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Global governance of international banks is breaking down after the Great Financial Crisis, as national regulators are withdrawing on their home turf. New evidence presented illustrates that the global systemically important banks underpin the global financial system. This book offers solutions for the effective governance of global banks.

How can governments and companies be jointly empowered to have a positive impact on the sustainable development goals? The current economic system is largely geared towards increasing economic growth. But this could come at the expense of rising social inequality and environmental degradation.This paper examines the link between economic system outcomes and corporate sustainability outcomes. We provide evidence that governments and companies can reinforce each other in their pursuit of sustainable development. Sustainable development is based on three pillars: economic, social and environmental. These pillars should be assessed and balanced in an integrated way. An impact economy, in which governments and companies balance profit and impact, is best placed to achieve the sustainable development goals.

Central banks have already started to look at climate-related risks in the context of financial stability. Should they also take the carbon intensity of assets into account in the context of monetary policy? The guiding principle in the implementation of monetary policy has been 'market neutrality', whereby the central bank buys a proportion of the market portfolio of available corporate and bank bonds (in addition to government bonds). But this implies a carbon bias, because capital-intensive companies tend to be more carbon intensive. The author first reviews the legal mandate of the Eurosystem. While the primary objective is price stability, the Treaty on European Union allows the greening of monetary policy as a secondary objective. He proposes a tilting approach to steer or tilt the allocation of the Eurosystem's assets and collateral towards low-carbon sectors, which would reduce the cost of capital for these sectors relative to high-carbon sectors. This allocation policy must be designed so it does not affect the effective implementation of monetary policy. The working of the tilting approach is calibrated with data on European corporate and bank bonds. We find that a modest tilting approach could reduce carbon emissions in the corporate and bank bond portfolio by 44 per cent and lower the cost of capital of low carbon companies by 4 basis points. Our findings also suggest that such a low carbon allocation can be done without undue interference with the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Price stability, the primary objective, is, and should remain, the priority of the Eurosystem.

Central banks have already started to look at climate-related risks in the context of financial stability. Should they also take the carbon intensity of assets into account in the context of monetary policy? The guiding principle in the implementation of monetary policy has been 'market neutrality', whereby the central bank buys a proportion of the market portfolio of available corporate and bank bonds (in addition to government bonds). But this implies a carbon bias, because capital-intensive companies tend to be more carbon intensive. We first review the legal mandate of the Eurosystem. While the primary objective is price stability, the Treaty on European Union allows the greening of monetary policy as a secondary objective. We propose a tilting approach to steer or tilt the allocation of the Eurosystem's assets and collateral towards low-carbon sectors, which would reduce the cost of capital for these sectors relative to high-carbon sectors. This allocation policy must be designed so it does not affect the effective implementation of monetary policy. The working of the tilting approach is calibrated with data on European corporate and bank bonds. We find that a modest tilting approach could reduce carbon emissions in the corporate and bank bond portfolio by 44 per cent and lower the cost of capital of low carbon companies by 4 basis points. Our findings also suggest that such a low carbon allocation can be done without undue interference with the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Price stability, the primary objective, is, and should remain, the priority of the Eurosystem.

In the transition to a sustainable economy, companies are increasingly adopting the goal of long-term value creation, which integrates financial, social and environmental value. Investors have an important stewardship role to steer companies to sustainable business practices that will achieve long-term value creation. Policy proposals from the European Union High Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, published in January 2018, promote a fiduciary duty to include sustainability in investment, company disclosure of sustainability information and a unified classification system (or taxonomy) of sustainable investments from which investors can choose. A fiduciary duty to include sustainability in the investment process and to disclose sustainability information can accelerate sustainable investment. But an official taxonomy might stifle innovation in sustainable investment. While such a taxonomy might bring much needed clarity in certain markets, such as the emerging market for green bonds, the general approach to sustainable investment should be market-led. Investors and banks are best placed to assess which companies are prepared for the transition to a sustainable economy. This Policy Contribution proposes an active investment approach to sustainable investment. This active approach is based on fundamental analysis of companies' environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors and engagement with investee companies on material ESG factors. The aim is to uncover and realise companies' social and environmental value alongside their financial value. Building on previous research (De Jong et al, 2017), we present a six-point plan for sustainable investing. These points range from active investment in concentrated portfolios and long investment horizons, to deep engagement with companies and shorter investment chains.

The large global banks were at the heart of the global financial crisis. In response to the crisis, the international Financial Stability Forum was upgraded to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2009, with the full participation of finance ministers and even heads of government. The newly established FSB then published an integrated set of policy measures, such as capital surcharges and resolution plans, to address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Eight years later, it is time to take stock of the impact of these measures. We answer three questions on what happened to the G-SIBs. First, have they shrunk in size? Second, are they better capitalised? Third, and in reference to the reported end of global banking, have they reduced their global reach? Overall, the conclusion is that reports of the demise of global banking are premature, especially in the euro area.