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Referendums and Democratic Government is the most systematic analysis of the referendum so far. The referendum phenomenon is approached from different perspectives: social choice theory, theories of democracy, a comparative study on 22 democracies, and in-depth case studies of Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland. The referendum is not a unitary phenomenon but it serves various functions and different normative goals in the political systems studied. This variation may largely be explained by the differences in the initiating and agenda-setting procedures

This article argues that the representation of future generations is likely to remain inadequate because of the lack of accountability mechanisms characteristic of representative relations among contemporaries. Two problems pertaining to the representation of future generations and their interests are distinguished, namely misrepresentation and negligence. Misrepresentation refers to ill-informed, biased, and purposive interpretations regarding the interests of future generations, whereas negligence involves future interests not being properly considered in policymaking. While these two problems are often intertwined, misrepresentation is a problem of epistemic and normative judgments, whereas negligence is a motivational problem. The interests of future generations are especially likely to be neglected in cases of so-called intergenerational conflict, that is, situations of welfare tradeoffs between present and future generations. Inclusive democratic deliberation is a remedy for misrepresentation, but its capacity to address negligence may be more limited. Finally, the article remarks on the role of future-regarding deliberation in representative democratic systems.

The normative point of departure in this article is that mini-publics can "complement" representative democracy only if they enhance inclusive processes of mutual justification among elected representatives who are responsible for public decisions. This article distinguishes three different roles of mini-publics in representative decision-making. Mini-publics can be 1) advisory when they provide input for collective will-formation in the representative arena, 2) collaborative when they involve elected representatives in the deliberative process, 3) scrutinizing when they check representative decision-making. The article analyzes strengths and weaknesses of these roles of mini-publics. Advisory mini-publics are particularly vulnerable to "cherry-picking." While collaborative uses of mini-publics may facilitate inclusive reason-giving among elected representatives, they entail risks of representative dominance. Scrutinizing use of mini-publics seem particularly promising from the normative perspective, but it requires a well-defined institutional framework. The article concludes that while there are ways to avoid problems emerging in these different roles, political context is crucial in terms of the deliberative impact of mini-publics.

AbstractDespite some prominent critics, deliberative democrats tend to be optimistic about the potential of deliberative mini‐publics. However, the problem with current practices is that mini‐publics are typically used by officials on an ad hoc basis and that their policy impacts remain vague. Mini‐publics seem especially hard to integrate into representative decision making. There are a number of reasons for this, especially prevailing ideas of representation and accountability as well as the contestatory character of representative politics. This article argues that deliberative mini‐publics should be regarded as one possible way of improving the epistemic quality of representative decision making and explores different institutional designs through which deliberative mini‐publics could be better integrated into representative institutions. The article considers arrangements which institutionalise the use of mini‐publics; involve representatives in deliberations; motivate public interactions between mini‐publics and representatives; and provide opportunities to ex post scrutiny or suspensive veto powers for mini‐publics. The article analyses prospects and problems of these measures, and considers their applicability in different contexts of representative politics.

The aim of this article is to analyze the explanations for the increased number of referendums in Western European states. Bogdanor has explained this by the unfreezing of political alignments and institutions. After classifying referendums in 18 Western European states, it will be observed that especially the number of referendums introduced by citizens has increased wherever they are constitutionally provided, that is, in Italy and in Switzerland. Referendums in these two countries contribute most of the overall increase in the number of referendums in Western Europe. Moreover, the number of referendums concerning European integration have increased, also in states that do not have the referendum as an integral part of their political system. When it comes to the unfreezing of institutions, it must be pointed out that after the 1970s there have been no constitutional reforms which would have significantly increased the use of referendums.