Suchergebnisse

The signaling trap -- How elections work in Vietnam -- "Unconditional party government" : legislative organization in the VNA -- Explaining the evolution of the VNA -- Mobilized or motivated? -- Explaining oversight behavior -- Intimidation or legitimation?

How does the salience of clientelism in politics impact voter support for women legislative candidates? Existing research finds little bias against women legislative candidates in survey experiments. Where bias exists, it is due to "role congruity," where voters penalize women because of a perceived lack of specific traits or issue preferences suitable for the position. Building on existing work, I theorize that the ability to deliver patronage is a "role" voters might find stereotypically incongruous with women. Using two waves of a nationally representative survey in Vietnam, I generate preregistered predictions about the impact of a clientelism prime on bias against women legislative candidates. I then test the prediction, with results showing that when clientelism is primed, bias against women candidates increases. These results provide evidence that clientelism has gendered effects on political representation. It also theorizes an additional "role" that could penalize women at the polls.

While Vietnam suffered economically due to COVID-19, the ruling Vietnam Communist Party burnished its image through its successful management of the crisis. This review examines the roots of the party's success and discusses why the party has nonetheless continued to stifle dissent. It also previews the 13th Party Congress.

Are representatives in authoritarian legislatures encouraged to take positions on salient issues? More generally, why do some autocracies allow public debate on hot topics at all? Understanding the dynamics of public legislative debate is important for the roles authoritarian legislatures are theorized to play in regime legitimation and information provision. I argue that the decision to allow public debate depends on autocratic incentives to mobilize public sentiment against the bureaucracy. While allowing debate on salient issues risks galvanizing antiregime sentiment, doing so may also mobilize public opinion against wayward government officials to improve performance and deflect blame. Therefore, I predict that autocrats will only allow public debate on issues they have delegated to the government. I test this using an automated content analysis of debate in the Vietnam National Assembly, with results showing evidence of position taking on salient issues, but only on issues the party delegates to the state.

Democracy is in decline – or so a growing consensus suggests. Paul Schuler sets out the evidence for claims that people are turning to autocratic alternatives, and asks whether they necessarily show a loss of faith in democracy. He proposes some alternative measures that could establish whether people are genuinely willing to trade freedom for a 'solution' to anxieties about immigration, inequality and globalisation.