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AbstractUnderstanding the social dynamics of public opposition to religious symbols is a pressing issue. This research finds that stereotypes of how committed group members are to the national community shape support for the right to wear religious symbols in various settings. These social perceptions are particularly influential in determining support for the rights of Muslims to wear religious symbols. Drawing on data from a national survey experiment (N = 974) conducted in Canada, the results show Christians benefit from a particularly strong perceived commitment to the nation, while religious minorities are stereotyped as less committed and identified to the country than the average Canadian. As the perceived national commitment of religious minorities increases, however, the gap in support shown for the rights of Christians over religious minorities disappears and may lead to particularly strong support for the rights of Muslims to wear religious symbols in public when perceptions of national commitment are high.

PurposeThis article addresses the relationship of universities to their changing regulatory environments internationally.Design/methodology/approachThis article updates analysis published in 2004 exploring the contrasting modes of, and key trends in, regulation of higher education across eight OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) states. The article offers a wider analysis of the changing patterns of regulation rooted in mutuality, oversight, competition and design, and the implications for the management of higher education institutions.FindingsSince 2004, higher education has seen more growth in oversight-based and competition-based regulation, but also some decentralization of regulation as an increasing cast of actors, many international and transnational in character, have asserted themselves in key aspects of the regulatory environment. This article explores the implications of these changes in the regulatory mix over higher education for the ways that universities manage their regulatory environment, arguing first, that there is significant evidence of meta-regulatory approaches to regulating universities, and second, that such a meta-regulatory approach is consistent with an emphasis on university autonomy, raising a challenge for universities in how to use the autonomy (variable by country) they do have to manage their environment.Originality/valueThis article offers an original analysis of how universities might most appropriately respond, deploying their autonomy, however variable, to address their external regulatory environment. The author suggests we might increasingly see the external regulatory environment as meta-regulatory in character and universities making more use of reflexive governance processes.

There has been a global trend towards greater dependence on regulation in contemporary governance in the period since the 1980s, notably within the member states of the OECD, but also more widely. This chapter examines how these trends have played out in Ireland and examines how we might understand the general trends and also those explanations particular to Ireland. The chapter first addresses the trend towards the establishment of regulatory agencies in Ireland and next considers the more diffuse forms of regulatory governance arising from both international obligations and the deployment of private rules. It concludes with an assessment of how trends in regulation have shaped the oversight of the public sector, both over regulatory activities in particular, and in respect of politics and public services more generally, establishing modes of accountability for public sector activity that are substantially non-parliamentary. ; 12 month embargo - ROR

The management of commitments by higher education institutions to equality, diversity and inclusion both for employees and students presents significant challenges. The implementation of measures to comply with legislative equality requirements, the indicators of commitment to formal equality, do not deliver anything like equality of outcome. This creates the challenge as to how universities may articulate and act on commitments which go beyond formal equality and which may be expected to build a culture of equality, diversity and inclusion. This article addresses the incorporation of equality values and objectives in institutional strategy and the governance arrangements to define, develop and implement measures to address the objectives. Analysing contrasting and coordinated modes of governing I note that a reflexive approach tends to shift regulatory emphasis from control to learning as the basis for effective action. I conclude that it is appropriate and possible that higher education institutions should, to a significant extent, be able to think of themselves as governing EDI matters as much through reflexive learning as through the aspiration to control.

Implementation is a key concept in the language of public policy as a field both of practice and of scholarship. The concept is less well developed in administrative law, but can be put to use in examining the daily practices of street level bureaucrats in giving effect to government programmes in such areas as welfare, housing, health, industrial policy, transport and so on. A focus on implementation takes us to what are frequently for administrative lawyers 'the dark and windowless areas of the administration (Harlow and Rawlings 2009: 201), since they are not very visible from the perspective of a court-centred approach to administrative law which largely focuses on judicial review. Today, of course, the development of a wide range of mechanisms for supporting the achievement of administrative justice means there is a greater focus by lawyers on such ground level decisions and actions which constitute the implementation of government programmes. The literature has largely focused on the broadening range instruments of accountability and control for decisions rather than primary decision making itself. Arguably, if the architecture of accountability and control was working well, administrative decisions would be properly made and would not need to call on such external scrutiny frequently. A key function of administrative law and administrative justice is to support decisions being made and implemented well on the ground. There is a potential tension between managerial concerns with effective and efficient decision making, on the one hand, and public law values of accountability, equality and legality on the other (Christensen, Goerdel et al. 2011). The focus of this chapter is on that first level implementation of administrative decisions and actions. I have aimed to pitch the analysis at a level of generality such that it captures key questions and trends relating to implementation across contemporary public administration within the member states of OECD. But the analysis has the potential to illuminate the core functions involved in implementation and the variety in how those functions are executed in terms of levels of government, actors and modes across any system of government. The Chapter concludes with an assessment of the role both of proactive and reactive modes of accountability and oversight in supporting legitimate and effective street level implementation.

As regulation boomed as an instrument of public policy, from the 1980s, so it has also become a major field for scholarly research which draws on a remarkably wide range of disciplines, including accounting, anthropology, criminology, economics, geography, law, political science and sociology. Regulatory governance today has its own major conferences and journals (notably Regulation & Governance), titled professorships and thriving graduate programmes. In Governing Through Regulation: Public Policy, Regulation and Law, Eric Windholz argues that much of the scholarly literature is insufficiently engaged with and accessible to practitioners. A key objective of this volume is to engage the burgeoning practice community with the central ideas of contemporary regulatory governance scholarship. Windholz's readership is 'persons who find themselves working with regulation …' recognising that the practitioner is increasingly likely to be a postgraduate student of regulation. ; Update citation detail during checkdate report - AC

A key trend for consumer law and policy in Europe has been the progressive expansion of consumer rights. It has long been recognized that the vindication of consumer rights is challenging. The expansion of consumer rights from the 1960s was accompanied by the establishment of proactive regulatory agencies whose enforcement powers complement and to some degree displace mechanisms of individual consumer enforcement. In April 2018 the European Commission proposed extensive reforms of consumer law and policy in its New Deal for Consumers, a key component of which is a further significant shift away from judicial enforcement. This trend is balanced by new proposals to enhance opportunities for collective consumer redress. In this article I offer an assessment of where we are today with the varied mechanisms and trends for enforcement of consumer law and where we are heading, not simply with the New Deal for Consumers, but also with related policies such as the Digital Single Market Strategy. Overall the pattern suggests a number of key trends including: a shift from reactive to more proactive modes of enforcement; from individuated to more collective modes; more evidence of meta-regulatory approaches, and; greater cooperation in enforcement (both public private and transnational). These trends are not necessarily consistent as between each other, generating potential for tensions between approaches and underlying assumptions about both purposes and effectiveness in consumer law and policy.
Consumer Law, Enforcement, European Union

The centrality of regulation among the tools deployed by governments is well established in the social science literature. Regulation of public sector bodies by non-state organizations is an important but neglected aspect of contemporary governance arrangements. Some private regulators derive both authority and power from a legal mandate for their activities. Statutory powers are exercised by private regulators where they are delegated or contracted out. Contractual powers take collective (for example, self-regulatory) and individuated forms. But a further important group of private regulators, operating both nationally and internationally, lack a legal mandate and yet have the capacity to exercise considerable power in constraining governments and public agencies. In a number of cases private regulators operate more complete regulatory regimes (in the sense of controlling standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement elements) than is true of public regulators. While private regulators may enhance the scrutiny given to public bodies (and thus enhance regimes of control and accountability), their existence suggests a need to identify the conditions under which such private power is legitimately held and used. One such condition is the existence of appropriate mechanisms for controlling or checking power. Such controls may take the classic form of public oversight, but may equally be identified in the checks exercised by participation in communities or markets.

The centrality of regulation among the tools deployed by governments is well established in the social science literature. Regulation of public sector bodies by non-state organizations is an important but neglected aspect of contemporary governance arrangements. Some private regulators derive both authority and power from a legal mandate for their activities. Statutory powers are exercised by private regulators where they are delegated or contracted out. Contractual powers take collective (for example, self-regulatory) and individuated forms. But a further important group of private regulators, operating both nationally and internationally, lack a legal mandate and yet have the capacity to exercise considerable power in constraining governments and public agencies. In a number of cases private regulators operate more complete regulatory regimes (in the sense of controlling standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement elements) than is true of public regulators. While private regulators may enhance the scrutiny given to public bodies (and thus enhance regimes of control and accountability), their existence suggests a need to identify the conditions under which such private power is legitimately held and used. One such condition is the existence of appropriate mechanisms for controlling or checking power. Such controls may take the classic form of public oversight, but may equally be identified in the checks exercised by participation in communities or markets.

The global financial crisis came in the wake of significant reforms to the structures, processes, powers, and rules of the regulatory regimes for financial markets in many of the countries adversely affected by the crash. The global financial crisis came in the wake of significant reforms to the structures, processes, powers, and rules of the regulatory regimes for financial markets in many of the countries adversely affected by the crash. In this Article, I follow the logic of an argument that regulation necessarily has political dimensions, even where it may appear technical. I am asking questions about how we might best think about accountability processes that encompass both democratic and technical dimensions of regulation and how their respective concerns might be combined with-in accountability regimes. Conceiving of accountability as embracing both technical and political requirements draws us towards a parallel world in which the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation is a core part of oversight concerns, alongside the issue of democratic concern with procedures.