The perverse effects of the Robinson–Patman Act
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 733-757
ISSN: 1930-7969
13 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: The Antitrust bulletin: the journal of American and foreign antitrust and trade regulation, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 733-757
ISSN: 1930-7969
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
In: The Journal of Industrial Economics, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 298-327
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
In: Economica, Band 83, Heft 332, S. 564-583
ISSN: 1468-0335
An important question in horizontal merger analysis is what share of a firm's lost output from a unilateral price increase will divert to its merger partner. This 'diversion ratio' is often estimated using data on customer switching from a firm to its rivals ('churn'). We use a tractable oligopoly model to investigate the potential biases of such estimates, depending on what caused the churn: shifts in quality or marginal cost of the firm or of a rival; or demand‐side shifts due to changed circumstances or learning about product attributes. With demand‐side shifts, churn can be greater between more distant competitors.
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 442-460
ISSN: 1756-2171
This article analyzes the welfare effects of monopoly differential pricing in the important, but largely neglected, case where costs of service differ across consumer groups. Cost‐based differential pricing is shown to increase total welfare and consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing for broad classes of demand functions, even when total output falls or the output allocation between consumers worsens. We discuss why cost‐based differential pricing tends to be more beneficial for consumers than its demand‐based counterpart, third‐degree price discrimination. We also provide sufficient conditions for welfare‐improving differential pricing when costs and demands differ across consumer groups.
In: Journal of international economics, Band 37, Heft 3-4, S. 167-195
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 1
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: American economic review, Band 94, Heft 3, S. 802-803
ISSN: 1944-7981
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 100-124
ISSN: 1756-2171
AbstractWe analyze welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly markets that differ in costs of service, and establish general demand conditions for differential pricing by symmetric firms to increase consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare. The analysis reveals why competitive differential pricing is generally beneficial—more than price discrimination—but not always, including why profit may fall, unlike for monopoly. The presence of more competitors tends to enlarge consumers' share of the gain from differential pricing, though profits often still rise. When firms have asymmetric costs, however, profit or consumer surplus can fall even with 'simple' linear demands.
In: Review of Industrial Organization, Band 41, Heft 4
SSRN
In: Georgetown McDonough School of Business Research Paper No. 3974267
SSRN