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This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is uni-dimensional, there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the future polarization of political parties, and politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters. Three types of institutions are compared: direct democracy, representative democracy, where politicians are accountable and independent agencies, where they are not. Low uncertainty about the state of the world and the future electorate s preferences and high expected polarization make direct democracy optimal, while the opposite configuration makes representative democracy optimal. Independent agencies are optimal for intermediate values.

Entrepreneurship education has become a regular part of the higher education curriculum worldwide. However, the distinct impacts of different pedagogical methods remain unclear. I develop six hypotheses and test them on a sample of participants in a business plan course and a lean startup camp. While any entrepreneurship course participation contributes to the students' entrepreneurial intentions, students gain very different learning outcomes depending on the courses' types. The impact of the business plan course (a hybrid supply–demand model course) lies mainly in its ability to increase the interest in general entrepreneurial activity of students with initially low entrepreneurial intention. The lean startup camp (a competence model course) attracts participants who are already highly motivated and is effective in fostering the initiation of startup projects. As parts of a balanced strategy within an entrepreneurial university, both pedagogical methods can contribute substantially to different objectives of entrepreneurship education.

Nonprofit-Organisationen (NPO) spielen eine wichtige Rolle in Bereichen wie der sozialen Arbeit, dem Umweltschutz oder der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Um ihre Leistungen zu erbringen, sind sie auf die Unterstützung der Zivilgesellschaft angewiesen - etwa in Form von Spenden, Freiwilligenarbeit oder generell Goodwill.Eine wichtige Voraussetzung für diese Unterstützung ist das Vertrauen der potenziellen Unterstützer den Organisationen gegenüber. Anhand des Beispiels von spendensammelnden Hilfswerken wird klar, dass Reputation ein wichtiger Hebel zur Generierung von Vertrauen ist.Doch auch Emotionen und Werte spielen eine wichtige Rolle für das Verhältnis von NPO und ihren Unterstützern: Zum einen ermöglichen sie Identifikation und eine besonders enge Zielgruppenbindung, zum anderen erzeugen sie unter bestimmten Bedingungen ein Polster von Goodwill angesichts einer schlechten Reputation. Die Untersuchung kombiniert Grundlagenwissen mit Empirie und Implikationen für die Praxis

In several European merger cases competition authorities have demanded that the merging firm auctions off virtual capacity. The buyer of virtual capacity receives an option on an amount of output at a pre-specified price, typically equal to marginal cost. This output is sold in the market in competition with the merging firm. The paper compares sale of physical and virtual capacity by the merging firm and shows that virtual capacity leads to a less competitive outcome. The merging firm can build up a reputation for producing little, so that the output price increases in the market, and this increases the auction price on virtual capacity.

The paper investigates strategic campaigning in a model of redistributive politics in a society with many groups and two parties. Campaigns are informative, and parties can target campaigns to different groups. Voters are uncertain about whether parties fabor special groups. The parties will seek to target campaings at groups where most votes are gained by informating about policies. In equilibrium campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile. These groups will therefore be very well informed about policy and will accordingly be favored by the parties' policies.

This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is uni-dimensional, there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the future polarization of political parties, and politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters. Three types of institutions are compared: direct democracy, representative democracy, where politicians are accountable and independent agencies, where they are not. Low uncertainty about the state of the world and the future electorate's preferences and high expected polarization make direct democracy optimal, while the opposite configuration makes representative democracy optimal. Independent agencies are optimal for intermediate values.

The paper investigates strategic campaigning in a model of redistributive politics in a society with many groups and two parties. Campaigns are informative, and parties can target campaigns to different groups. Voters are uncertain about whether parties favor special groups. The parties will seek to target campaigns at groups where most votes are gained by informing about policies. In equilibrium campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile. These groups will therefore be very well informed about policy and will accordingly be favored by the parties' policies.

This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is uni-dimensional, there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the future polarization of political parties, and politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters. Three types of institutions are compared: direct democracy, representative democracy where politicians are accountable, and independent agencies where they are not. Low uncertainty about the state of the world and the future electorate's preferences and high expected polarization make direct democracy optimal, while the opposite configuration makes representative democracy optimal. Independent agencies are optimal for intermediate values.