Suchergebnisse

Ukraine has repeatedly shifted between the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism, i.e. between premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. The aim of this article is to discuss to what extent theoretical arguments against premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems are relevant for understanding the shifting directions of the Ukrainian regime. As a point of departure, I formulate three main claims from the literature: 1) "President-parliamentarism is less conducive to democratization than premier-presidentialism." 2) "Semi-presidentialism in both its variants have built-in incitements for intra-executive conflict between the president and the prime minister." 3) "Semi-presidentialism in general, and president-parliamentarism in particular, encourages presidentialization of political parties." I conclude from the study's empirical overview that the president-parliamentary system – the constitutional arrangement with the most dismal record of democratization – has been instrumental in strengthening presidential dominance and authoritarian tendencies. The premier-presidential period 2006–2010 was by no means smooth and stable, but the presidential dominance weakened and the survival of the government was firmly anchored in the parliament. During this period, there were also indications of a gradual strengthening of institutional capacity among the main political parties and the parliament began to emerge as a significant political arena.
(Published: April 2016)
Citation: Thomas Sedelius (2016) »Ukrainas konstitutionella sicksackande: Regimförändring och partiutveckling under semipresidentialism». Nordisk Østforum 30 [1] 18–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.17585/nof.v30.389

Ukraine has repeatedly shifted between the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism, i.e. between premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. The aim of this article is to discuss to what extent theoretical arguments against premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems are relevant for understanding the shifting directions of the Ukrainian regime. As a point of departure, I formulate three main claims from the literature: 1) "President-parliamentarism is less conducive to democratization than premier-presidentialism."; 2) "Semi-presidentialism in both its variants have built-in incitements for intra-executive conflict between the president and the prime minister."; 3) "Semi-presidentialism in general, and president-parliamentarism in particular, encourages presidentialization of political parties." I conclude from the study's empirical overview that the president-parliamentary system– the constitutional arrangement with the most dismal record of democratization – has been instrumental in strengthening presidential dominance and authoritarian tendencies. The premier-presidential period 2006–2010 was by no means smooth and stable, but the presidential dominance weakened and the survival of the government was firmly anchored in the parliament. During this period, there were also indications of a gradual strengthening of institutional capacity among the main political parties and the parliament began to emerge as a significant political arena.

While authoritarian presidents prevail under heavily president-oriented constitutions throughout the post-Soviet region, democracy along parliamentary lines triumphs in Central Europe. This article discusses the constitutional pattern among the post-communist countries on the basis of two general questions: First, how can we explain why strong presidential constitutions dominate throughout the post-Soviet region whereas constrained presidencies and governments anchored in parliament have become the prevailing option in Central Europe? Second, and interlinked with the first question, why have so many post-communist countries (in the post-Soviet region as well as in Central Europe) chosen neither parliamentarism nor presidentialism, but instead semi-presidential arrangements whereby a directly elected president is provided with considerable powers and coexists with a prime minister? The analysis indicates that both historical-institutional and actor-oriented factors are relevant here. Key factors have been regime transition, pre-communist era constitutions and leaders, as well as short-term economic and political considerations. With differing strengths and in partly different ways, these factors seem to have affected the actors' preferences and final constitutional compromises.

Presidential power and constitutional issues are at the very core of recent popular upheavals in the former Soviet republics, as demonstrated by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and similar protests in Georgia in 2003 and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. After the demise of the Soviet Union, these countries opted for a particular form of semi-presidentialism, here referred to as president-parliamentary. This dissertation deals with president-parliamentary systems, as well as with the other form of semi-presidentialism, namely premier-presidentialism. The study examines a typical feature of semi-presidentialism, i.e. intra-executive conflicts between the president and the prime minister/cabinet, by analysing the pattern, institutional triggers, and implications of such conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, the choice of semi-presidentialism and differences in transitional context and constitutional building are accounted for. The following countries are specifically dealt with: Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, and Romania, Russia and Ukraine. The study's empirical base is a mixture of data derived from literature, reports, review of constitutional documents, as well as from an expert survey conducted among analysts with an expert knowledge on the countries under scrutiny. The results suggest that both actor-oriented and historical-institutional factors have to be considered in order to understand why so many post-communist countries ended up with semi-presidentialism, and why there is such a sharp divide between Central Europe and the (non-Baltic) former Soviet republics with regard to the choice of semi-presidential type. The pattern of intra-executive struggles reveals that conflicts were somewhat more recurrent in the early period following the transition, but persist as a frequently occurring phenomenon throughout the post-communist period. The most common type of conflict has revolved around division of powers within the executive branch. As for triggers of conflict, the study suggests that certain institutional factors, such as electoral concurrence and party system fragmentation, have been important. Regarding the management of conflict, and the options available to the conflicting parties, the analysis indicates that the constitutional courts have played an important role as conflict mediators, and that attempts of changing the constitution, and using public addresses are options preferred by the presidents. Finally, the analysis shows that intra-executive conflict is associated with cabinet instability. A case study example also illustrates how the president-parliamentary framework can be related to policy ineffectiveness. The study finally concludes that premier-presidential systems have great governance potential provided that the party systems develop and consolidate. The conclusions regarding the president-parliamentary system are less encouraging, and it is argued that the adoption of this system is an important factor in relation to the failed democratisation in many post-Soviet countries.

From comparative research on the constitutional development in Central & Eastern Europe & also from the long-standing debate on whether parliamentarism or presidentialism best facilitates democracy, it is apparent that there has been & continues to be, a certain degree of confusion concerning the concepts of semi-presidentialism & presidentialism. Different scholars mean different things by the terms & therefore classify countries differently. In this article I argue that the conceptual dichotomy between pro-premiar (premier-presidentialism) & pro-president systems (president-parliamentary systems) provide the best solution to several of the problems related to categorizing constitutional types, most importantly perhaps to the presidential power dilemma. I, furthermore, employ these concepts on the post-communist constitutional systems & try to reveal patterns with regard to presidential power, geographical region & democratzsation. 6 Tables, 3 Figures, 51 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis study examines the relationship between citizens' satisfaction with government COVID‐19 communication and management (SWCCM) and institutional trust. By employing a longitudinal approach, using three‐wave panel data from Sweden from 2020 to 2022, the study addresses the current lack of research on the interplay between SWCCM and institutional trust across different stages of a societal crisis like the COVID‐19 pandemic. The results show that SWCCM increased slightly over the pandemic period, while trust in institutions slightly decreased. The study also finds that changes in SWCCM predict changes in trust in institutions, suggesting that increased satisfaction with communication and management is associated with increased trust in institutions. Additionally, we find that higher initial levels of SWCCM contribute to a faster decline in trust over time. However, no evidence supports the idea that initial trust in institutions predicts changes in SWCCM. This suggests a unidirectional relationship where SWCCM is a key driver of institutional trust during a crisis. Overall, the study uncovers intriguing dynamics in the relationship between SWCCM and trust over time, and it emphasizes the significance of effective and consistent communication and management in maintaining and boosting public trust during crisis.

This article seeks to explain variations in presidential activism in semi-presidential countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa is one of the continents where semi-presidentialism is most prevalent, but the dynamics of intra-executive relations are severely understudied. The four case studies discussed here—the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Cabo Verde, and São Tomé e Príncipe—belong to the premier-presidential subtype. In this exploratory study, we aim to examine how institutional dimensions of premier-presidentialism interact with contextual factors to explain variations in presidential activism among Sub-Saharan African countries. In addition to fundamental contextual differences among the two pairs of countries, francophone and lusophone, there are specific institutional factors associated with the design and operation of premier-presidentialism that contribute to greater presidential activism in the two francophone cases. Taken together, these contextual and institutional factors skew effective executive power heavily toward the president in our francophone countries. We also find that the degree of political institutionalization matters for the impact of presidential activism on intra-executive conflict and government policymaking capacity. The article increases our understanding of the operation of semi-presidentialism in this understudied region, underscoring the importance of both contextual and constitutional factors for explaining variations in presidential activism in Africa.