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The political economy of intellectual property treaties
In: NBER working paper series 9114
Patents in the University: Priming the Pump and Crowding Out
In: NBER Working Paper No. w19252
SSRN
Cap-and-Trade, Emissions Taxes, and Innovation
In: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Band 11, S. 29-54
ISSN: 1537-2618
Openness, Open Source, and the Veil of Ignorance
In: American economic review, Band 100, Heft 2, S. 165-171
ISSN: 1944-7981
The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties
Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protections. I address the positive question of when countries would want to treat foreign inventors the same as domestic inventors, and how their incentive to do so depends on reciprocity. I also investigate an equlibrium in which regional policy makers choose IP policies that serve regional interests, conditional on each other's policies, and investigate the degree to which "harmonization" can redress the resulting inefficiencies.
BASE
The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties
In: NBER Working Paper No. w9114
SSRN
The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties
Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protections. I characterize the circumstances in which countries would want to treat foreign inventors the same as national inventors. I then argue that national treatment of foreign inventors leads to stronger intellectual property protection than is optimal, and that this effect is exacerbated when protections must be harmonized. However levels of public and private R&D spending will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated externalities that its R&D spending confers on other countries. The stronger protection engendered by attempts at harmonization are a partial remedy.
BASE
The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties
Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protections. I characterize the circumstances in which countries would want to treat foreign inventors the same as national inventors. I then argue that national treatment of foreign inventors leads to stronger intellectual property protection than is optimal, and that this effect is exacerbated when protections must be harmonized. However levels of public and private R&D spending will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated externalities that its R&D spending confers on other countries. The stronger protection engendered by attempts at harmonization are a partial remedy.
BASE
The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties
SSRN
Working paper
On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 30, Heft 2, S. 181
ISSN: 1756-2171
Externality pricing in club economies
In: Ricerche economiche, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 347-366
ISSN: 0035-5054
Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products be Patentable?
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 27, Heft 2, S. 322
ISSN: 1756-2171