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The refusal of the United States to consider itself bound by the recent decision in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, coupled with the earlier termination of its adherence to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, has sparked a small storm of controversy and concern. Part of this concern involves how the United States, presumably a law-abiding and law-respecting nation, could possibly bring itself to snub the International Court of Justice and, by extension, the ideal of international law. Another part of this concern involves the likely consequences of the United States move on the vitality of the Court as the focal institution of a slowly evolving system of international law. A less obvious concern, but arguably one of paramount importance, calls into question the wisdom of insisting that the ICJ retain its optional compulsory jurisdiction. It is this less obvious concern that we propose to discuss here.

Kommentar zum Urteil des International Court of Justice vom 27.6.1986 im Verfahren über die Klage gegen die USA wegen militärischer und paramilitärischer Aktivitäten in und gegen Nikaragua

This article evaluates the effectiveness of traditional state primary classification schemes as tools for the study of state primary systems. It calls into question the traditional categories (open, closed, and blanket) and analyzes the validity of research based on these categories. It is also argued that alternative classification schemes fail to overcome problems endemic to the traditional scheme. The authors introduce as a corrective the notion of "subject-relevance"—the notion that primary classifications must be made through the use of criteria relevant to specific end-view studies of state primaries. The authors conclude that state primary classification schemes have an acceptable heuristic function only if the requirement of subject-relevance is followed in their construction and only if the limitations of subject-relevance are acknowledged in their future use.

This article will discuss the scope and nature of constitutional protection to be afforded political party autonomy by the first and fourteenth amendments. The purpose of the present discussion is to review both legal and political sides of this question. Once this is done it will become clear that a party right to protected autonomy during the candidate selection process is not only founded upon solid constitutional ground but is also in keeping with sound political wisdom.