenzen in Zusammenhang steht. Die Untersuchung beruht auf einer Ereignisdatenanalyse der hessischen Städte und Gemeinden über den Zeitraum von 2009 bis 2020. Die Ergebnisse deuten an, dass von Grünen (Ober‑)Bürgermeister*innen regierte Städte und Gemeinden eher den Klima-Kommunen beitreten. Allerdings finden wir keine Hinweise darauf, dass sich die Erstellung der Aktionspläne, und damit ein konkreteres klimapolitisches Engagement, auf die Parteizugehörigkeit der (Ober-)Bürgermeister*innen zurückführen lässt. Allerdings zeigt sich, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Erstellung eines Aktionsplans mit der Stärke der Grünen in der Gemeindevertretung steigt. Diese heterogenen Ergebnisse lassen erkennen, dass die Parteiendifferenzhypothese auch zur Erklärung von Unterschieden in der kommunalen Klimapolitik beitragen könnte und dass weiterer Forschungsbedarf hierzu auf der lokalen Ebene besteht.

Machen Parteien für die Klimapolitikgestaltung einen Unterschied? Diese Frage ist nicht nur angesichts des auf nationalen Beiträgen basierenden globalen Klimaregimes relevant, sondern auch, da die Klimapolitik häufig als stärker parteipolitisiert wahrgenommen wird als die Umweltpolitik im Allgemeinen. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage auf der kommunalen Ebene nach, die bislang in der Forschung zur umweltpolitischen Parteiendifferenzhypothese selten Beachtung findet. Am Beispiel des Bundeslandes Hessen prüfen wir erstens, ob Parteiendifferenzen eine Rolle für den Beitritt der hessischen Städte und Gemeinden zum Klimanetzwerk "Hessen aktiv: Die Klima-Kommunen" spielen. Zweitens prüfen wir, ob die Erstellung der obligatorischen Aktionspläne unter den Mitgliedern des Netzwerks mit Parteiendifferenzen in Zusammenhang steht. Die Untersuchung beruht auf einer Ereignisdatenanalyse der hessischen Städte und Gemeinden über den Zeitraum von 2009 bis 2020. Die Ergebnisse deuten an, dass von Grünen (Ober‑)Bürgermeister*innen regierte Städte und Gemeinden eher den Klima-Kommunen beitreten. Allerdings finden wir keine Hinweise darauf, dass sich die Erstellung der Aktionspläne, und damit ein konkreteres klimapolitisches Engagement, auf die Parteizugehörigkeit der (Ober-)Bürgermeister*innen zurückführen lässt. Allerdings zeigt sich, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Erstellung eines Aktionsplans mit der Stärke der Grünen in der Gemeindevertretung steigt. Diese heterogenen Ergebnisse lassen erkennen, dass die Parteiendifferenzhypothese auch zur Erklärung von Unterschieden in der kommunalen Klimapolitik beitragen könnte und dass weiterer Forschungsbedarf hierzu auf der lokalen Ebene besteht.

Although systematic policy evaluation has been conducted for decades and has been growing strongly within the European Union (EU) institutions and in the member states, it remains largely underexplored in political science literatures. Extant work in political science and public policy typically focuses on elements such as agenda setting, policy shaping, decision making, or implementation rather than evaluation. Although individual pieces of research on evaluation in the EU have started to emerge, most often regarding policy "effectiveness" (one criterion among many in evaluation), a more structured approach is currently missing. This special issue aims to address this gap in political science by focusing on four key focal points: evaluation institutions (including rules and cultures), evaluation actors and interests (including competencies, power, roles and tasks), evaluation design (including research methods and theories, and their impact on policy design and legislation), and finally, evaluation purpose and use (including the relationships between discourse and scientific evidence, political attitudes and strategic use). The special issue considers how each of these elements contributes to an evolving governance system in the EU, where evaluation is playing an increasingly important role in decision making.