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AbstractPrevious research finds that policy complexity affects important political processes including legislative delegation and policy diffusion. However, policy complexity is not directly observable and the search for a reasonable proxy constitutes a major challenge for scholars. This research note presents a concise and measurable definition of complex policy based on two aspects: a policy's textual sophistication and its ties to other rules and regulations. Using crowdsourcing and a pairwise comparison framework it is shown that the proposed defining features are crucial for humans' understanding of policy text. The proposed definition is then operationalized using a large corpus of European Union rules and is shown to outperform alternative operationalizations of policy complexity in predicting the level of legislative delegation.

Jens Blom-Hansen, Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen, Caroline Howard Grøn, Michael Hansen Jensen og Peter Bjerre Mortensen: Det nationale råderum ved gennemførelse af EU-regler. København: DJØF Forlag, 2021, 227 sider, 285 kr. (anmeldt af Roman Senninger)

Institutional responses of parliaments to international developments are widely regarded as efficient changes because they tend to be unaffected by partisan preferences and benefit all members of parliament equally. This article challenges that common notion by providing evidence that the institutional responses of national parliaments to European integration are in large part the result of international partisan emulation. Spatial regression analyses robustly show that parliamentary EU oversight institutions diffuse across member states whose majority parties have similar constitutional preferences. A parliament is more likely to emulate the EU oversight institution of another parliament if their majority parties have similar ideas about the territorial distribution of power and institutional framework for policy making. This result has important implications for our understanding of institutional change in parliament. Responses of parliaments to external developments may appear non-partisan at first sight but unfold partisan characteristics if one looks beyond the domestic level.

The scrutiny exerted by opposition parties in European Union (EU) affairs crucially contributes to the functioning of democratic accountability in the EU. While our knowledge about the extent of control activities has increased, we know little about their content. This article investigates the policy issues that opposition parties address in parliamentary questions about the EU. I argue that Eurosceptic opposition parties follow vote-maximizing strategies and selectively scrutinize very general aspects of the EU. My expectation is tested using a unique data collection of written questions in the Danish Folketing (1973–2013). I find evidence that the content of questions has been broadened over time and that Eurosceptic parties strongly emphasize general EU matters. The results point to the importance of political parties in making democratic accountability in the EU work.

AbstractIn light of important political events that go beyond the nation state (e.g., migration, climate change, and the coronavirus pandemic), domestic politicians are increasingly pressured to scrutinize and speak out on European policy-making. This creates a potential trade-off between allocating effort to domestic and supranational affairs, respectively. We examine how citizens perceive legislator involvement in European Union (EU) politics with a pre-registered conjoint experiment in Germany. Our results show that Members of Parliament (MPs) are not disadvantaged when allocating effort to European affairs as compared to local and national affairs. In addition, voters tend to prefer MPs who engage in EU policy reform over those who do not. As demand for legislator involvement in European politics is on the rise, we provide empirical evidence that MPs can fulfill this demand without being disadvantaged by the electorate.

In light of important political events that go beyond the nation state (e.g., migration, climate change, and the coronavirus pandemic), domestic politicians are increasingly pressured to scrutinize and speak out on European policy-making. This creates a potential trade-off between allocating effort to domestic and supranational affairs, respectively. We examine how citizens perceive legislator involvement in European Union (EU) politics with a pre-registered conjoint experiment in Germany. Our results show that Members of Parliament (MPs) are not disadvantaged when allocating effort to European affairs as compared to local and national affairs. In addition, voters tend to prefer MPs who engage in EU policy reform over those who do not. As demand for legislator involvement in European politics is on the rise, we provide empirical evidence that MPs can fulfill this demand without being disadvantaged by the electorate.

In this study, we examine whether and how policy issues addressed by political parties travel across the national and European legislative arena. We define 'party policy issue transfer' as the articulation of similar issues in the work of political parties at different parliamentary venues in short distance of time and argue that issues particularly transfer within the same party. This is mainly so for three reasons: exchange of information between parties across levels, national parties' attempts to influence European Union policies, and career incentives of representatives at the supranational level. We test our theoretical framework using unique data on parliamentary questions asked by Danish representatives (the Folketing and the European Parliament, 1999–2009) and a dyadic data structure. Our results show that parties' policy issues—in particular those over which the European Union holds legislative power—transfer across the national and European levels on a regular basis and that issues are more likely to travel within parties.

In this study, we examine whether and how policy issues addressed by political parties travel across the national and European legislative arena. We define 'party policy issue transfer' as the articulation of similar issues in the work of political parties at different parliamentary venues in short distance of time and argue that issues particularly transfer within the same party. This is mainly so for three reasons: exchange of information between parties across levels, national parties' attempts to influence European Union policies, and career incentives of representatives at the supranational level. We test our theoretical framework using unique data on parliamentary questions asked by Danish representatives (the Folketing and the European Parliament, 1999–2009) and a dyadic data structure. Our results show that parties' policy issues—in particular those over which the European Union holds legislative power—transfer across the national and European levels on a regular basis and that issues are more likely to travel within parties.

AbstractWhich parties use simple language in their campaign messages, and do simple campaign messages resonate with voters' information about parties? This study introduces a novel link between the language applied during election campaigns and citizens' ability to position parties in the ideological space. To this end, how complexity of campaign messages varies across parties as well as how it affects voters' knowledge about party positions is investigated. Theoretically, it is suggested that populist parties are more likely to simplify their campaign messages to demarcate themselves from mainstream competitors. In turn, voters should perceive and process simpler campaign messages better and, therefore, have more knowledge about the position of parties that communicate simpler campaign messages. The article presents and validates a measure of complexity and uses it to assess the language of manifestos in Austria and Germany in the period 1945–2013. It shows that political parties, in general, use barely comprehensible language to communicate their policy positions. However, differences between parties exist and support is found for the conjecture about populist parties as they employ significantly less complex language in their manifestos. Second, evidence is found that individuals are better able to place parties in the ideological space if parties use less complex campaign messages. The findings lead to greater understanding of mass‐elite linkages during election campaigns and have important consequences for the future analysis of manifesto data.

AbstractThis paper examines political party mobilization on European Union issues during national election campaigns. We consider which actors talk about the EU, specifically which parties and which actors within parties, as well as how these actors talk about the EU, specifically the types of EU issues addressed as well as their framing. We argue that issue‐based strategies and government participation may provide important reasons why parties only mobilize selectively on EU issues. We test our expectations using data from party press releases in Austrian general election campaigns in 2008 and 2013. We find that selective mobilization is most prevalent in terms of content, thus in how parties talk about the EU. This article provides new evidence on the extent of party political contestation over EU issues and shows how strategic incentives limit the ways in which they are incorporated into national politics.

Abstract
Politicians are exposed to a constant flow of information about societal problems. However, they have limited resources and need to prioritize. So, which information should they pay attention to? Previous research identifies four types of information that may matter: public concern about a problem, problem attention by rival parties, news stories about problems, and statistical problem indicators. We are the first to contrast the four types of information through a field experiment with more than 6,000 candidates and multiple elite interviews in Denmark. The candidates received an email invitation to access a specially tailored report that randomly highlighted one of the four types of information. Statistical indicators and public opinion were accessed the most (26.9 per cent and 26.5 per cent of candidates in the two conditions). Our results provide new and important evidence about the types of information politicians consider when addressing societal problems.

AbstractSince the heyday of Jacques Delors, the Commission has been challenged by the rise of the European Council, the empowerment of the European Parliament and the creation of European agencies. However, while many scholars agree about the direction of change, there is disagreement about the extent to which the Commission's position has declined. A number of studies are sceptical, and we join this sceptical line. Our contribution is to focus on the Commission's role as a maker of both legislative and executive rules (implementing and delegated acts). These rules are all decided under complex inter‐institutional procedures. But the Commission possesses the right of initiative in all procedures. We investigate how the Commission can use this first‐mover advantage to influence EU policy. We establish a framework for understanding what strategic options the first‐mover advantage entails and provide a first empirical illustration with a qualitative analysis of ten selected Commission proposals.