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AbstractState capacity is known to constitute a driver of economic development. This note establishes the emergence of state power as a precondition for the development of state capacity. After clearly establishing the differences between these concepts, I explore the geographical factors favouring the emergence of state power and provide some evidence from a study of Madagascar.

Institutions have become the hallmark of development economics (e.g. Sokoloff and Engerman 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2002, Brunnschweiler 2008, Nunn 2008, Galor and Moav 2012, Voth and Voigtlander 2015). The state constitutes a crucial institution driving the development process. This can be seen by the strong parallels in human history between the emergence of mighty states on the one hand and economic, scientific and cultural progress on the other hand (e.g. Ancient Egypt, Classic Greece, Rome). Yet while a powerful state appears as a sine qua non condition of development broadly defined, it is not necessarily tantamount to economic progress and prosperity as exemplified by the numerous mighty autocracies that have undermined their countries' development in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. State power is therefore defined as the state's ability to broadcast power (military, police), and state capacity captures the capacity of the state to collect taxes and enforce property rights (e.g. Besley and Persson 2010). State power is necessary for a government to develop state capacity, yet it is not necessarily conducive to development-friendly institutions. This short note constitutes a first attempt to clarify the distinction between the two notions, and to hint at the drivers of state power, with a particular emphasis on geography.

Earlier research has shown that the tragedy of the commons may be resolved by Folk theorems for dynamic games. In this article, we graft on a standard natural‐resource exploitation game the possibility to appropriate the resource through violent means. Because conflict emerges endogenously as resources get depleted, the threat supporting the cooperative outcome is no longer subgame perfect, and thus credible. The unique equilibrium is such that players exploit noncooperatively the resource when it is abundant, and they revert to conflict when it becomes scarce. The players' utility is shown to be lower even if conflict wastes no resources.

Using US data of media's coverage of politics and individual survey data, the authors document that in the states with a greater coverage of politics, citizens especially exposed to newspapers have more polarized preferences, partly coming from better political knowledge, and resulting in a higher political involvement measured as contributions to political parties and candidates.

The authors use US data on media coverage of politics and individual survey data to document that citizens exposed to more politicized newspapers have more extreme political preferences. This polarization effect of media is mainly driven by individuals who harbor liberal opinions reading more newspapers, as opposed to individuals endorsing rather conservative positions. More politicized media also reinforce other aspects of citizens' political sophistication such as political knowledge. This enhanced political sophistication materializes in observable involvement in politics, measured by campaign contributions.

International audience ; In this article we propose a theoretical model to better comprehend the effect of gun laws on violent property crime. We assume that a violent encounter between a criminal and a victim is costly to both, and we uncover two types of equilibria: a pure strategy violent equilibrium and a mixed strategy equilibrium where the criminal is deterred with strictly positive probability. The effect of a relaxation of gun laws is shown to be conditional on both initial gun laws and on the relative improvement of the victims' defense capacity relative to the criminals' offense capacity. We uncover a potentially inverted U-shaped relationship between gun laws leniency and investments in violent activities which helps reconciling seemingly contradictory empirical findings. ; Dans cet article nous développons un modèle théorique permettant de mieux comprendre l'effet des lois sur le contrôle des armes à feu sur les crimes violents liés à l'appropriation de propriété privée. Nous supposons qu'une rencontre violente est coûteuse aussi bien pour un criminel que pour sa victime et nous identifions deux types d'équilibres : un équilibre violent en stratégie pure et un équilibre en stratégie mixte dans le cadre duquel le criminel est dissuadé avec une probabilité strictement positive. L'effet d'un assouplissement de la législation sur les armes à feu dépend du niveau des restrictions légales initiales en la matière, ainsi que du gain d'efficacité relatif de la victime et du criminel. Nous mettons au jour une possible relation en U-inversé entre la souplesse des lois sur les armes à feu et les investissements en activités violentes, ce qui permet de réconcilier des résultats empiriques antérieurs contradictoires.

International audience ; In this article we propose a theoretical model to better comprehend the effect of gun laws on violent property crime. We assume that a violent encounter between a criminal and a victim is costly to both, and we uncover two types of equilibria: a pure strategy violent equilibrium and a mixed strategy equilibrium where the criminal is deterred with strictly positive probability. The effect of a relaxation of gun laws is shown to be conditional on both initial gun laws and on the relative improvement of the victims' defense capacity relative to the criminals' offense capacity. We uncover a potentially inverted U-shaped relationship between gun laws leniency and investments in violent activities which helps reconciling seemingly contradictory empirical findings. ; Dans cet article nous développons un modèle théorique permettant de mieux comprendre l'effet des lois sur le contrôle des armes à feu sur les crimes violents liés à l'appropriation de propriété privée. Nous supposons qu'une rencontre violente est coûteuse aussi bien pour un criminel que pour sa victime et nous identifions deux types d'équilibres : un équilibre violent en stratégie pure et un équilibre en stratégie mixte dans le cadre duquel le criminel est dissuadé avec une probabilité strictement positive. L'effet d'un assouplissement de la législation sur les armes à feu dépend du niveau des restrictions légales initiales en la matière, ainsi que du gain d'efficacité relatif de la victime et du criminel. Nous mettons au jour une possible relation en U-inversé entre la souplesse des lois sur les armes à feu et les investissements en activités violentes, ce qui permet de réconcilier des résultats empiriques antérieurs contradictoires.

In anarchic settings, potential rivals can be dragged into arms races degenerating in open wars out of mutual suspicion. We propose a novel commitment device for contestants to avoid both arming and fighting. We assume that the military decides the armament levels of a country, while the civilian decides whether to attack a rival country. When these decision-making bodies perfectly communicate, the decision makers are unable to credibly communicate to their foe their willingness not to arm and not to attack, thus implying that war ensues. With imperfect information, however, peace may ensue as countries credibly signal to their rival a more peaceful stance since contestants are more reluctant to enter in an armed confrontation with a potentially understaffed army. Using data on the 1975 to 2001 period, we provide supportive evidence that in countries where the head of the state or the defense minister are military officers, and are therefore better informed of their armies' fighting preparedness, the likelihood of observing an international conflict is higher.