Suchergebnisse

We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation which forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 16 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment and sales.

Abstract
Using data on bank-firm relationships in Italy during the Eurozone financial crisis, we show that: (i) compared to healthy banks, under-capitalised banks cut credit to healthy but not to zombie firms and are more likely to prolong a credit relationship with a zombie; (ii) in area sectors with more low-capital banks, zombies are more likely to survive; (iii) bank under-capitalisation does not hurt the growth rate of healthy firms. We provide evidence that extending credit to the weakest firms during the recession mitigated the disruption of supply chains and adverse local demand externalities.