Suchergebnisse

1. Os Mocambicanos antes da penetracao estrangeira. - 105 S. : Lit. S. 87-103, Lit.Hinw. S. 73-86. - (... ; 1).; 2. Dos mercadores estrangeiros a ocupacao militar-imperialista. - 107 S. : Lit. S. 89-107, Lit.Hinw. S. 71-88. - (... ; 2)

This article seeks to understand why the Mexican economy ended in three of the last presidential periods with an overvalued exchange rate, high deficits of the current account, unsustainable short term debt, and a financial crisis. The article focuses on the Salinas administration, but shows that a similar logic led to economic crisis in the Echeverria (1970-76) and Lopez Portillo (1976-82) administrations. It is argued that the 1994 crisis is the result of three traps: an international context which allowed a massive entrance of capital flows, the ideology of the state elite, and the incentives provided by the institutional framework. These three traps were also present in the previous two crises. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)

Preface -- Overview -- Acknowledgments -- About the author -- Benefits realization management and the creation of strategic value to the business -- Introduction -- Strategy execution : translating corporate strategy into program and project strategy -- Project success and creation of value to the business -- Enterprise benefits realization management (ebrm) -- Establishing the environment for benefit realization -- Planning benefits -- Realizing benefits -- Reviewing and evaluating benefits -- Appendices -- References -- Index

Desde antes de la alternancia del año 2000, se planteaba la necesidad de un gran acuerdo para la gobernabilidad democrática en México. La incapacidad de los gobiernos panistas, durante doce años, para llevar a término su agenda reformadora hizo creer a muchos que se necesitaba una reforma institucional que fortaleciera al Presidente. En este sentido, el Pacto por México fue una sorpresa, ya que innovó los mecanismos de acuerdo político que posibilitaron la aprobación de siete reformas constitucionales, que en los dos gobiernos emanados del PAN habían enfrentado una rígida oposición, incluida la del PRI, que ahora encabezaba el gobierno. Este artículo analiza la negociación del Pacto y la naturaleza de las reformas aprobadas. Se encuentra que el Pacto fue resultado de un cierto acuerdo entre la mayoría de la élite política sobre qué reformas requería el país y una estrategia de los dos partidos de oposición para logar imponer una parte de su agenda en la negociación de esas reformas. También se muestra cómo hubo una suerte de corrupción "legalizada", como pagos a legisladores, para mantener la disciplina partidista, que permitió aprobar las reformas en muy poco tiempo. Finalmente, se concluye que, a pesar del optimismo reformador con el que inició el gobierno de Peña Nieto, las reformas no han logrado promover el crecimiento económico esperado, tanto por la caída en el precio del crudo, como porque su implementación ha estado en manos de una administración poco experimentada y con problemas de corrupción.

This article explores how tax revenue can be increased in Mexico, especially through more collection in higher-income sectors. An overview of the Mexican government's capacity to collect taxes is offered before analyzing the reasons why tax revenue has not increased in over more than two decades. A sketch of strategies that the recent Pena Nieto administration could have followed in order to increase tax revenue in a progressive fashion is also provided. One of the article's main arguments is that without more efficient public spending, it will be difficult to collect more taxes permanently, especially in such an open economy, with institutions that are as weak as those in Mexico. Furthermore, in a democracy, there is little public acceptance for more taxes, no matter how progressive they may be, unless the government can provide certainty about more efficient public spending. For these reasons, unless the quality and progressiveness of public spending and tax collection advances, it is even undesirable that the government increase its tax revenue. Adapted from the source document.

This article analyses the industry of the writ of amparo in tax issues in Mexico. This is a successful and flourishing industry that has grown following a "pro rights" interpretation of article 31 of the Constitution. This interpretation enables the tax payer to dispute the constitutionality of tax laws in the courts. This has lead to a legal protection for the tax payer that does not exist with the same amplitude in the other countries members of the OECD and probably in any other country in the world. The writ of amparo in tax issues and the industry that has grown thanks to it not only erodes the capacity of the government to raise resources, but also undermines the legitimacy of taxes because winners of an amparo end paying less taxes than similar taxpayer that did not get an amparo. The article analyses what explains the growth of this industry, how significant it is, with what implications, and how this problem can be addressed. Adapted from the source document.

ABSTRACT In all developing countries facing economic reform there are political and economic obstacles to such a radical change. In the case of Mexico, however, during the Salinas administration (1988-94), a new economic crisis exploded after serious changes had taken place and the economy seemed to have stabilized and was prepared for continuous growth under a new development strategy. By the end of the six-year presidential period, the old cycle of boom and bust returned. This article seeks to understand why the Mexican economy has ended in two of the last three presidential periods with an overvalued exchange rate, high deficits of the current account, unsustainable short-term debt, and a financial crisis. The article focuses on the Salinas administration, but shows that a similar logic led to economic crisis in the Echeverría (1970-76) and López Portillo (1976-82) administrations. It is argued that the 1994 crisis is the result of three traps: an international context which allowed a massive entrance of capital flows, the ideology of the state elite, and the incentives provided by the institutional framework. These three traps were also present in the previous two crises.