Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between government and opposition parties influences threats in international crises and how rival states interpret those threats. Schultz uses game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies
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This article describes a new data set consisting of precise digital maps of regions that were the subject of interstate territorial disputes in the period 1947 to 2000. Each dispute identified by Huth and Allee is rendered as a polygon corresponding to the area subject to overlapping claims. After describing the data collection procedures and presenting some descriptive statistics, this article develops three novel results that demonstrate the potential of geospatial data to advance our understanding of the causes and consequences of territorial conflict. In particular, I use the data to (1) show how different measurements of the geographic extent of disputes can help unpack the mechanisms through which they dampen international trade, (2) cast doubt on the role of oil deposits in fueling territorial conflict by analyzing the relationship at a finer level of spatial resolution than previously possible, and (3) examine the harmful legacy of territorial conflict on local development in formerly contested regions along the El Salvador-Honduras border.
This article describes a new data set consisting of precise digital maps of regions that were the subject of interstate territorial disputes in the period 1947 to 2000. Each dispute identified by Huth and Allee is rendered as a polygon corresponding to the area subject to overlapping claims. After describing the data collection procedures and presenting some descriptive statistics, this article develops three novel results that demonstrate the potential of geospatial data to advance our understanding of the causes and consequences of territorial conflict. In particular, I use the data to (1) show how different measurements of the geographic extent of disputes can help unpack the mechanisms through which they dampen international trade, (2) cast doubt on the role of oil deposits in fueling territorial conflict by analyzing the relationship at a finer level of spatial resolution than previously possible, and (3) examine the harmful legacy of territorial conflict on local development in formerly contested regions along the El Salvador-Honduras border.
Research on the relationship between territorial disputes, militarized conflict, and economic integration occurs at the intersection of two large research programs in international relations: one linking territorial disputes to violence, and another exploring the effects of conflict on trade and vice versa. Although we know that territorial disputes fuel conflict and that conflict dampens trade, we know less about whether the prospects of economic gains contribute to the settlement of disputes and subsequent compliance with those settlements. I argue that research in this area could profitably adopt an emerging view of borders as institutions that not only distribute territory but also allow cooperation and the production of joint gains. This review identifies gaps in the existing literature on the resolution of territorial disputes and helps to reframe a persistent methodological challenge in this area: missing and noisy data on trade flows.
Research on the relationship between territorial disputes, militarized conflict, and economic integration occurs at the intersection of two large research programs in international relations: one linking territorial disputes to violence, and another exploring the effects of conflict on trade and vice versa. Although we know that territorial disputes fuel conflict and that conflict dampens trade, we know less about whether the prospects of economic gains contribute to the settlement of disputes and subsequent compliance with those settlements. I argue that research in this area could profitably adopt an emerging view of borders as institutions that not only distribute territory but also allow cooperation and the production of joint gains. This review identifies gaps in the existing literature on the resolution of territorial disputes and helps to reframe a persistent methodological challenge in this area: missing and noisy data on trade flows. Adapted from the source document.
This note uses a new data set on international territorial disputes and boundary agreements to explore whether and how legal commitments affect state behavior. Do border treaties reduce subsequent conflict simply through their effect on the distribution of the disputed good, or do treaties have legal and political implications such that a given distribution of territory has different effects depending on whether it is de facto or de jure? There are three main results. First, among states that have homeland territory disputes, the adoption of a legally binding border is associated with a significant reduction in the likelihood of future militarized conflict over the territory. Second, this effect is the same regardless of whether the treaty transfers territory or converts a de facto or contested border into a de jure border without changing the status quo distribution. Third, there is no equivalent reduction in conflict when states create explicitly provisional borders that allow them to retain their claims to areas that they do not possess. These findings suggest that border treaties do more than simply specify the distribution of territory and provide for transfers. By requiring states to renounce claims to territories that they do not receive, treaties generate ex ante costs of signing and/or ex post costs for reneging that explain their association with subsequent peace. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]
This note uses a new data set on international territorial disputes and boundary agreements to explore whether and how legal commitments affect state behavior. Do border treaties reduce subsequent conflict simply through their effect on the distribution of the disputed good, or do treaties have legal and political implications such that a given distribution of territory has different effects depending on whether it is de facto or de jure? There are three main results. First, among states that have homeland territory disputes, the adoption of a legally binding border is associated with a significant reduction in the likelihood of future militarized conflict over the territory. Second, this effect is the same regardless of whether the treaty transfers territory or converts a de facto or contested border into a de jure border without changing the status quo distribution. Third, there is no equivalent reduction in conflict when states create explicitly provisional borders that allow them to retain their claims to areas that they do not possess. These findings suggest that border treaties do more than simply specify the distribution of territory and provide for transfers. By requiring states to renounce claims to territories that they do not receive, treaties generate ex ante costs of signing and/or ex post costs for reneging that explain their association with subsequent peace.