Suchergebnisse

This study examines Russia's policies towards and within the Councilof the Baltic Sea States in the aftermath of the Ukrainian and other internationalcrises. More specifically, this paper analyses Russia's interest in andexpectations from the CBSS, as well as Moscow's institutional behaviour in theCouncil. The CBSS is viewed by Russia as both a centrepiece and cornerstoneof the regional governance system. Moscow also sees the CBSS as an importanttool for overcoming the politico-diplomatic isolation where Russia founditself with the start of the Ukrainian crisis. With the help of the CBSS, it retainsits ability to influence socioeconomic, political, environmental, and humanitariandevelopments in the Baltic Sea region. Russia supported the Council'sthree long-term priority areas: a regional identity, a sustainable and prosperousregion, and a safe and secure region. Russia favoured further the Council'sinstitutionalization and strengthening of its role in the regional governancesystem. Despite the fact that Russia's relations with other CBSS member-statesremain tense and that Moscow does not always manage to use the Councilto promote its interests in the region, the CBSS is still seen by Russia as animportant platform for regional cooperation.

Der Beitrag untersucht die politischen Prioritäten Russlands für dessen Vorsitz im Arktischen Rat und die potenziellen Implikationen für die Region. Der Autor argumentiert, dass die Agenda Russlands für seinen Vorsitz wohl folgende Prioritäten beinhalten wird: Maßnahmen zum Klimaschutz; nachhaltige Entwicklung; sozialer Zusammenhalt und Konnektivität in der Region; die indigenen Völker; Erhaltung der Biodiversität; Wissenschaftsdiplomatie und eine institutionelle Teilreform des Rates. Moskau dürfte allerdings kaum seine früheren Versuche wiederholen, den Rat aus einem zwischenstaatlichen Forum in eine vollwertige internationale Organisation zu verwandeln und militärische Sicherheitsfragen auf die Agenda des Arktischen Rats zu setzen. Russlands Vorsitz wird wahrscheinlich die Rolle des Arktischen Rates stärken, um die regionale Verantwortung geltend zu machen, indem auf die Herausforderungen für die Arktis reagiert wird, die in einem rapiden Wandel begriffen ist.

This study discusses whether the concept of societal security is embedded in the Russian formal and informal discourses as well as in the Russian strategic documents on national security and the Baltic Sea region. Particularly, the paper describes four paradigms of international relations (neorealism, neoliberalism, globalism and postpositivism) and theoretical approaches to the concept of societal security formulated in them. On a practical plane, Russia has managed to develop - together with other regional players - a common regional approach to understanding societal security threats and challenges in the Baltic Sea region. These challenges include uneven regional development, social and gender inequalities, unemployment, poverty, manifestations of intolerance, religious and political extremism, separatism, large-scale migration, climate change, natural and man-made catastrophes, transnational organized crime and cybercrime, international terrorism, so-called hybrid threats, disharmony between education systems, etc. In 2017, Russia and other Baltic countries agreed that the Council of the Baltic Sea States would be the regional institution to implement a common societal security strategy exemplified by the Baltic 2030 Agenda Action Plan.

Der Beitrag untersucht die politischen Prioritäten Russlands für dessen Vorsitz im Arktischen Rat und die potenziellen Implikationen für die Region. Der Autor argumentiert, dass die Agenda Russlands für seinen Vorsitz wohl folgende Prioritäten beinhalten wird: Maßnahmen zum Klimaschutz; nachhaltige Entwicklung; sozialer Zusammenhalt und Konnektivität in der Region; die indigenen Völker; Erhaltung der Biodiversität; Wissenschaftsdiplomatie und eine institutionelle Teilreform des Rates. Moskau dürfte allerdings kaum seine früheren Versuche wiederholen, den Rat aus einem zwischenstaatlichen Forum in eine vollwertige internationale Organisation zu verwandeln und militärische Sicherheitsfragen auf die Agenda des Arktischen Rats zu setzen. Russlands Vorsitz wird wahrscheinlich die Rolle des Arktischen Rates stärken, um die regionale Verantwortung geltend zu machen, indem auf die Herausforderungen für die Arktis reagiert wird, die in einem rapiden Wandel begriffen ist.

This study aims to examine Russia's policy priorities for its chairmanship in the Arctic Council and the possible implications thereof for the region. The author argues that Russia's Arctic Council presidential agenda will likely include the following priorities: climate change action; sustainable development; social cohesiveness and connectivity in the region; indigenous peoples; conservation of biodiversity; science diplomacy; and partial institutional reform of the Council. Moscow will not, however, renew its earlier efforts to transform the Council from an intergovernmental forum into a full-fledged international organization and introduce military security issues to the Council's agenda. Russia's chairmanship will likely strengthen the Arctic Council's role in asserting regional stewardship by responding to the challenges of a rapidly changing Arctic.

This DIIS Report identifies Russian national interests in the BSR (Baltic Sea Region) and discusses whether there are continuities and changes in these interests in the post-Crimea era. The Russian discourse on the BSR is explored, including Russian foreign policy schools and official foreign policy and national security doctrines. Different aspects of Moscow's BSR strategy - political, economic, sub-regional, environmental and military - are examined. The chances for Russia's participation in the BSR multilateral cooperative framework are assessed.

This article examines policies of Moscow and Brussels in the Baltics since the launch of the European Union's Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region in June 2009. An increase in the efficiency of Russia's policy in the region requires not only the development of bilateral relations with the region's countries but also a dialogue with the European Union, the key player in the Baltic. The author identifies Russian economic, military, political, and humanitarian interests in the region, and describes the structure, content, and main areas of the implementation of the EU Baltic strategy in 2009—2013. The article examines the evolution of the Strategy, which initially ignored Russian national interests in the region, yet eventually resulted in cooperative efforts in the areas of common interest such as energy, transport infrastructure, environment, research, education and culture. The results of the Russian presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (2012—2013) are evaluated. It is noted that, despite an appealing presidency strategy and certain achievements in its implementation, Russia was unable to draw up a regional agenda and use the CBSS as an efficient platform for harmonizing its Baltic strategy with that of the EU. The causes of the current deadlock in EU — Russian relations regarding the Baltic are analyzed. The author formulates policy recommendations on fostering Russian-European cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. These recommendations range from the suggestion of joint revisions of mutual conceptual perceptions and strategic goals pursued by the EU and Russia in the Baltic Sea region to more practical measures in the institutional, administrative, and financial fields.