Game Theory: 5 Questions
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 165, Heft 3, S. 558
ISSN: 1614-0559
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In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 165, Heft 3, S. 558
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Politeia. Notizie di Politeia, Band 16, Heft 59, S. 44-66
ISSN: 1128-2401
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6935
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6381
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 36, S. 1-12
In: European journal of political economy, Band 36, S. 1-12
ISSN: 1873-5703
We revisit the classical result that taxation of private consumption is distortionary and therefore precludes the efficient provision of public goods. We introduce a nonlinear consumption tax which we call a 'tax lottery'. Under this scheme, an ad-valorem consumption tax is supplemented with a lottery in which consumers can win cash prizes. The winning probabilities in this lottery depend on all consumers' private good consumption decisions. We show that for a given ad-valorem tax, an appropriately designed lottery can implement an efficient allocation in pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The lottery component corrects the distortion in private consumption due to the ad-valorem tax, while the resulting tax revenue is sufficient to efficiently provide the public good and pay out the lottery prize. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]
In: Public choice, Band 161, Heft 1-2
ISSN: 1573-7101
Decision-making processes are studied using non-standard all-pay structures. Our interest is motivated by regulatory, political, legal, military, and economic applications in which individual actions determine the consequences for a larger group or the general public. The common features of these examples are a competitive environment, a winner-takes-all reward structure, and some form of all-pay-all payment rule. Adapted from the source document.
In: Public choice, Band 161, Heft 1, S. 73-90
ISSN: 0048-5829
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Working paper
In: Public choice, Band 161, Heft 1-2, S. 73-90
ISSN: 1573-7101
We study decision making processes with non-standard all-pay structures. We motivate this interest through a group of regulatory, political, legal, military, and economic applications where individual actions determine the consequences for a larger group or the public. The common features of these examples are a competitive environment, winner-take-all reward structure, and some form of all-pay-all payment rule.
BASE
We revisit the classical result that financing a pure public good through taxation of private consumption is inefficient. To this standard setup we add a consumption contest in which consumers can win a prize. We show that an appropriately chosen contest - which we call a 'tax lottery' - can correct the distortion in private consumption while, at the same time, inducing efficient provision of the public good and balancing the government's budget. The result does not depend on whether the public good is provided exogenously or dependent on actual tax revenue. We show that neither pure fundraising contests nor a sales tax combined with a 'simple' lottery can induce efficiency in the standard environment.
BASE
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4472
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4228
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Working paper