Search results

ABSTRACTDeregulation typically comes with redistribution of rents and thus with opposition from the losing interest groups. We show that, by exploiting complementarities, synchronising deregulation across markets makes this opposition lower. Indeed, a particular deregulation may reduce rents for one interest group, but may result in gains for another interest group. Synchronising reforms can therefore offer a way out of the 'sclerosis' of especially European markets. For this effect, we build a microeconomic model based on two assumptions: Cournot competition à la Vives in the product markets and firms hiring workers in accordance with an efficiency wage in the labour markets. As being particularly relevant for European economies, we focus on product market regulation that determines the degree of market integration and labour market regulation that determines the degree of employment protection.

Labour market reforms face very often opposition from the employed workers, because it normally reduces their wages. Also product market regulations are regularly biased towards too much benefitting the firms. As a result there remain many frictions in both the labour and product markets that hinder an optimal functioning of the economy. These issues have recently received a lot of attention in the economics literature and scholars have been looking for politically viable reforms in both markets. However, despite its potential importance, there has been done virtually no research on the interaction between reforms in product and labour markets. We find that when combining reforms, the opposition for reforms decreases considerably. This is because there exist complementarities and the gains in total welfare can be more evenly distributed over the interest groups. Moreover, the interaction of reforms offers a way out for the so-called 'sclerosis' effect.

Regionale Beihilfen sind ein zentrales Instrument zur Stärkung der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität benachteiligter Regionen und des regionalen Zusammenhalts im Binnenmarkt. Die Europäische Kommission legt Regeln fest, damit solche Subventionen den Wettbewerb und den Handel innerhalb der EU nicht verzerren. Dieser Bericht analysiert die Auswirkung des Europäischen Rahmenwerks für regionale Beihilfe. Es wird geprüft, wie die im Modernisierungsprozess von 2014 eingeführten Einschränkungen der Beihilfen für Großunternehmen in weniger benachteiligten Fördergebieten sowie die Senkung der Beihilfehöchstgrenzen in vielen Regionen Investitionen von privaten Unternehmen beeinflusst haben. Es zeigt sich, dass die Investitionen von Unternehmen durch die Restriktionen zurückgegangen sind. Dies ist fast ausschließlich bei Großunternehmen zu beobachten. Daher wird empfohlen, die eingeführten Beschränkungen für Großunternehmen neu zu justieren. Genau diese Empfehlungen sind in den im August 2020 von der EU-Kommission vorgelegten Entwurf der überarbeiteten Leitlinien für Regionalbeihilfen aufgenommen worden.

We investigate the impact of competition policy enforcement on the functioning of European energy markets, and how sectoral regulation influences these outcomes. For this purpose, we compile a new dataset on the European Commission's (EC) and EU member states' competition policy decisions, and combine it with firm- and sector-level data. We find that EC merger policy has a positive and robust impact on (i) the level of competition; (ii) investment; and (iii) productivity. This impact, however, only shows up in low-regulated sectors. Other competition policy decisions - EC state aid and anti-trust interventions; as well as all individual Member State policy variables - do not have a uniform effect on energy markets' functioning. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the EC's merger policy actions have been used to overcome significant obstacles to a well-functioning EU energy sector and may well have shaped the overall development of gas and electricity markets in Europe.

Der Energiesektor zeichnet sich durch den Bedarf an kapitalintensiven Investitionen in Infrastruktur aus - vor allem in der Stromerzeugung und der Gasgewinnung, aber auch in der Energieübertragung und -verteilung. Sowohl die Marktstrukturen als auch der Grad an Wettbewerb und Regulierung sind Schlüsselfaktoren bei der Bestimmung der Investitionsanreize für Unternehmen. Dennoch sind die empirischen Erkenntnisse zum Zusammenhang zwischen diesen Faktoren und privaten Investitionen noch immer recht bescheiden, insbesondere in den Energiesektoren. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht empirisch, ob die Wettbewerbspolitik und regulatorische Eingriffe in die europäischen Märkte für Gas und Strom die Investitionsanreize für Unternehmen beeinflussen. Es zeigt sich, dass die Durchsetzung der EU-Fusionskontrolle signifikant mit höheren Investitionen in weniger regulierten Märkten zusammenhängt. ; Energy sectors - primarily power generation and gas production, but also energy transmission and distribution - require significant capital investment in infrastructure. Market structures as well as the degree of competition and regulation are key factors that determine firms' incentive to invest. Yet the empirical research on the link between these factors andprivate investment is still quite scarce, especially in the energy sectors. This study empirically examines whether competition policy enforcement and regulatory intervention in European gas and electricity markets affects firms' incentive to invest. The findings show that EU merger policy enforcement is significantly related to a higher investment in low-regulated markets.

Energy sectors-primarily power generation and gas production, but also energy transmission and distribution-require significant capital investment in infrastructure. Market structures as well as the degree of competition and regulation are key factors that determine firms' incentive to invest. Yet the empirical research on the link between these factors and private investment is still quite scarce, especially in the energy sectors. In this study, we empirically examine whether competition policy enforcement and regulatory intervention in European gas and electricity markets affects firms' incentive to invest. Our findings show that EU merger policy enforcement is significantly related to a higher investment in low-regulated markets.

We investigate patterns in common ownership networks between firms that are active in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry for the period 2004–2014. Our main findings are that "brand firms"—that is, firms that have research and development capabilities and launch new drugs—exhibit relatively dense common ownership networks with each other that further increase significantly in density over time, whereas the network of "generic firms"—that is, firms that primarily specialize in developing and launching generic drugs—is much sparser and stays that way over the span of our sample. Finally, when considering the common ownership links between brands firms, on the one hand, and generic firms, on the other, we find that brand firms have become more connected to generic firms over time. We discuss the potential antitrust implications of these findings.