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The fates of "transboundary" environmental systems depend on how nation states interact with one another. In the absence of a hegemon willing and able to coerce other states into avoiding a "tragedy of the commons," shared environments will be safeguarded if international cooperation succeeds and degraded or even destroyed if it fails. Treaties and related institutions of international law give form to these efforts to cooperate. Often, they implore states to act in their collective (as opposed to their national) interests. Sometimes, they impel cooperating states to punish free riders. A few agreements coordinate states' behavior. Here, I present simple game-theoretic models showing whether and how treaties and related institutions can change incentives, aligning states' self-interests with their collective interests. I show that, as a general matter, states struggle to cooperate voluntarily and enforce agreements to cooperate but that they find it relatively easy to coordinate actions. In some cases, the need for coordination is manifest. In other cases, it requires strategic thinking. Coordination may fall short of supporting an ideal outcome, but it nearly always works better than the alternatives.

What the world does or does not do about climate change will have profound implications. If the world fails to act, we may cross a climate tipping point, with disastrous consequences all around. No country by itself can prevent this, but a substantial number of countries working together can avert disaster. Collectively, we know what we need to do. However, can we agree on what each of us should do? Can we be assured that, if we act, others will fulfill their pledges? An experimental paper in PNAS (1) provides reasons for optimism and despair, optimism because, with communication, outcomes improve; despair because intransigence by a few countries can block progress. A key impediment to success, this paper (1) shows, is overcoming historical inequities.

According to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, global collective action is needed to stabilize "greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous [our emphasis] anthropogenic interference with the climate system." The Framework Convention thus implies that, on the far side of some critical concentration level, climate change will be "dangerous," while on the near side of the threshold, climate change will be "safe" (though perhaps still undesirable). Rather than be linear and smooth, the Framework Convention warns that climate change may be "abrupt and catastrophic."

Previous research shows that collective action to avoid a catastrophic threshold, such as a climate "tipping point", is unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of crossing the threshold but that collective action collapses if the location of the threshold is uncertain. Theory suggests that behavior should differ dramatically either side of a dividing line for threshold uncertainty. Inside the dividing line, where uncertainty is small, collective action should succeed. Outside the dividing line, where uncertainty is large, collective action should fail. We test this prediction in the experimental lab. Our results strongly support the prediction: behavior is highly sensitive to uncertainty around the dividing line.

AbstractThis article is concerned with situations in which avoiding a catastrophic outcome requires collective action. Using the logic of simple game theory, I identify circumstances that would cause rational players to act so as to guarantee that a catastrophe occurs, even when it is in their collective interests to avoid such an outcome – and when these players have the means at their disposal to ensure that such an outcome is avoided. I also identify circumstances that would cause rational players to act in concert to avert a catastrophe, and explain why other circumstances that might seem relevant to explaining these outcomes may be entirely inconsequential. Most of my discussion focuses on climate change. However, I also explain the relevance of the approach to three other areas: the millennium bug, drug resistance and nuclear arms control. In the final sections I discuss whether and how institutions might be designed to overcome, or at least reduce the likelihood of, catastrophic collective‐action failures at the international level.

The fates of "transboundary" environmental systems depend on how nation states interact with one another. In the absence of a hegemon willing and able to coerce other states into avoiding a "tragedy of the commons," shared environments will be safeguarded if international cooperation succeeds and degraded or even destroyed if it fails. Treaties and related institutions of international law give form to these efforts to cooperate. Often, they implore states to act in their collective (as opposed to their national) interests. Sometimes, they impel cooperating states to punish free riders. A few agreements coordinate states' behavior. Here, I present simple game-theoretic models showing whether and how treaties and related institutions can change incentives, aligning states' self-interests with their collective interests. I show that, as a general matter, states struggle to cooperate voluntarily and enforce agreements to cooperate but that they find it relatively easy to coordinate actions. In some cases, the need for coordination is manifest. In other cases, it requires strategic thinking. Coordination may fall short of supporting an ideal outcome, but it nearly always works better than the alternatives.

Abstract