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Alarms and false alarms -- Pyroclastic density currents and lahars : agents of death and destruction -- United States : Mount Katmai (Novarupta), Alaska -- United States : Mount St. Helens, Washington -- China, natural dams : natural and coseismic -- Colombia, Nevado del Ruiz : day of reckoning -- Colombia, Nevado del Huila : la avalancha -- Mexico, Citlaltépetl and the trans-Mexican volcanic belt -- Mexico, Popocatéptl and the eagle warriors -- Mexico, Volcanes de Colima : debris avalanches.

Attempts to demonstrate that law systematically influences the behavior of the justices of the Supreme Court have traditionally foundered on the inability to provide systematic tests for such influence. At the same time, attitudinalists have traditionally asserted that the influence of law and policy preferences must be mutually exclusive, which is an unreasonably high standard. In this article, I develop a model of what federalism might look like to a Supreme Court justice. In doing so, I emphasize the difference between constitutional and political federalism but in the context of the judicial role in federalism. The model is then tested by looking at the pro-state bloc in the late Rehnquist Court, finding that four of the five justices can be considered federalists. The evidence presented here can be taken as a test of the influence of law beyond the influence of ideology of Supreme Court justices. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2008.]

Attempts to demonstrate that law systematically influences the behavior of the justices of the Supreme Court have traditionally foundered on the inability to provide systematic tests for such influence. At the same time, attitudinalists have traditionally asserted that the influence of law and policy preferences must be mutually exclusive, which is an unreasonably high standard. In this article, I develop a model of what federalism might look like to a Supreme Court justice. In doing so, I emphasize the difference between constitutional and political federalism but in the context of the judicial role in federalism. The model is then tested by looking at the pro-state bloc in the late Rehnquist Court, finding that four of the five justices can be considered federalists. The evidence presented here can be taken as a test of the influence of law beyond the influence of ideology of Supreme Court justices.

Objectives: Recent work on Supreme Court decision making has argued that different areas of law demonstrate the creation of jurisprudential regimes, which alter the importance of different case facts to the justices, suggesting that the justices do alter their behavior in response to changes in the law. However, the work on jurisprudential regimes has suggested that all justices, or at least all justices who participate in establishing the regime, react similarly to the regime creation. Methods: I separate out the justices who support the establishment of the regime and those who oppose the establishment of the regime to test the hypothesis that majority and dissenting justices react differently to the creation of jurisprudential regimes. Results: Both sets of justices react to the establishment of the regime, but the change in behavior of the dissenters occurs after that of the majority. Conclusions: These results suggest that the impact of jurisprudential regimes may be even more substantial than previously believed. Tables, Figures, 2, References. Adapted from the source document.

Objectives. Recent work on Supreme Court decision making has argued that different areas of law demonstrate the creation of jurisprudential regimes, which alter the importance of different case facts to the justices, suggesting that the justices do alter their behavior in response to changes in the law. However, the work on jurisprudential regimes has suggested that all justices, or at least all justices who participate in establishing the regime, react similarly to the regime creation.Methods. I separate out the justices who support the establishment of the regime and those who oppose the establishment of the regime to test the hypothesis that majority and dissenting justices react differently to the creation of jurisprudential regimes.Results. Both sets of justices react to the establishment of the regime, but the change in behavior of the dissenters occurs after that of the majority.Conclusions. These results suggest that the impact of jurisprudential regimes may be even more substantial than previously believed.