The article analyses and evaluates the use of deliberative mini-publics in the context of representative democracy. Based on an overview of the use of referendums and mini-publics, it is argued that the use of mini-publics has often been comparable with the use of ad hoc referendums. Some recommendations are made on how deliberative mini-publics should be used in representative democracies. In addition to the theory of deliberative democracy, the experience of the use of referendums helps to envision new, alternative ways of organising mini-publics. Adapted from the source document.
Abstract. Supporters of representative democracy tend to be critical of referendums. They argue that referendums give citizens more responsibility for political decisions than they have either the capacity or the competence to take. Moreover, they argue that referendums may undermine representatives' accountability. In this article, these arguments about responsibility and accountability are analyzed in the light of normative theories of democracy, especially the theory of deliberative democracy. Furthermore, different institutional forms of referendum are analyzed. Particular attention is paid to the following aspects: the extent to which governments control the use of referendums, how referendums interact with parliamentary decision making, and whether referendums are advisory or binding. It is argued that sometimes governments indeed use their control over referendums to avoid taking stands on difficult issues. More importantly, however, current forms of government-initiated referendums tend to weaken the accountability of the representatives, at least when interpreted in terms of liberal and deliberative democracy, and to distort parliamentary deliberations. Since delegation is a necessity in modern democracies, referendums should not undermine the mechanisms of representative democracy. In addition to the issues of citizens' capacity and competence, this viewpoint should be taken into account when designing referendum institutions. Tables, 3, References. Adapted from the source document.
Despite much political and academic debate on referendums and initiatives, they are still exceptional events in the national-level politics of most western European democracies. The numbers of government-initiated referendums have remained relatively steady since the 1940s. More than half of government-initiated referendums held since the 1970s have concerned issues related to European integration. However, the numbers of decision-controlling referendums have increased sharply, mostly due to Italian abrogative referendums. Overall, it seems that governmental parties are reluctant to adopt forms of referendums which are beyond their control, that is, decision-controlling and especially citizen-initiated referendums. Adapted from the source document.
This article studies how citizens' evaluations of the political system and its actors affect their propensity to vote. Based on the earlier theoretical and empirical research, we analyse the concepts of political trust and satisfaction that are often used in survey research. We argue that political trust has to do with the normative expectations towards political institutions and actors, whereas satisfaction may be regarded as an indicator of attitudes to policy outputs. Furthermore, we differentiate between attitudes to democratic system on the one hand and political actors on the other hand, because in representative democracies it should be possible to replace incumbent politicians at elections. We hypothesize that trust in parliament and satisfaction with democracy increase turnout, whereas trust in politicians has a smaller impact on turnout, and satisfaction with the incumbent government does not affect turnout at all. The empirical evidence is based on the first round of the European Social Survey, which was collected simultaneously in 22 countries in 2002-2003. Our analysis confirms that trust in parliament has a positive impact on turnout, and also satisfaction with democracy increases it. These effects are especially high when aggregated at a country level and when hard data on turnout are used. At the individual level, in particular trust in parliament increases the likelihood of voting. Adapted from the source document.
