Suchergebnisse

Dieses Buch untersucht mit Hilfe politikökonomischer Theorien den Entscheidungsprozess innerhalb der Europäischen Union. Hierbei werden zum einen die Relevanz und die Methodik unterschiedlicher Theorien beim Analysieren des politischen Systems der EU erläutert, zum anderen wird die Prognosekraft der aus diesen Theorien abgeleiteten Hypothesen empirisch überprüft. Das Buch vermittelt einen Einblick in den EU-Gesetzgebungsprozess sowie in die internen Entscheidungsfindungsstrukturen der Europäischen Kommission, des Ministerrates, des Europäischen Parlaments und der Europäischen Zentralbank

This article maps out the state of affairs of the academic literature which uses procedural spatial voting models to explain legislative decision-making in the European Union. Employing Tsebelis's (1994) article in which the author models the Union's co-operation procedure and using it as a reference point, I show that there is no clarity yet as to which of the several existing procedural model specifications yields the most convincing results. I conclude by suggesting how the current situation could be improved, and that procedural modelling might be integrated with other rational choice theory for a better understanding of the ongoing evolution of the policymaking instruments in the European Union.

Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comparing different models of how the EU negotiates new legislative measures, the models' predictive power is evaluated. On a more general level, Preferences and Procedures answers questions regarding the empirically recognizable effects of institutional arrangements on joint bargaining outcomes.

Focusing on recent studies of European Union legislative decision-making, this research note evaluates the current literature that attempts to improve the explanatory power of bargaining models by integrating game-theoretic spatial models with micro-level data gained from expert interviews or from document analyses.

Focusing on recent studies of European Union legislative decision-making, this research note evaluates the current literature that attempts to improve the explanatory power of bargaining models by integrating game-theoretic spatial models with micro-level data gained from expert interviews or from document analyses. 18 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2005.]

In this article I test spatial models of European Union (EU) legislative decisionmaking regarding the dimensionality of the policy space. After clarifying the concept of dimensionality, I review the existing literature. I then map out possible ways to test these models based on different dimensionality assumptions. Using quantitative data on actor positions for EU legislative politics, I .rst employ dimension-reducing techniques. The results show that this technique is not appropriate for generating a decreased number of underlying dimensions for the data at hand and that a one- or two-dimensional European policy space cannot be detected. Shifting to more theory-based analysis, I calculate the predicted outcomes for voting models of the EU under different spatial con.gurations. The findings show that the formal models' predictive power increases with the use of multi-dimensional policy spaces. I conclude by interpreting these findings in the light of a more general debate on evaluating the decision space assumed bymodels of group decision-making.

In this article I test spatial models of European Union (EU) legislative decision-making regarding the dimensionality of the policy space. After clarifying the concept of dimensionality, I review the existing literature. I then map out possible ways to test these models based on different dimensionality assumptions. Using quantitative data on actor positions for EU legislative politics, I first employ dimension-reducing techniques. The results show that this technique is not appropriate for generating a decreased number of underlying dimensions for the data at hand & that a one- or two-dimensional European policy space cannot be detected. Shifting to more theory-based analysis, I calculate the predicted outcomes for voting models of the EU under different spatial configurations. The findings show that the formal models' predictive power increases with the use of multi-dimensional policy spaces. I conclude by interpreting these findings in the light of a more general debate on evaluating the decision space assumed by models of group decision-making. 1 Table, 3 Figures, 1 Appendix, 40 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2004.]