Suchergebnisse

Mainstream and alternative media often frame key political events in divergent ways. The present research examined how mainstream and alternative media consumption was linked to public support for Bersih, a pro-democracy movement in Malaysia. We conducted a two-wave panel study before and after the Bersih 5 protests demanding electoral reform ( N = 422), and another two-wave panel study before and after the 14th General Elections which were historic in unseating the ruling government ( N = 386). Against mounting corruption, the two events were important to Malaysia's democratic transition. Across both studies, alternative media consumption was linked to more positive attitudes toward the Bersih movement, especially among people who were strong supporters of the previous ruling government. Mainstream media did not play a consistent role in shaping attitudes toward the movement, nor was there evidence of backlash among government supporters. Thus, alternative media may have legitimized the cause for social change.

People on both sides of an intergroup conflict undertake various forms of collective action to seek justice for their own group. Three studies investigated whether modes of ingroup identification promoted distinct preferences for justice, which subsequently shaped the form of collective action people supported. Among Arab (Study 1, n = 148) and Jewish Israelis (Study 2, n = 294), we found that ingroup glorification promoted a desire for retributive justice, which predicted support for nonnormative collective action, whereas ingroup attachment promoted a desire for restorative justice, which predicted support for normative collective action. Further, during a period of conflict escalation (i.e., Palestinian protests at the Gaza Strip), emphasizing retributive or restorative justice produced differential effects on the links from glorification and attachment to nonnormative and normative collective action (Study 3, n = 546). This research advances our understanding of when and how collective action can escalate intergroup conflict.

Our analysis explores the rise of the Yellow Vest movement as a collective response to perceptions of growing levels of economic inequality in France whereby collective action is triggered by the perceived illegitimacy of the growing gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots'. We highlight different psychological processes that might explain why concerns about economic inequality have become more salient. We focus on two dynamics in particular: (a) President Macron's perceived alignment with the elites and disconnection from ordinary French people, and (b) historically dominant collective narratives that frame growing inequality as breaking with long-standing values and norms of equality. Both processes enhance 'us' (the victims) versus 'them' (the elite and those that are not true to national values of equality) categorizations along wealth lines whereby, 'us' becomes a broad category. To explain why the movement continues to go strong, we focus on ongoing intergroup processes (i.e., the police response, lack of support from intellectuals and the middle class) and intragroup processes (i.e., the movement brings together all those who self-categorise as victims of inequality, uniting those that may at other times be seen as 'strange bedfellows'). We conclude that a proper understanding of the way in which economic inequality might divide society creating new intergroup dynamics is essential to understand the Yellow Vest movement.

The ways in which collective memories are constructed in the present is important in explaining how people choose to commemorate their nation's history. The present research focused on the context of Australia Day, a controversial national holiday that falls on January 26, which is a date that marks the beginning of colonization. We conducted field surveys of community members participating in an Invasion Day protest pushing for Indigenous rights (n = 219) and community members enjoying the public holiday in a public park (n = 174). We found that greater recognition of colonial history explained protesters' (vs. nonprotesters') greater support for changing the date of Australia Day. Further, protesters' lower levels of perceived continuity and higher levels of desired continuity of First Australian culture was linked to greater support for changing the date of Australia Day compared to the nonprotesters. These findings suggest that creating consensus over contested collective memories of a nation's history requires greater recognition of the ongoing impact of past atrocities.

Polarization in society may hold consequences beyond the undermining of social cohesion. Here we provide the first evidence highlighting the power of perceived moral polarization in society to drive support for strong leaders. Across two studies and four samples drawn from the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States (N = 1,664), we found evidence linking perceived moral polarization with perceived anomie in society (defined as the perceived breakdown of social fabric and leadership) and with the rise in support for leaders with both a conservative/authoritarian and progressive/democratic style. Specifically, via the perceived breakdown in social fabric, heightened moral polarization predicted increased support for conservative/authoritarian style strong leaders, and via the perceived breakdown of leadership, increased support for progressive/democratic style strong leaders. Experimentally, using a fictionalized society paradigm, we then established causal links between moral polarization and the desire to elect conservative/authoritarian and progressive/democratic strong leaders. The current research is the first to identify the potential political consequences of heightened perceived moral polarization in two‐party liberal democracies and contributes to the growing body of research highlighting the role of societal factors in driving support for strong leaders.

AbstractAround the world, we witness not only growing levels of economic inequality but also the rise of protests whereby people from different social classes are demanding a more equal society. Our research uses a person‐centered approach to examine subgroups of participants in a social movement against inequality on the basis of their social class, intention to participate in conventional and/or radical collective actions, and social identification with the movement. We used longitudinal data from the Chilean student movement (two time points; total N = 1226) to conduct latent profile and latent transition analysis. We identified four profiles of participants: (1) inactive supporters (mostly from the upper class), (2) low radicals (mostly from the middle class), (3) moderate radicals (mostly from the middle class), and (4) high radicals (mostly from the middle class). The four profiles were generally stable over the one‐year period. We further found that group efficacy and a "nothing to lose" mindset predicted the profile membership of participants. Group efficacy also predicted transitions of participants between different profiles. Our findings highlight the key role that the middle class plays in diverse forms of collective action.

In December 2019, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accused the Myanmar government of genocide against Rohingya Muslims. Represented by Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar authorities denied such accusations. To understand how a political leader can deny ingroup wrongdoings, we unpacked Suu Kyi's ICJ speech and analyzed her defensive rhetorical style through critical narrative analysis. We aimed to identify and describe the denial strategies Suu Kyi used as well as how she maintained a positive ingroup image to support her position. Our findings showed that Suu Kyi engaged in interpretative denial of genocide by arguing that genocide cannot occur when there is armed conflict, that there were victims and perpetrators on both sides, and that misconducts by law enforcement had been addressed. To maintain the ingroup's positive image, she portrayed Myanmar as moral by emphasizing the government's knowledge of ethical standards and laws, as well as their support for peace and justice. By examining political discourse used by a national leader internationally renowned for supporting human rights, our findings shed light on the dynamic, constructive nature of denial. Theoretical and applied contributions to understanding denial of ingroup wrongdoing are discussed. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

In December 2019, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accused the Myanmar government of genocide against Rohingya Muslims. Represented by Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar authorities denied such accusations. To understand how a political leader can deny ingroup wrongdoings, we unpacked Suu Kyi's ICJ speech and analyzed her defensive rhetorical style through critical narrative analysis. We aimed to identify and describe the denial strategies Suu Kyi used as well as how she maintained a positive ingroup image to support her position. Our findings showed that Suu Kyi engaged in interpretative denial of genocide by arguing that genocide cannot occur when there is armed conflict, that there were victims and perpetrators on both sides, and that misconducts by law enforcement had been addressed. To maintain the ingroup's positive image, she portrayed Myanmar as moral by emphasizing the government's knowledge of ethical standards and laws, as well as their support for peace and justice. By examining political discourse used by a national leader internationally renowned for supporting human rights, our findings shed light on the dynamic, constructive nature of denial. Theoretical and applied contributions to understanding denial of ingroup wrongdoing are discussed.

Economic inequality has been found to have pernicious effects, reducing mental and physical health, decreasing societal cohesion, and fueling support for nativist parties and illiberal autocratic leaders. We start this review with an outline of what social identity theorizing offers to the study of inequality. We then articulate four hypotheses that can be derived from the social identity approach: the fit hypothesis, the wealth‐categorization hypothesis, the wealth‐stereotype hypothesis, and the sociostructural hypothesis. We review the empirical literature that tests these hypotheses by exploring the effect of economic inequality, measured objectively by metrics such as the Gini coefficient as well as subjectively in terms of perceptions of economic inequality, on wealth categorization (of others and the self), the desire for more wealth and status, intergroup hostility, attitudes towards immigrants, prosocial behavior, stereotyping, the wish for a strong leader, the endorsement of conspiracy theories, and collective action intentions. As we will show, this research suggests that economic inequality may have even more far‐reaching consequences than commonly believed. Indeed, investigating the effects of economic inequality on citizens' sociopolitical behaviors may be increasingly important in today's turbulent political and social landscape.