"Recent cohorts of college enrollees are more likely to work, and work substantially more, than those of the past. October CPS data reveal that average labor supply among 18 to 22-year-old full-time undergraduates nearly doubled between 1970 and 2000, rising from 6 hours to 11 hours per week. In 2000 over half of these "traditional" college students were working for pay in the reference week, and the average working student worked 22 hours per week. After 2000, labor supply leveled off and then fell abruptly in the wake of the Great Recession to an average of 8 hours per week in 2009. This paper considers several explanations for the long-term trend of rising employment-including compositional change and rising tuition costs-and considers whether the upward trend is likely to resume when economic conditions improve"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
In this Brookings report, the author analyzes new data on student debt and repayment, released by the U.S. Department of Education in October 2017. Previously available data have been limited to borrowers only, follow students for a relatively short period (3–5 years) after entering repayment, and had only limited information on student characteristics and experiences. The new data allow for the most comprehensive assessment to date of student debt and default from the moment students first enter college, to when they are repaying loans up to 20 years later, for two cohorts of first-time entrants (in 1995–96 and 2003–04). This report provides a broader perspective on student debt and default that considers all college entrants rather than just borrowers, provides substantially longer follow-up, and enables a more detailed analysis of trends over time and heterogeneity across subgroups than previously possible. Trends for the 1996 entry cohort show that cumulative default rates continue to rise between 12 and 20 years after initial entry. Applying these trends to the 2004 entry cohort suggests that nearly 40 percent may default on their student loans by 2023. The new data show the importance of examining outcomes for all entrants, not just borrowers, since borrowing rates differ substantially across groups and over time. For example, for-profit borrowers default at twice the rate of public two-year borrowers (52 versus 26 percent after 12 years), but because for-profit students are more likely to borrow, the rate of default among all for-profit entrants is nearly four times that of public two-year entrants (47 percent versus 13 percent). The new data underscore that default rates depend more on student and institutional factors than on average levels of debt. For example, only 4 percent of white graduates who never attended a for-profit defaulted within 12 years of entry, compared to 67 percent of black dropouts who ever attended a for-profit. And while average debt per student has risen over time, defaults are highest among those who borrow relatively small amounts. Debt and default among black college students is at crisis levels, and even a bachelor's degree is no guarantee of security: black bachelor's degree graduates default at five times the rate of white bachelor's degree graduates (21 versus 4 percent), and are more likely to default than white dropouts. Trends over time are most alarming among for-profit colleges; out of 100 students who ever attended a for-profit, 23 defaulted within 12 years of starting college in the 1996 cohort compared to 43 in the 2004 cohort (compared to an increase from just 8 to 11 students among entrants who never attended a for-profit). The results suggest that diffuse concern with rising levels of average debt is misplaced. Rather, the results provide support for robust efforts to regulate the for-profit sector, to improve degree attainment and promote income-contingent loan repayment options for all students, and to more fully address the particular challenges faced by college students of color.
Since its inception in 1972, the Pell Grant program has expanded dramatically in size and scope. With 9.4 million individuals receiving $35 billion in funds in 2011–12 for programs ranging from short-term certificates in automotive technology to four year degrees in art history, the program is the federal government's flagship effort to develop both general human capital and specific workforce skills. Yet the structure of the program—a one-size-fits-all voucher originally designed for recent high school graduates from poor families—has remained fundamentally unchanged. In the face of growing concerns about the sustainability of current funding, as well as increasing frustration with low rates of degree completion, we argue that the time has come to comprehensively redesign the Pell program to fit the needs of a twenty-first-century economy and student population. To accomplish this, we propose three major structural reforms. First, we propose to augment the Pell program's financial support with tailored guidance and support services that have been shown to improve academic and/or labor-market success, including separately tailored services for the distinctive circumstances of dependent and independent recipients. Second, we propose to dramatically simplify the eligibility and application process to ensure that the program reaches those who need it most, again tailoring the simplification to the distinctive circumstances of dependent and independent students. Finally, we propose several modifications to strengthen incentives for student effort and timely completion, without leading the program away from its core need-based (not merit-based) mission. Taken together, the reforms that we propose would for the first time make Pell a true program, and not just a grant, thus inducing its beneficiaries to become full participants, and not just recipients. Although our proposed reforms are substantial, the existing structures for processing and delivering Pell Grants would continue to be relevant, and the goals of Pell supporters and beneficiaries would be furthered. Finally, while significant congressional action would be required in order to implement our proposal, these reforms would not substantially increase the cost of the program, and we believe they are structurally and politically feasible.
Socioeconomic gaps in college enrollment and attainment have widened over time, despite increasing returns to postsecondary education and significant policy efforts to improve access. We describe the barriers that students face during the transition to college and review the evidence on potential policy solutions. We focus primarily on research that examines causal relationships using experimental or quasi-experimental methods, though we draw upon descriptive evidence to provide context. Our review is distinctive in three respects. First, in addition to the literature on financial aid, we examine the evidence on informational and behavioral interventions, academic programs, and affirmative action policies intended to improve college access. Second, we incorporate a wealth of recent research not included in prior reviews. Finally, we conceptualize college access broadly, as including not just whether but also where students attend and whether they have access to college-level courses. We conclude with a discussion of implications for policy and research.
