Structural differences and the convergence to a European internal market
In: Discussion papers / Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung (IIMV)
15 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Discussion papers / Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung (IIMV)
World Affairs Online
In: Discussion papers
In: Strukturpolitik = Industrial policy 84,13
In: Discussion papers
In: Discussion papers
In: Strukturpolitik = Industrial policy 84,22
In: Vahlens Kurzlehrbücher
Dieses Lehrbuch führt Sie in die betriebliche Leistungserstellung ein. Dabei wird die Bedeutung der Produktionstheorie anhand realitätsnaher Beispiele erläutert. Zur Kontrolle des Lernerfolges finden Sie zahlreiche, in den Text integrierte Aufgaben. Die dazugehörigen Lösungen werden Ihnen am Ende des Buches präsentiert. Der Autor Prof. Dr. Joachim Schwalbach leitet das Institut für Management und ist Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Internationales Management an der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
In: Corporate governance: an international review, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 1-12
ISSN: 1467-8683
ABSTRACTManuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: We examine whether anti‐director laws and legal director liability rules affect the diligence of directors in setting the compensation of CEOs. The study uses a world‐wide data set covering 27 countries for the period 1995 to 2005.Research Findings/Results: Controlling for a number of legal and economic determinants, we find that independent of managerial risk‐aversion, CEO pay is always less generous under stricter anti‐director rules and a stronger rule of law. Director liability rules are associated with more generous pay schemes. The results persist once we control for the presence of institutional investors and cross‐listing in the US.Theoretical Implications: Our results suggest that there exists an agency conflict between shareholders and outside directors reflected in the degree to which directors act diligently when negotiating the pay contract with the CEO. However, this conflict may be alleviated by specific legal rules making boards more accountable to shareholders. Private measures of shareholder protection do not seem entirely capable of substituting for legal institutions.Practical Implications: Reducing managerial agency cost is commonly viewed as a desirable policy goal. We advocate the view that specific legal institutions that strengthen procedural rights of shareholders' voting on directors and the overall quality of the legal system help to achieve this goal. Director liability rules, however, appear to be ineffective for this purpose.
In: ZfB-Special Issues
Diversity management has recently attracted a lot of attention in both academia and practice. Globalization, migration, demographic changes, low fertility rates, a scarce pool of qualified labor, and women entering the workforce in large scales have led to an increasingly heterogeneous workforce in the past twenty years. In response to those ongoing changes, organizations have started to create work environments which address the needs and respond to the opportunities of a diverse workforce. The implementation of diversity policies and practices and the creation of an organizational culture that values heterogeneity have been the focus of recent organizational initiatives. This special issue aims at shedding light on some of open research questions by including both theoretical and empirical contributions
In: Managing Diversity in Organizations, S. 1-2
In: Corporate governance: an international review, Band 21, Heft 5, S. 413-419
ISSN: 1467-8683
In: The Economic Journal, Band 102, Heft 414, S. 1290
In: CEPS Working Document, No. 19
World Affairs Online
In: Anatomy of Civil Societies Research Project, 2012
SSRN
Working paper
In: Publications of the Society for Economics and Management at Humboldt-University Berlin