Suchergebnisse

In 2004 the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF published a report on this institution's interventions in Argentina between 1991 & 2001. This document provides all the elements for a sociological analysis of an institutional failure. Three main relationships proved dysfunctional: the realist interaction between the Fund & the Argentine authorities, the hierarchical link between management & staff, & the principal/ agent relation with the G7 governments, whose representatives within the Fund should have made sure that operating rules were respected. Adapted from the source document.

Although Argentina's monetary crisis, which reached its climax in the early half of 2002, was clearly coming, no effort was made to prevent it. This failure to avoid something so obvious is attributed to certain of Argentina's old & established structural constraints & a set of institutional game rules set up to help stabilize the monetary environment, known as the Currency Board. The Currency Board was extremely rigid, & because of this, was believed to be strong enough to compensate for the weaknesses of all other public institutions. However, its reliance on the dollar & policy of sending out national money automatically in response to growth in the monetary reserves of the Central Bank, as well as a monetary policy based entirely on American interest rates, contributed to the collapse of Argentine banks. The various steps in Argentina's financial collapse as well as efforts made to restabilize it are outlined. 11 References. D. Weibel

The recent conflict between the EU & the US on the former's veto to the General Electric/Honeywell merger has often been overstated. Neither the procedural nor the doctrinal differences between the two largely self-governed agencies that decide on such affairs seems to be a recurrent source of conflict. As a rule, cooperation is fairly smooth for two main reasons: their decisions do not have a direct impact on economic policy & they do not require a cumbersome legislative process whereby international norms would have to be written into national laws. This does not imply that a fully self-governed body of international norms & rules may be derived from such regulatory activity. Both at the national & international level, it relies on the political legitimacy as well as the authority of states. The main constraints on cooperation are twofold: a strong degree of de facto agreement on the issue at stake & a constant defense of the regulator's political independence. 12 References. Adapted from the source document.

On présente les principaux caractères de la transition en Bulgarie depuis 1991, en soulignant la formation de deux larges "pyramides financières" qui ont conduit à la crise de 1996-1997. Une première phase, de janvier à septembre 1996, a été dominée par une crise bancaire ouverte ; puis, une crise des finances publiques a suivi, due au gonflement des paiements d'intérêts, à la chute de la valeur réelle des prélèvements fiscaux et à l'anticipation d'un défaut prochain sur la dette extérieure. Ceci a débouché sur une phase de type hyperinflationniste, en janvier et février 1997, suivie d'une stabilisation rapide. On analyse ces différentes périodes, y compris sous l'angle de l'économie politique, et on présente un bilan du régime de Currency Board établi le 1er juillet 1997. Enfin, on souligne le rôle des effets quantitatifs et anticipatifs, qui donne à cet épisode un caractère nettement monétariste, en opposition avec les inflations de type inertiel, marquées par les mécanismes individuels et collectifs d'indexation ou de re-coordination. En ce sens, cet épisode reflète le cadre institutionnel et social faible, caractéristique des transitions indisciplinées observées dans les Balkans et en CEI.

AbstractPolitical and economic rights are envisaged as the outcome of an ongoing bargain between citizens and their rulers. Over the long run, this constitutive process shapes the development of both the economy and the state. Globalization, however, corresponds to a period where both the market and civil society extend far beyond the borders of the initial political compact. Hence, citizens may not only ask that cross-border transactions be made easier; they may also challenge the institutional cohesion and integrity of the classical, Westphalian state, i.e., its legal and judicial order, and its bureaucratic capabilities. We are proposing a schematic description of how this political process may gradually exit the national perimeter and deliver four possible models of international or global governance, depending upon the potential structuring of coalitions between the potential winners of the globalization both in the elite and in society, and the losers; national games being ultimately arbitrated by the international competition among elites, but also by the possible formation of global coalitions of citizens and merchants.