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AbstractA global game framework of bank runs is used to analyse a bank's choice of its reserve level and short‐term interest rate. Higher level of reserves and a lower short‐term interest rate would decrease the probability of bank runs. When the bank's reserve policy is transparent, it will hold excess reserves to discourage withdrawals by patient depositors. This inefficiency of excess reserves increases with the proportion of impatient depositors. When the bank has private information about its reserve level, it will follow a more risky strategy of choosing lower reserves and higher early return than what maximizes depositor welfare and increases the probability of bank runs.

We present an evolutionary growth model where the degree of gender equality evolves towards the value maximizing social output. It follows that a woman's bargaining power should depend positively on her relative productivity. When an economy is less developed, physical strength plays a key role in production and thus, total output is greater when the man gets a larger share. As society develops and accumulates physical capital and human capital, the woman becomes relatively more productive, which drives the output maximizing social norm towards gender equality. Empirical results support these predictions of the theoretical model. Simulations show that in the long run, an economy with gender equality can outperform an economy where gender balance of power maximizes social output, although in the short run, it can lag behind.