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Why did pro-welfare Social Democrats and Christian Democrats cease to support the welfare state in the 1980s and 1990s, and support measures such as tighter welfare programme conditionality rules and lower social security benefits instead? Building on the party position change literature, I argue and empirically demonstrate that parties with an activist-dominated party organization adapt their position to shifts in the party voter position. Parties with a leadership-dominated party organization adapt their position to shifts in the median voter position. Parties in which neither leaders nor activists dictate party policy shift in the opposite direction of the previous policy shift if they are excluded from office. Using a cross-sectional time-series regression analysis of 181 position shifts of European Socialist, Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties in the period 1977-2003, I find strong evidence that party organization is a crucial mediating variable in explaining when these parties shift to the right or left. Demonstrating that differences in party organizations motivate parties to respond to different incentives, this study has implications for the relationship between party behaviour and welfare state policy-making. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Why did pro-welfare Social Democrats and Christian Democrats cease to support the welfare state in the 1980s and 1990s, and support measures such as tighter welfare programme conditionality rules and lower social security benefits instead? Building on the party position change literature, I argue and empirically demonstrate that parties with an activist-dominated party organization adapt their position to shifts in the party voter position. Parties with a leadership-dominated party organization adapt their position to shifts in the median voter position. Parties in which neither leaders nor activists dictate party policy shift in the opposite direction of the previous policy shift if they are excluded from office. Using a cross-sectional time-series regression analysis of 181 position shifts of European Socialist, Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties in the period 1977–2003, I find strong evidence that party organization is a crucial mediating variable in explaining when these parties shift to the right or left. Demonstrating that differences in party organizations motivate parties to respond to different incentives, this study has implications for the relationship between party behaviour and welfare state policy-making.

Abstract
Do political parties change their position when military casualties increase? Several studies demonstrate that once military casualties increase, public support for sometimes even the government itself declines. With this potential backlash, once governing parties are faced with military casualties, do they (1) maintain that intervention was the "right thing" to do and even escalate their commitment by becoming even more pro-military or (2) try to avoid the blame and downplay the issue, i.e., "not mentioning the war"? And do the opposition parties become more negative or more positive about the military? To evaluate this, we measure the position on military issues in parties' election manifestoes. Our dataset comprises 326 party policy changes in eleven Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and focuses on post-Cold War military interventions. By using pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis, we find that opposition parties and governing parties respond differently. Generally, governing parties become more negative in their manifesto and opposition parties more positive. We also demonstrate important differences between party families and pre/post-9/11. Our analyses show that whether political parties change policy course once confronted with negative outcomes depends on their position in office, and also the direction in which they change policy depends on political ideology.

Do politicians demand change if party support is slipping in opinion polls? If so, should a party change its program or just the way it communicates with voters? To investigate this, we conducted a survey experiment with 1236 Swedish politicians. We exposed them to a frame in which their party was losing in the polls, or a frame in which their party was gaining in the polls without using deception. Our results demonstrate that losing politicians seek change, both in terms of program and communication. However, the effects of the most recent polls are typically stronger than our experimental treatment. Along those lines we also find that politicians who are losing in recent polls, but not in our experimental treatment, favor ideological radicalization more than moderation or staying put. With these results our study paper speaks to the discussion on how representation is achieved and whether opinion polls are good or bad for democracy.

AbstractIn this study we focus on party organizational characteristics as key determinants of party congruence. We examine how the horizontal and vertical integration of parties is linked to representation in comparative perspective. We further focus on how congruence is achieved by detailing our expectation regarding effects on the uncertainty versus bias in the estimates of party constituents' opinion. Exploiting a comparative database on political parties and data from Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems, we show that having a complex organizational structure and being leadership dominated makes parties less representative of their constituencies. These findings carry important implications for the study of political representation but also for the literature on political parties in crisis.