Preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning
In: Journal of international economics, Band 79, Heft 1, S. 143-159
ISSN: 0022-1996
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In: Journal of international economics, Band 79, Heft 1, S. 143-159
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 118, Heft 525, S. 16-36
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Economica, Band 62, Heft 248, S. 507
In: Economica, Band 58, Heft 232, S. 491
In: The Economic Journal, Band 97, Heft 387, S. 746
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 625
© The Author 2015. Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This article studies an extension of the Baron-Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of periods, the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy (which is, in turn, the default for the next period). The model provides a number of quite different predictions. (i) From a positive perspective, the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity. In that case, patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria. In contrast, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs in a unanimity committee coincide with those in the corresponding Baron-Ferejohn framework. (ii) If players have heterogeneous discount factors then a large class of subgame perfect equilibria (including all Markov perfect equilibria) are inefficient.
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In: Social choice and welfare, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 707-734
ISSN: 1432-217X
Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This paper studies an extension of the Baron-Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of periods, the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy (which in turn determines the default for the next period). The model provides a number of quite different predictions. In particular: (i) Substantial shares of the pie are wasted each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria of non-unanimity games with patient enough players; and (ii) All Markov perfect equilibria are Pareto inefficient when discount factors are heterogenous. However, there is a unique equilibrium outcome in unanimity standing committee games, which coincides with the unique equilibrium outcome of the corresponding Baron-Ferejohn framework.
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In: Economica, Band 49, Heft 193, S. 100