Bargaining and Market Behavior: Essays in Experimental Economics
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 112, Heft 480, S. F390-F391
ISSN: 1468-0297
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 112, Heft 480, S. F390-F391
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 111, Heft 468, S. 51-68
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 3639
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6489
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In: Journal of risk and uncertainty, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 21-46
ISSN: 1573-0476
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5345
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 6345
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10754
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9041
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Working paper
In: Economic Inquiry, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 953-967
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2602
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In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Band 69, Heft 1, S. 39-50
We use an experiment to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenue-sharing team members have an incentive to free ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Band 67, Heft 3-4, S. 782-793
Voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time. We use a two-stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior. Using a strategy method we find a robust pattern of declining contributions: contributions in stage 2 are 45 percent lower than in stage 1. Repeating the game five times we find that experience generates a smaller decline in contributions: stage 1 contributions decrease by around 7 percent per game. Finally we find no significant differences between the strategy and direct-response method, which suggests that our results help explain behavior in the latter.