Suchergebnisse

This volume examines the core ideas of moral rationalism: the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, the metaphysical thesis that it is the basis of moral requirements, the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori, and the normative thesis that moral requirements entail reasons for action.

This volume examines the core ideas of moral rationalism: the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgment, the metaphysical thesis that it is the basis of moral requirements, the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori, and the normative thesis that moral requirements entail reasons for action

Abstract
We defend the claim that there can be testimonial transfer of reasons against Steinig's recent objections. In addition, we argue that the literature on testimony about moral reasons misunderstands what is at stake in the possibility of second-hand orientation towards moral reasons. A moral community faces two different but related tasks: one theoretical (working out what things are of genuine value and how to rank goods and ends) and one practical (engaging in joint action and social coordination). In between, simultaneously theoretical and practical, lies the activity of co-deliberation. Virtuous participation in co-deliberation can require limited moral deference. Refusal to recognize this, combined with excess self-trust, can derail co-deliberation.

Abstract
This paper surveys recent work on moral expertise. Much of that work defends an asymmetry thesis according to which the cognitive deference to expertise that characterizes other areas of inquiry is out of place in morality. There are two reasons why you might think asymmetry holds. The problem might lie in the existence of expertise or in deferring to it. We argue that both types of arguments for asymmetry fail. They appear to be stronger than they are because of their focus on moral expertise regarding all-in judgments about rightness. We reject this emphasis on all-in judgment in favor of an account of moral expertise as typically multi-stranded and domain limited. This account of moral expertise is better able to address the problem of how to identify those who have expertise. It also offers a more nuanced picture of the contrast between accepting a moral claim on one's own and accepting it on testimony.