Suchergebnisse

Exports have been rapidly increasing in South Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan) over the past 20 years. The ratio of exports to GDP has soared, but so has the ratio of imports to GDP. Thus, extemal trade did not provide a direct source of growth before the mid 70's in Taiwan, the early 80's in South Korea. In both countries, the United States and Japan account for more than 50 % of external trade. They are therefore hugely dépendant on the fluctuations of the world economy. Their GDP growth has been hampered in 1985 by the slowdown of world imports.
The State is a major agent in the making of économie décisions in both countries. But the stratégies hâve been différent as regards the building of manufacturing industry. The emphasis has been placed in South Korea on large firms heavily relying on capital borrowed in international markets, in Taiwan on small-scale entreprises using mainly national savings.
The increase of private consumption has been the main drive behind the growth of GDP and has enabled the standards of living to improve. Producti-vity is still growing faster than real wages in South Korea, but no more in Taiwan since the early 70's. Both économies are progressively shifting towards higher value-added productions, whereas their initial development relied mainly upon a low-paid and abundant labor force.
Both économies are faced with the risk of a market slowdown of world imports during the coming 2 years. Conséquences would be harder for Taiwan where private consumption is less dynamic. In the longer run, South Korea and Taiwan will be faced with a more acute compétition from other asiatic nations. They will therefore try to shift further their productive capaci-ties towards higher value-added activities and to enlarge the geographical scope of their exports.

Depuis le début des années 1980 les excédents commerciaux japonais sont spectaculaires, mais aussi leurs emprunts à l'étranger ; tandis que l'excès d'épargne intérieure sur l'investissement provoque des sorties massives de capitaux. Ce qui fait du Japon une plaque tournante non seulement commerciale, mais aussi financière. Le rapide développement de l'économie a bénéficié d'une démographie favorable depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale. L'émergence de nouvelles activités et les chocs pétroliers ont suscité des restructurations répétées. Celles-ci ont permis d'enrayer le laminage des profits, renforçant la mainmise de l'industrie sur l'économie. Engagés dans une phase de rattrapage des pays les plus riches, les Japonais ont payé l'intense effort de modernisation par une pause des salaires réels depuis dix ans et un surcroît d'épargne. Leur consommation n'est pas à la mesure de leur travail. Le passage, au milieu des années 1970, d'un endettement des entreprises à celui de l'Etat a favorisé l'éclosion de nouveaux marchés financiers et rendu moins efficace le contrôle direct de la liquidité. La régulation par les taux d'intérêt est privilégiée depuis 1980. L'internationalisation du yen pourrait la remettre en cause. Le freinage des dépenses publiques amorcé en 1980 et la privatisation d'entreprises publiques déficitaires se heurtent à des limites ; mais la faiblesse de la pression fiscale laisse une marge de manœuvre. Depuis 1983 la reprise américaine a permis aux entreprises japonaises de hautes technologies de développer massivement leurs exportations, et a amplifié la vague de modernisation. La production industrielle s'est acrrue de 20 %. En dépit de l'amélioration de l'emploi, la croissance du pouvoir d'achat a été lente et la consommation n'a progressé que de 6 % en deux ans. Le redressement des profits a restauré la confiance des entrepreneurs. L'investissement prendra le relais des exportations, permettant de maintenir un rythme de croissance de 5 à 6 % jusqu'en 1986. A plus long terme le Japon aura à faire face aux difficultés nées de ses excédents commerciaux, engendrés par son goût de l'épargne et de la compétition, et, d'autre part, au vieillissement de sa population.

The collapse of oil prices together with the depreciation of the dollar fail to bring the world economy back to its pre-oil shock situation. At the beginning of spring, the real price of oil is still twice what it was at the end of 1973. Besides, many decisions in the field of investment and indebtedness cannot be reversed. Lastly, the relative weight of trading partners has considerably altered. In spite of these shifts, Japan, Europe and the USA will benefit from the ongoing counter shocks. Terms of trade will soar in the first two regions, enabling them to enjoy an accelerated rate of growth and, at least until the end of 1986, an improvment in their balance of current account. The third of these countries could more easily reduce its imbalances both budgetary and external. The results of all these movements are still uncertain where latin America and Asia are concerned ; much will depend on the attitude of developped countries as regards a decrease of interest rates and the spreading of protectionism. OPEC and Africa will be the main losers.
This new international environment might boost France's economic growth by 1 %. Household consumption will be sustained by and increase in real disposable income following two years of decline, an by a decrease in the saving ratio as rebuilding financial assets calls for less savings in a time of low inflation. Investment will be somewhat pulled by the upsurge of demand and the growth of profits, but those are still small relatively to the capital stock, while reducing indebtedness remains a top priority for the firms. The trade balance will remain positive albeit the industrial balance will deteriorate further as imports will soar while exports lack competitiveness. The rate of inflation might fall under 2 %. Real interest rates will remain high despite the lowering of nominal interest rates.