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AbstractObjectiveScholars have presented compelling evidence that participation in voluntary sector organizations (VSOs)—which is primarily motivated by the desire to help society—also benefits volunteers. The objective of this article is to determine whether and how these positive impacts vary across the type of VSO where individuals volunteer.MethodsWe examine European Value Survey and World Value Survey data from 18 advanced industrial democracies using multilevel regression models to establish the link between VSO participation and three individual health and welfare (IHW) outcomes: an individual's self‐reported health status, financial satisfaction, and overall life satisfaction.ResultsOur findings indicate (1) that the relationship between voluntary sector participation and positive IHW outcomes depends on the type of VSO where individuals volunteer and (2) that heterogeneous VSO exposure is also positively related to IHW.ConclusionWe emphasize that voluntary sector participation has heterogeneous impacts that variously determine outcomes depending on the type of VSO where an individual chooses to participate.

The governments of the advanced industrial democracies have long provided public policies that redistribute income, and public support for such redistribution has varied across countries and over time. "Who is likely to support these egalitarian policies?" is a perennial question. This article investigates individuals' participation in voluntary sector organizations (VSO) to understand the relationship between VSO participation and support for public policies aimed at reducing inequalities. We use five waves of the World Values Survey across 18 advanced industrial democracies to examine this relationship. Our findings suggest that, in aggregate, the impact of VSO participation negatively influences support for redistribution. This pattern of support changes significantly, however, when we consider the type of VSO, suggesting that VSO participation is not homogeneous. Individuals' support for redistribution is conditioned by where their VSO participation happens.

Using Canadian Election Study data, we explore the relationship between income inequality and popular support for redistribution in Canada between 1993 and 2008. We demonstrate that the relationship between inequality and attitudes toward redistribution tends to be positive within provinces but negative across them. We argue that two markedly different mechanisms explain this discrepancy. First, within any particular political and economic context, people are more likely to benefit from redistribution, and hence support it, when inequality is high. Second, both inequality and attitudes toward redistribution are affected by characteristics unique to provincial political cultures, which results in attitudes toward redistribution having a different baseline depending on the province. We end with a discussion of the policy implications of these findings.

While peacekeeping's effects on receiving states have been studied at length, its effects on sending states have only begun to be explored. This article examines the effects of contributing peacekeepers abroad on democracy at home. Recent qualitative research has divergent findings: some find peacekeeping contributes to democratization among sending states, while others find peacekeeping entrenches illiberal or autocratic rule. To adjudicate, we build on recent quantitative work focused specifically on the incidence of coups. We ask whether sending peacekeepers abroad increases the risk of military intervention in politics at home. Drawing on selectorate theory, we expect the effect of peacekeeping on coup risk to vary by regime type. Peacekeeping brings with it new resources which can be distributed as private goods. In autocracies, often developing states where UN peacekeeping remuneration exceeds per-soldier costs, deployment produces a windfall for militaries. Emboldened by new resources, which can be distributed as private goods among the selectorate, and fearing the loss of them in the future, they may act to depose the incumbent regime. In contrast, peacekeeping will have little effect in developed democracies, which have high per-troop costs, comparatively large selectorates, and low ex-ante coup risk. Anocracies, which typically have growing selectorates, and may face distinctive international pressures to democratize, will likely experience reduced coup risk. We test these claims with data covering peacekeeping deployments, regime type, and coup risk since the end of the Cold War. Our findings confirm our theoretical expectations. These findings have implications both for how we understand the impact of participation in peacekeeping – particularly among those countries that contribute troops disproportionately in the post-Cold War era – and for the potential international determinants of domestic autocracy. ; Jamie Levin acknowledges the support of the Azrieli Foundation and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace. Joseph MacKay acknowledges the support of a Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada postdoctoral award (no. 756-2014-0655) early in the course of this study.

While peacekeeping's effects on receiving states have been studied at length, its effects on sending states have only begun to be explored. This article examines the effects of contributing peacekeepers abroad on democracy at home. Recent qualitative research has divergent findings: some find peacekeeping contributes to democratization among sending states, while others find peacekeeping entrenches illiberal or autocratic rule. To adjudicate, we build on recent quantitative work focused specifically on the incidence of coups. We ask whether sending peacekeepers abroad increases the risk of military intervention in politics at home. Drawing on selectorate theory, we expect the effect of peacekeeping on coup risk to vary by regime type. Peacekeeping brings with it new resources which can be distributed as private goods. In autocracies, often developing states where UN peacekeeping remuneration exceeds per-soldier costs, deployment produces a windfall for militaries. Emboldened by new resources, which can be distributed as private goods among the selectorate, and fearing the loss of them in the future, they may act to depose the incumbent regime. In contrast, peacekeeping will have little effect in developed democracies, which have high per-troop costs, comparatively large selectorates, and low ex-ante coup risk. Anocracies, which typically have growing selectorates, and may face distinctive international pressures to democratize, will likely experience reduced coup risk. We test these claims with data covering peacekeeping deployments, regime type, and coup risk since the end of the Cold War. Our findings confirm our theoretical expectations. These findings have implications both for how we understand the impact of participation in peacekeeping – particularly among those countries that contribute troops disproportionately in the post-Cold War era – and for the potential international determinants of domestic autocracy.